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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis begins by examining the concepts of civil society and social capital. Specifically, 
it outlines the role of health and education third sector organisations (TSOs) in building civil 
society and generating social capital which is conducive to democratisation. Following this, 
the thesis presents literature on civil society development in the context of the Russian 
Federation, highlighting a void in our understanding of health and education TSOs in this 
context. The literature review examines cultural-historic antecedents and their impact on civil 
society development. These antecedents result in three constraints which limit TSOs ability to 
establish civil society as an autonomous space. In light of these constraints, the thesis explores 
the present day realities faced by Russian TSOs and proposes that the all-dominant nature of 
the Russian state leads to managed civil society arrangements. Consequently the thesis 
addresses the question of how a managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the 
Russian Federation. Using a qualitative research design, the thesis investigates the control 
mechanisms created by legislative framework, the ability of third sector organisations to 
substitute for the state, and the organisational characteristics of TSOs within a managed civil 
society space. Based on interview data from 82 TSOs across three geographical regions, the 
empirical chapters explore these three aspects in-depth. Firstly, the thesis demonstrates how a 
specific legislative framework is used as a legally mandated method to manage civil society. 
Secondly, the thesis explores more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. And 
thirdly, the thesis highlights ways in which the state controls TSOs and coerces them to mimic 
marionette organisations. Overall, the evidence presented throughout the thesis highlights the 
idiosyncratic nature of managed civil society arrangements in Russia in which the state is able 
to control and direct civil society. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to thesis 
This thesis investigates civil society arrangements in the Russian Federation. It puts forward 
the argument that in the context of the Russian Federation, civil society arrangements are 
managed by the state. The thesis delineates theoretically and empirically the contextual 
factors and particular state-society relations of such civil society arrangements. To facilitate 
this discussion, the thesis draws upon the theoretical constructs of civil society. Following 
Neace (1999, p. 150), civil society is defined as “the social space between the individual 
family and the state”, which is constituted of “autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary 
organisations” or third sector organisations (TSOs). Furthermore, the thesis operationalises 
the construct of social capital. Social capital is defined as “features of social organisation such 
as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). The thesis discusses these concepts in turn, according to their 
specific relevance to the research question of how emergent managed civil society 
arrangements manifest themselves in Russia. In this discussion, and throughout this thesis, the 
principal understandings and assumptions of conventional autonomous state-society relations, 
which is the mediating role of civil society and the universal applicability of the civil society-
democracy trajectory, are challenged. This thesis illustrates the limitations of these 
understandings by demonstrating, characterising and illustrating the facets of managed civil 
society arrangements in Russia. Consequently, the thesis addresses the research question 
about how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. In 
anwsering this question, the key contribution of this thesis is the propostion that in the context 
of the Russian Federation, civil society exists within a managed setting which does not 
correspond to traditional models of civil society. In so doing, this thesis illustrates the 
mechanisms put in place by the state to manage civil society, as well as outlining the 
limitations of the state to mould civil society in this specific way.  
11 
 
1.1.1 Background 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a process of rapid 
democratisation and economic transformation. In order to achieve this transition from a 
planned economy and a communist regime, to a modern society embracing a market economy 
and a liberal democratic regime, civil society and its development are ascribed with a pivotal 
role (Diamond, 1994). Furthermore, given that Russia is an industrialised country, a member 
of the G8, as well as a country in possession of nuclear weapons, an understanding of 
Russia‟s governance structures (i.e. the role of the state and society in shaping such 
structures), of which civil society forms a part, is particularly important. In order to 
demonstrate the successful completion of the transition process, Russia now aims to portray 
itself, at least notionally, as a democratic country (Shlapentokh, 2009). Consequently, the 
existence of the impression of an autonomous third sector that subjects the government to 
scrutiny and holds the state accountable is important. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the importance attributed to civil society, the assessment of its 
contribution to the democratisation process in Russia in the past, as well as within 
contemporary considerations, remains predominantly downbeat (Crotty, 2009). Traditionally 
civil society constitutes the lynchpin for democratisation, and thus the development of 
societies with functioning institutional environments and governance structures, which 
facilitate the creation of wealth and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 
2000). In order for such a development to take place and institutionalise democratic 
governance, state-society relations are critical. Autonomous organisations or Third Sector 
Organisations (Neace, 1999) known as TSOs play an important role in shaping these 
relations. TSOs are characterised as doing “things business and government are either not 
doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough”, (Levitt, 1973, p. 49) and therefore provide 
a valuable lens to examine wider state-society relations.  
12 
 
In the context of the Russian Federation, state-society relations and civil society arrangements 
have taken a somewhat different form in the past. As is argued throughout this thesis, 
characteristics that develop in the Soviet period remain intact, and post ante shape the 
development of civil society arrangements. Since the ascendance of the Putin/Medvedev 
administration to power, Russia has witnessed the strengthening of the state and the re-
emergence of a strong executive power (vertikal’ vlasti) (Hale, 2010; Mommen, 2001). This 
represents a shift away from the democratisation process set in motion during the 1990s, 
towards establishing a more illiberal regime (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005) which has been 
characterised as a sovereign or managed democracy (Balzer, 2003; Schröder, 2005). The 
strengthening of the state has entailed some advantages, specifically with regard to economic 
development (Hanson, 2002). However, the state‟s leverage of this new powerbase into 
politics, the economy and the space of civil society has also been argued to be “detrimental to 
the process of democratisation” (Konitzer & Wegren, 2006, p. 517). This strong Federal state 
draws on past paternalistic traditions, which are evidently less conducive to individual rights 
of a liberal tradition, not only to direct the political landscape but also to manage civil society. 
In turn, the ability of civil society space to emerge as an institution of democracy and 
facilitate continuing democratisation is likely to be limited. It is doubtful that within such a 
regime where the state manages democracy (Balzer, 2003; Schröder, 2005), and in which 
some democratic institutions exist to cover an authoritarian regime (Hale, 2010), that an 
autonomous civil society space is likely to develop.  
 
These recent developments reflect the “resurrection of the traditional Russian state” (Hedlund, 
2006, p. 775) with its claim to be the all-dominant actor resulting in paternalistic state-society 
relations. The subsequent weakness of the rule of law and lack of democratic accountability 
of the state even as they are in theory contradictory to the development of a democratic 
society, yet they are necessary for the Russian state to ensure the continuous functioning of its 
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(managed democratic) regime (Hedlund, 2006). This in turn influences the nature of civil 
society arrangements that can evolve and, as argued throughout this thesis, means that such 
arrangements rather than being autonomous are managed by the state. Therefore, civil society 
is unable to form a bridge between the state and society by holding the state accountable, a 
pivotal function civil society assumes in traditional arrangements (Taylor, 2006). Hedlund 
(2006) argues that recent political developments and a strengthening of the state continue the 
tradition of Russian politics in which the state is very important for society. Consequently, it 
enables the Putin/Medvedev administration to develop “a system in which market economy 
[co-exists with] state control, authoritarian rule with democratic election” (Sevcova, 2006, p. 
6). The emergent and managed nature of civil society arrangements discussed in this thesis is 
a reflection of such developments, and an illustration of the ongoing penetration of this logic 
into all societal structures. Hence, applying this understanding of civil society to the activities 
of TSOs in Russia, such managed arrangements would imply that TSOs do exist, but do not 
create, build, or institutionalise civil society as an autonomous space.  
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society development in the context of the Russian 
Federation has received increasing attention within the academic literature. However, such 
studies have predominantly focused on the environmental movement (Crotty, 2003; 2006; 
2009; Henry, 2002; 2006), the women‟s rights movement (Richter, 2002; Sperling, 1999), 
trade unions (Baglione & Clark, 1998; Kubicek, 2002), or human rights organisations 
(Mendelson & Gerber, 2007; Sundstrom 2005). Hence the existing collective literature lacks a 
clear and in-depth assessment of Russian TSOs, their activities and contribution to civil 
society development, particularly those advocating and engaging in health/welfare and 
education (Salmenniemi, 2008). As stated above, the period since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the Russian Federation has been characterized by rapid democratization and the 
implementation of neo-liberal oriented welfare reforms. In turn this has meant that the state 
„retreated‟ from arenas that have traditionally been within its purview (Sil & Chen, 2004). As 
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neo-liberal reforms took hold, the health and education sector in particular faced this 
retreating state. Hence TSOs which are active in these areas have been forced to take up the 
gap left behind by the state. Specifically for health and education organisations this has 
included addressing both past social problems such as the societal integration of the disabled 
as well as newly emerging problems such as HIV/AIDS (Hoppenbrouwer, Sergeyev, & 
Nitzsche-Bell, 2005). In addition to this and similar to other agents of civil society, health and 
education TSOs are faced with the attempts by the state to control and manage agents of civil 
society and thus challenge their independence. Therefore, as well as to building civil society 
like most agents of civil society, health and educational TSOs also have to deal with a broader 
variety of challenges, which means that investigating them is important. In addition, such 
TSOs constitute the bulk of organisations which make up civil society (Salmenniemi, 2008) 
and thus provide a more representative picture of TSOs in Russian Federation. Hence by 
focusing on health and educational TSOs rather than the environmental movement, trade 
unions or other non-governmental organisations, this thesis extends the academic inquiry and 
provides an important additional perspective to the functioning and development of Russian 
civil society. 
 
Contrary to the assessment that Russian civil society resembles a statist/corporatist model 
(Domrin, 2003; Hale, 2002; Hudson, 2003), this thesis illustrates that contemporary Russian 
civil society embeds within itself aspects of both statist and liberal facets of civil society 
arrangements (see chapters 3 and 8). Therefore, the thesis highlights that the state is unable to 
re-establish the much more restrictive societal arrangements of the Soviet period. 
Nevertheless, managed civil society arrangements are unlikely to nurture the norms of 
democracy, hold the state accountable, and pluralise participation in decision making, as 
assumed in traditional civil society thinking (see Chapter 2). It seems that civil society is 
turning into a mechanism of Russia‟s political machine. At the same time, this seems to 
reflect the most appropriate arrangements given Russia‟s current political environment. 
15 
Therefore, this thesis challenges the assumptions of democratisation literature and its romance 
with civil society, in which civil society becomes a panacea for democratisation. Thus, the 
thesis argues that managed arrangements do not encourage democratisation but instead reflect 
the ability of the state to „manage‟ state-society relations. It is set against such considerations 
that this thesis proposes and examines the emergence of managed civil society arrangements 
and asks the question of how such arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation? 
 
1.1.2 Aims of thesis 
In addressing the research question, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the emergent 
managed civil society arrangements in Russia. To achieve this aim the thesis explores three 
research objectives, which will be illustrated in turn. Firstly, given the lack of available 
literature and evidence-based assessments, the thesis examines the impact of recent legislative 
changes as providing the legal basis for such specific civil society arrangements. The aim here 
is to understand the incentive system created by the legislative environment, specifically the 
2006 NGO law, and how this influences the activities of TSOs, their ability to remain 
independent, the impact on the way they organise themselves, and how they assess the impact 
of this framework on shaping civil society development. Furthermore, the limits of this 
legislation to further the establishment of managed civil society arrangements are explored. 
Consequently, this outlines objective one of this thesis; 
 
Objective 1: To investigate the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day 
workings of TSOs in Russia and establish the limits of this law on furthering the 
Russian state‟s agenda vis-à-vis a managed or controlled civil society and/or third 
sector. 
 
Secondly, the thesis aims to explore the implications of TSOs becoming providers of public 
and semi-public goods (i.e. service providers) in the context of the continuous withdrawal of 
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the state from service provision (Sil & Chen, 2004). Whereas Russian third sector 
organisations have been researched in the past (by, amongst many, Crotty, 2003, 2006, 2009; 
Henry, 2006), organisations at the forefront of service provision, particularly in the area of 
health and education, have received little attention (Salmenniemi, 2008). Therefore, with the 
focus here on health and education organisations, this thesis not only serves to extend our 
existent understanding about the agents making up the Russian civil society space, but also 
illustrates the role they assume in mitigating a retreating state. The objective is to assess to 
what extent TSOs see themselves as substituting (i.e. cooperating in equal partnerships) or 
complementing (i.e. cooperating in vertical partnerships) the Russian state. This will provide 
an insight into the relationship between TSOs and the state on a micro level (i.e. local and 
regional), and the impact on their ability to contribute to the creation of an autonomous civil 
society space. Therefore, the second objective of this thesis is as follows; 
 
Objective 2: To establish the impact of Russia‟s retreat away from state service 
provision in the health and education sectors on TSOs working in these areas, and 
assess how TSOs now act as state substitutes. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis aims to establish the sort of organisations that will be considered 
„legitimate‟ in managed civil society arrangements. The objective is to determine the nature 
and type of such organisations, and what role they are playing in consolidating managed civil 
society arrangements and thus the managed democratic regime. In so doing, characteristics of 
managed arrangements are illustrated. Furthermore, in exploring such organisations, the limits 
of the state‟s pursuit to establish managed civil society arrangements will potentially be 
highlighted. Hence, objective three of this thesis is; 
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Objective 3: To investigate the characteristics of a state managed civil society and to 
establish the limits of the Russian state‟s ability to control or mould civil society in 
this way. 
 
These three research objectives allow this thesis to illustrate different facets of managed civil 
society arrangements. In addressing these objectives, the thesis will not only contribute to our 
understanding of how practices of civil activity evolve in an era of increasing state control 
and the effects these have on democratisation in Russia, but also what the wider implications 
are for „traditional‟ civil society theory. It is the assessment of traditional civil society theory 
and cultural-historic antecedents to Russian civil society development that inform the 
proposed managed style civil society arrangements (see Chapters 2 and 3). The empirical 
evidence illustrates facets of such emerging arrangements, and is indicative of their 
institutionalisation as the overarching logic for civil society arrangements in the context of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters. As illustrated in this chapter, the focus of the 
thesis is on exploring the emerging managed civil society arrangements. Having provided a 
background to such considerations, chapter two delineates the conceptual frameworks 
informing this thesis. Chapter two discusses the theoretical concepts operationalised in this 
thesis, namely civil society and social capital. The chapter builds on the theoretical-historic 
origins of civil society theory to illustrate the traditional model of civil society, often referred 
to as the western model, and presents what can be considered pro-typical civil society agents 
in the form of third sector organisations. It discusses the role of TSOs in building civil 
society. The concept of social capital is also outlined, focusing on its relevance to civil society 
and its importance vis-à-vis facilitating associational life, which is at the heart of traditional 
civil society arrangements. Further, the interdependence of civil society with democracy and 
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democratisation is presented. The challenging of this civil society-democracy orthodoxy is a 
pivotal contribution of this thesis. In concluding, the chapter highlights contemporary debates 
in the extended literature in order to draw out the relevance of operationalising the traditional 
concept of civil society for the study of a non-traditional context such as Russia.  
 
Chapter three builds on the insights of chapter two, and explores the cultural-historic 
antecedence as well as present day realities of Russian civil society. These considerations 
firmly establish the emergence of managed civil society arrangements. The chapter assesses 
the legacies of Soviet period state-society relations, highlighting the peculiar institutionalised 
civil society arrangements that existed. The chapter also identifies that issues of trust have 
created an hourglass society (Rose, 1995), which reflects a detachment of the state from 
society. The discussion of post-Soviet civil society development of the 1990s illustrates the 
constraints resulting from such arrangements. Specific cultural and societal norms, which are 
rooted in the Soviet period, continue to shape civil society arrangements by leading to a 
fragmentation of civic activism, a lack of public support and participation, and a lack of 
resources. Contemporary civil society arrangements are also considered with a particular 
focus on contextual issues that influence civil society development, such as changes in the 
economic, political, and legal environment. Chapter three clearly illustrates how these, in 
combination with Soviet period legacies, are indicative of a shift in civil society 
arrangements. Reflecting managed democracy and a corporatist economy, these are indicative 
of emerging managed civil society arrangements. The consideration of the specific literature 
on Russian civil society also indicates that such arrangements are likely to be based on strong 
and dependent relations between TSOs and the state.  
 
Chapter four provides a detailed description of the research methodology adopted to explore 
managed civil society arrangements. In line with best practice in areas where no or little 
literature exists about a particular phenomenon, this thesis adopts a qualitative research 
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design. Firstly, chapter four highlights the philosophical paradigm which guided the research 
of this thesis. In discussing the research design in more detail, chapter four provides a 
description of the selection criteria used to identify and select participating TSOs. The chapter 
also offers a description of the cases which formed the basis for analysis. An overview of the 
analytical techniques is then provided, illustrating the three themes which guided analysis. 
The quality and robustness of the study is discussed by assessing the study‟s research strategy 
against best practice recommendations. 
 
Chapter five presents the results of the first analytical theme examining managed civil society 
arrangements. The chapter explores the respondents‟ understanding of the NGO law, 
depicting how the effects of NGO law are perceived. The chapter also presents results 
concerning the pivotal issues of registration and reporting requirements outlined in chapter 
three. In so doing, the chapter highlights the existence of three distinct groups. Each of these 
groups, and the discourses respondents within construct to rationalise and use to portray the 
impacts of the NGO law, are discussed in turn. This section of the chapter illustrates that 
TSOs within this study either portray the law as improving organisational capabilities by 
forcing them to become more professional, or as constricting their activities by 
bureaucratising the way they operate. A minority of TSOs have not registered out of protest 
against the restrictive nature of the NGO law. In relation to managed civil society 
arrangements, these insights highlight the all-encompassing nature of the state and the 
creation of an incentive framework that enables the state to manage civil society 
arrangements.  
 
Chapter six goes on to present a second major facet of managed civil society arrangements in 
Russia. It illustrates that in line with the theoretical proposition put forward in chapter 3, 
TSOs in this study are increasingly focused on acting as service providers. The chapter 
explores how activists in this study perceive their activities as either being complementary to, 
20 
or substituting for the state. In so doing, the chapter presents insights about the way TSOs see 
state-civil society relations, reaffirming the all-encompassing nature of the Russian state. 
TSOs see themselves, rather than as a political force that can hold the state to account, as 
service providers that act according to the policies of the state. These considerations illustrate 
that in the context of the Russian Federation, an opting in of TSOs, rather than a contracting 
out of state service provision as within traditional welfare state, motivates service provision in 
Russia. The chapter develops this insight to explore issues of state-substitution or 
complementation. In so doing, the chapter examines what effect these developments have on 
the ability of TSOs to act in their traditional advocacy roles. Drawing on these results, the 
chapter concludes that TSOs equate advocacy with service provision and subordinate 
themselves to the Federal state.  
 
Chapter seven goes on to examine indicative insights illustrated in chapters five and six about 
the potential of specific organisations becoming the only „legitimate‟ civil society agents. The 
key focus of this chapter is the exploration of the role of marionette organisations in such 
managed arrangements. The chapter highlights that there is an increase in organisations with 
marionette-like characteristics. The chapter presents these marionette-like characteristics 
within each of the three regions. This leads to the argument that within the proposed managed 
civil society arrangements, the pro-typical understanding of marionette organisations needs to 
be extended because many TSOs within this study engage in mimicking marionette-like 
characteristics. In so doing, the chapter reports TSOs as aiming to establish the ties necessary 
to become marionette organisations, trading in their autonomy and independence. The chapter 
illustrates the institutionalisation of organisations with marionette-like characteristics as the 
main legitimate and only officially recognised (autonomous) agents of civil society. By 
outlining these aspects, the chapter highlights how such organisations are themselves 
facilitating the institutionalisation of such managed civil society arrangements. Therefore, 
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chapter seven concludes that such arrangements reflect an extension of Russia‟s managed 
democratic system to civil society. 
 
Finally, chapter eight provides a general discussion of the findings and conclusions of this 
thesis. The chapter revisits the core research question about how managed civil society 
arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation by discussing how the empirical 
findings of the thesis answer the research question by exploring the three research objectives 
outlined in chapters one and four. The chapter then provides a detailed discussion of the 
implications and theoretical contributions that this thesis makes to the literature on civil 
society and democratisation. Drawing upon the various debates and discourses on the key 
constructs outlined earlier in the thesis, chapter eight discusses how the insights of this thesis 
further extend and deepen our theoretical understanding of civil society, third sector 
organisations and social capital. Following this, the chapter discusses policy implications of 
the research. Before concluding, the chapter outlines limitations and caveats of the research 
design and potential future research avenues. The chapter then concludes with a brief 
summary of the thesis, reiterating the major findings and conclusions.  
 
Following the outline above, this thesis will first turn to a discussion of the major constructs 
guiding the analytical process, with chapter two outlining civil society, third sector 
organisations and social capital in turn.  
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CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, this thesis addresses the question of how managed civil 
society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. Chapter one details that to do 
so, the thesis operationalises the constructs of civil society, third sector organisations and 
social capital. The aim of this chapter is to discuss these constructs in turn by reviewing 
contemporary literature. This indicates that these constructs are assumed to be essential to the 
development of democracy.  
 
Discussions of modern societies, no matter where these debates begin, always arrive at 
evaluating civil society (Van Rooy, 1998). This is because civil society is considered the 
lynchpin of an effective institutional environment and political governance structures 
(Putnam, 2002). Civil society is attributed with ensuring the rule of law, transparency and 
accountability of authorities, and the protection of individual rights, which ensures 
development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Consequently, 
in discussing modern societies and specifically democracy, considerations of civil society 
play a pivotal part. This is particularly the case in the context of the Russian Federation, 
which following the end of the Soviet Union, began processes of economic and social 
transformation and democratisation. Therefore, examining and evaluating Russian civil 
society is important. The construct and concepts present in this chapter assist this thesis in this 
process.  
  
In order to delineate and discuss the theoretical frameworks of civil society, third sector 
organisations, and social capital, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 
provides a brief introduction and key definitions relevant for this study. This section also 
illustrates the importance of this study focusing on aspects of democracy. The second section 
of the chapter discusses civil society. Defining and understanding civil society is vital to 
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operationalising this construct. The chapter then moves on to examine civil society in more 
detail. In order to do so, civil society actors and their activities are discussed as they offer a 
lens into civil society arrangements. The fourth section of this chapter presents the concept of 
social capital. In so doing, this section focuses on the social capital embedded in civil society 
actors. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting contemporary debates in the literature and 
drawing out the relevance of these concepts to the research questions at hand. 
  
2.1 Introduction 
Civil society is the intermediary space between the individual and the state, where the state is 
defined as an “ensemble of insitutions and practises with powerful cultural consequences” 
(Salmenniemi, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, as Mercer states (2007, p. 7) in order to investigate civil 
society, the state and its interactions vis-à-vis civil society are important, because “the state 
and civil society [are] separate from, yet essential complements to, one another”. In the 
context of the Russian Federation, the power of the state and its territorial division is 
particularly important. Following Salmenniemi (2008), this thesis refers to state power on 
different levels, each of which has partiular practices, policies and thus effects on civil 
society. The aspects of state power are the Federal level of state power (central legislative and 
executive in Moscow), the regional level (Federal subjects), and municipal level (city and 
villages) (Salmenniemi, 2008). As has been highlighted in chapter one, the Russian Federal 
state has effectively penetrated the various other levels, enabling it to create a managed 
democratic environement (Balzer, 2003 Schröder, 2005). Taking into account the insight 
illustrated, investigating civil society offers a powerful lens to understand both Russia‟s future 
path of democratisation, as well as the shifts of wider state-society relations. The empirical 
findings and their theoretical contextualisation within this thesis assert that civil society in 
Russia is shaped by a strong Federal state. Specific aspects of civil society development in 
Russia will be discussed in chapter three.  
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Within the literature on democracy and democratisation, civil society has become a critical 
concept (Uhlin, 2006). Other strands of the literature, such as the management literature, in 
particular that on cross-sectoral partnerships, corporate social responsibility (Muthuri, Matten, 
& Moon, 2009) or the area of non-profit management, also contribute and draw extensively 
on civil society as a theoretical construct (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990). Thus, it is not 
surprising that there is an ample array of definitions of civil society (Jensen, 2006). Most of 
them understand civil society as an autonomous sphere of society that is neither the 
government nor business (Jensen, 2006). This thesis follows such understandings and adopts 
Neace‟s definition of civil society as “the social space between the individual family and the 
state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). As will be discussed below (see section 2.2) this definition 
captures the essence of what civil society is, namely an intermediary area between the private 
(individual) and the public (state) (Sukel, 1978). Understanding civil society as an 
intermediary space enables the thesis to establish agents, participant, activities, and the 
particular contribution it makes to contemporary societal arrangements.   
 
Civil society is “made up of autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary organisations” (Neace, 
1999, p. 150). Within the literature these organisations are also known as „third sector 
organisations‟ or TSOs, and are characterised as organisations which “do things business and 
government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 
49). By engaging in such activities, TSOs ensure that public participation in decision-making 
is pluralised (Mercer, 2002), and thus they contribute to democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). 
Following this train of thought, this thesis defines democracy as “a mode of decision making 
about collective binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control [and] where 
all members of the collective enjoy equal rights in such decision-making” (Uhlin, 2006, p. 
17).  
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Within the literature, the orthodox assumption is that civil society makes democracy function 
(Diamond, 1994). More specifically, civil society facilitates democracy in three ways (Taylor, 
2006). Firstly, individuals freely associated in TSOs, engage in collective activity, which 
transmits the norms and values of democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) such as 
civil behaviour (Shils, 2003). Civil society creates the space were individuals practice the 
norms and values of democracy, building generalised social trust and norms of reciprocity 
(Taylor, 2006). Civil society plays a critical role in shaping citizens and citizenship skills 
(Ossewaarde, 2006), transforming society from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Toennies, 
1955). Secondly, such engagement allows TSOs to act as a “counterweight to the state” 
(Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 39) holding and tempering the power of the state (Taylor, 2006). 
As an autonomous and intermediary sphere, civil society aggregates and represents interest 
(Fish, 1991), often that of minorities, and through that acts as a counterweight to the state. As 
a counterweight, civil society is able to hold the state accountable for its actions and thus 
ensure the state‟s civil and democratic behaviour. Thirdly, it allows TSOs to work together 
with the state to develop and consolidate democracy (Taylor, 2006). Civil society pluralises 
the democratic arena and participation in decision-making. Civil society ensures that no one 
societal actor is able to dominate policy-making (Oxhorn, 2001) and thus strengthens 
democracy. 
 
It is not surprising therefore, that in particular the democratisation literature often considers 
civil society as synonomous with democracy (Chandhoke, 2007; Diamond, 1994; Kaldor, 
2003; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Thus, civil society has the dual responsibility of 
democratising the state and its institutional environment, as well as democratising the 
individual and society (Uhlin, 2006). This is of particular importance in the context of the 
Russian Federation and the process of rapid democratisation that it has undergone.   
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“A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to 
monitor government and state, can help start transitions, help resist reversals, help 
push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy.” 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 18)  
 
Subsequently, civil society becomes both a path towards democracy as well as a roadblock to 
any reversal.  
 
Another critical aspect of the debate on civil society and democracy is often discussed in 
terms of TSOs building social capital (Putnam, 1995). This thesis adopts Putnam‟s definition 
of social capital, who defines it as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, 
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 
1995, p. 67). This definition dovetails with the above described function of civil society to 
foster norms and values of democratic governance (Fukuyama, 2001; Newton, 2001a; 
Newton, 2001b; Putnam, 1993; Welzel, Ingelhart, & Deutsch, 2005; Woolcock, 1998). Much 
of the importance of social capital is attributed to the associational life it fosters (de 
Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). Individuals get together on a voluntary basis, forming associations 
and networks for a variety of purposes, such as playing cards, bowling (Putnam, 1995) or 
saving the environment. Such civic activism or engagement is the basis of associational life, 
which manifests itself in TSOs. Social capital is critical for these intermediary organisations 
to enable them to bridge between the individual and the state (Portes, 1998). The ability to 
bridge across the gap between the individual and the state is pivotal for civil society in order 
to hold the state accountable, as well as cooperate with it to consolidate democracy. In 
addition, the concept of social capital pays attention to informal interpersonal practices that 
Hann (1996) argues are important in “explorations of civil society” (p. 3). This chapter 
presents these concepts in more detail, forming the basis for an examination of the literature 
on civil society in the context of the Russia Federation in chapter three. 
27 
 
2.2 Civil society 
As mentioned above, civil society has become a key concept when analysing democracy and 
democratisation (Bernhard, 1993; Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, as a 
concept it stretches back to as far as ancient Greece (Aristotle, 2003 [1983]). In the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 century, civil society received particular attention from a variety of different 
philosophical streams and perspectives (Carothers, 2000; Ferguson, 2003 [1767]; Hegel, 2003 
[1821]; Kant, 2003 [1795]; Madison, 2003 [1787]; Marx, 1978; Pain, 2003 [1791]; Smith, 
1993 [1776]; de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). It is these early discourses that have shaped civil 
society as a construct, and their contributions to the history of civil society are well-
documented (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Ehrenberg, 1999; Keane, 1988; Kubicek, 2002; Kumar, 
1993). However, a detailed discussion is beyond the realm of this thesis. Of particular 
importance for this thesis is the contribution these historic debates made to the idea of civil 
society as contributing to democratic governance and social capital, (de Tocqueville, 2003 
[1848]) and considering it as a space which is non-state and non-economic (Gramsci, Hoare, 
& Smith, 1971). Those considerations, which shape our understanding of civil society and our 
assumptions about civil society, are integral to democratic societies. This illustrates the 
importance of presenting the concept of civil society in this thesis. As a notional democratic 
country, civil society in the Russian Federation should aim to mirror the form, function, and 
structures associated with civil society. Therefore, clarifying the concept of civil society and 
how it contributes to democratic governance is a central objective of this chapter. The 
following two subsections dissect the understanding of civil society to provide a 
comprehensive overview of its form and function within modern societies. The first section 
will outline key definitions and contemporary conceptual debates. The second section sheds 
light on the current issues, particularly with regard to the role of the state.  
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2.2.1 Definitional issues and assumptions 
At the heart of debates about civil society is the pursuit to uncover what constitutes a „good 
society‟ (Foley & Hodgkinson, 2003). In the past, civil society has been seen as the 
constitutional state (Lock, 1965), a system of needs (Hegel, 2003 [1821]), associational life 
(de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]), or a realm of conflict (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). These 
perspectives have transcended into contemporary debates, where civil society is either 
understood by its function or as a space (Jensen, 2006). The former aims to outline what 
responsibilities, tasks, and functions civil society should be performing. The latter 
understands civil society as a distinct space outside the state and business. As a space, civil 
society is shaped by the public (the state and business) and private (the individuals and 
family) realms of society. The analytic distinction between space and function is particularly 
relevant for examining civil society in the context of the Russia Federation (Salmenniemi, 
2008). As a debate, it greatly influences the assessment of civil society in Soviet Russia, and 
is at the heart of the argument about whether civil society existed, or whether it was 
institutionalised in the Soviet Union (see chapter 3.2). The functional perspective‟s inherent 
assumptions of liberal democratic state-society relations (Fukuyama, 1992; Fukuyama, 2001; 
Seligman, 1992) mean that an autonomous civil society did not exist in the Soviet Union. 
However, as discussed in more detail in chapter three section two, the rudiments of civil 
society were present in Soviet society in places such as trade unions, sports organisations 
(Salmenniemi, 2008) or an autonomous nature protection movement (Weiner, 1999). These 
were not necessarily „autonomous‟, „intermediary‟ or even „freely chosen‟. However they did 
provide a space for social interaction, which was non-state and non-economic (see chapter 
3.2). Therefore, investigating civil society from a spatial perspective bears a more fruitful lens 
for examining civil society in the context of the Russian Federation.  
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2.2.1.1 Spatial approaches to civil society 
Spatial definitions of civil society do not have the inherent normative constraints often 
associated with functional understandings. Within such understandings, civil society is 
demarcated as “situated between the state and the market” (Kuchukeeva & O'Loughlin, 2003, 
p. 557) or the market, the state and the individual (Chandhoke, 2007; Cohen & Arato, 1992; 
Hyden, 1997; Lovell, 2007). As mentioned above, civil society encompasses the interactions 
that are non-state and non-economic (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). Kaldor (2003) points 
to the fact that a constitutional state, the rule of law, or clear boundaries of the public and 
private realm are often assumed in spatial understandings of civil society, but frequently do 
not reflect realities within transitory or developing contexts. Consequently, civil society is 
often understood very narrowly as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary” 
(Diamond, 1994, p. 5).  
 
Nevertheless, this limits the ability of civil society as a concept to capture the „life of society‟ 
outside such frequently formalised settings. In the context of the Russian Federation for 
example, such narrow approaches to civil society have led literature to be preoccupied with 
organisations which have enjoyed foreign funding, or are aimed at the protection of human 
rights, or advancing democratic governance (Salmenniemi, 2008; see also chapter 3.3). This 
has led to other agents and actors situated within civil society being neglected in research 
activities. Nonetheless such agents also play an important role in establishing and creating a 
civil society space (Kaldor, 2003). Thus, defining civil society as a space provides this thesis 
with a useful tool to examine actors and agents, be they formal or informal, of civil society 
and their capability to build civil society as a bridge between the individual and state. Thus, 
this thesis operationalises civil society as the “space between the individual family and the 
state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150).  
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Drawing on this discussion, a central aspect and assumption of the spatial concept of civil 
society is the equi-distance between spheres. Effectively equi-distance demarcates civil 
society from the individual family (private sphere) and the state (public sphere), asserting that 
there are clear boundaries to civil society. Further, it means that civil society is an 
autonomous space, which is critical to the three democratic functions: conveying norms and 
values of democracy, holding the state accountable, and collaborating with the state to 
strengthen democracy (Taylor, 2006).  
 
The idea of an autonomous sphere juxtaposes civil society with the state, and is central to its 
contribution to democracy (Walzer, 1992; Whittington, 2001; Warren, 2001; Foley & 
Edwards, 1996; Wood, 2001). Only as an autonomous space, can civil society, through its 
agents, facilitate collective action and hold the state accountable (Fukuyama, 1997; Putnam, 
1995; Thomas, 1996). Autonomy allows civil society to take up a role of agency vis-à-vis the 
state as well as the market (Keane, 2005; Walzer, 1991). However, civil society as an 
autonomous space requires institutions, which ensure its separation from the state, such as 
political competition, independent judiciary, rule of law, and freedom of expression (Shils, 
2003).  
 
Interlinked with the issue of equi-distance and autonomy is the role of civil society in acting 
as a bridge between the individual and the state (Portes, 1998). The function of bridging the 
gap between the individual and the state allows civil society to aggregate and represent the 
interests of individuals (Fish, 1991; Foley & Edwards, 1996). By bridging the gap between 
the individual and the state, civil society is able to mediate interest and demands, facilitating 
problem solving through collective action (Habermas, 1982). Nevertheless being a bridge 
assumes that civil society is a) legally permitted and b) equal to the state. Further, it is crucial 
for civil society to be able to aggregate, represent, and promote interest, which requires its 
agents to mobilise broad public participation and support. Such activities enable civil society 
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agents to generate norms of reciprocity and social trust. However, for civil society to be able 
to act as a bridge between the individual and the state, the state needs to acknowledge the 
existence of civil society by being responsive, cooperative, and open to accommodate 
demands arising from civil society agents. Such civil society arrangements extend formal 
democratic structures such as elections and ensure that a more democratic mode of decision-
making emerges (Uhlin, 2006). 
  
2.2.1.2 Civil society and the state 
Edwards and Foley (2001) argue that the state provides the “constitutional, legal, political, 
and moral framework” (p. 13). Through this framework, the state creates an environment in 
which civil society facilitates government and strengthens democracy (Foucault, 1991 
[1978]). Civil society becomes a political institution in itself, with the aim to limit the actions 
of the state (Shils, 2003 [1997]). A vibrant civil society is thus a crucial pillar for the ability of 
a modern state to exist and a government to govern (Mann, 1984). Thus, strong and effective 
political institutions are critical to both civil society and modern states (Berman, 1997). In 
such an environment, civil society can hold the state accountable without the fear of 
retribution by the state. Consequently, civil society and the state cooperate to build democracy 
(Taylor, 2006) and develop symbiotic mutually dependent relationships (Walzer, 1992) as 
depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
For Walzer (1992) these symbiotic relationships are a result of the historic path which the 
concept of civil society has taken within western political debate. Effective civil society-state 
relations arise when political elites are tolerant of civil society and formalised mechanisms of 
interaction exist (Bremeo, 2000; Kubik, 2005). Ehrenberg (1999) highlights that any state can 
“create, support, manipulate, or repress” (p. 238) civil society, and therefore, interaction 
mechanisms have to be formalised and the autonomy of civil society has to be 
institutionalised and legally protected (Uhlin, 2006; Weigle, 2000). In turn, the nature of these 
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state-civil society relations determines the political opportunities available and constraints 
faced by civil society and its agents (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; 
Uhlin, 2006). Consequently, an autonomous and independent civil society becomes a pivotal 
institution of democratic governance. The issue of state-civil society relations provides a 
central analytical perspective within this thesis. Specific civil society-state relations have 
developed in different contexts. In light of rapid democratisation, it is likely that such 
relations have significantly evolved and changed in the context of the Russian Federation (see 
chapter 3). In particular, democratising contexts have less clear cut boundaries between the 
state and civil society (Mercer, 2002). In such contexts, this often involves movements of 
particular individuals between civil society organisations and state structures. However, clear 
boundaries and civil society-state relations, which preserve the autonomy of civil society, are 
vital to its democratic functionality.  
 
As discussed above, autonomy from the state also ensures the existence of a pluralistic 
associational life (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). Nonetheless, Uhlin (2006) warns that too 
much autonomy could “delegitimize the state” (p. 29). In such cases, civil society strengthens 
at the expense of the state, and often fails to produce the democratic outcomes such as 
pluralisation of the democratic arena, or bridging between the state and the individual 
(Berman, 1997; Luong & Weinthal, 1999). Therefore, an autonomous civil society that is 
good for democracy cannot exist in an environment in which the state does not have sufficient 
strength to enforce the rules of the game (North, 1991). However, neither can an autonomous 
civil society exist where the state refuses to acknowledge it.  
 
Within developed democratic settings, close interaction between civil society and the state are 
desirable and unavoidable (Uhlin, 2006). The state‟s cooperation with civil society 
strengthens associational life (Skocpol, 1987; 1996). In effect, cooperation on an equal basis 
is the key to improving policymaking (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). A democratic state is more 
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likely to provide “channels of influence, arenas for interaction and a facilitative legal-
administrative framework” (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996, p. 1630). In these circumstances, the 
power civil society exercises vis-à-vis the state comes from  
 
“changing political discourse, legitimisation of particular forms of collective action, 
the establishment of policy-oriented institutions within civil society, and protest 
activities that leads to governmental response” (Uhlin, 2006, p. 30).  
 
Effectively, the state becomes more responsive to bottom-up impetus, and develops 
cooperative relations with agents of civil society although not at the expense of the autonomy 
of civil society. Nonetheless, such arrangements are very different from the paternalistic 
traditions that governed state-society arrangements in Soviet Russia. Such considerations 
assume that the state is willing to share its power base, something that is inherently new to the 
post-Soviet Russian state. Consequently, understanding the level of autonomy of Russian civil 
society arrangements is critical to the examinations presented in this thesis. Clearly civil 
society as a societal space is unable to take on these functions. Its manifestations and agents 
such as TSOs, on the other hand, engage with the state and its institutions. Therefore, the 
following section discusses TSOs, their role, and function in building civil society and 
democracy. 
 
2.3 Third sector organisations 
The discussion in the previous section focused on discussing civil society as a space. As a 
space, civil society manifests itself in various agents, actors, and institutions. This section 
examines networks, associations, groups, organisations, and other agents and manifestations, 
which make up civil society (Renshaw, 1994). These elements are representations of civil 
society and empirical investigations use them as lenses to examine civil society. It is those 
manifestations which also constituted civil society in Russia, and therefore, such elements 
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need to be defined and discussed. As illustrated above, civil society is delineated against the 
state and the market, and as a result often referred to as the third sector (Uphoff, 1993). 
Within the literature, civil society organisations are referred to as non-profit, non-government 
(NGOs), voluntary or third sector organisations (TSOs) (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). TSO is 
the most commonly used term to described civil society organisations. As will be discussed 
below, the term TSO carries a normative connotation, which restricts its usability for 
empirical inquiry (Mercer, 2002). Taking this into account, this thesis still refers to agents and 
manifestations of civil society as TSOs.  
 
TSOs span the spectrum of informal associations such as neighbourhood watch associations, 
and formal associations such as trade unions (Borris, 1998). Based on membership, and the 
way members interact with each other and with the organisation, TSOs are classed into three 
different typologies; primary, secondary and tertiary (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). In primary TSOs, 
members interact with circles of families and friends (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). In secondary 
TSOs, members interact with individuals outside their family networks in a face-to-face 
manner (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). Tertiary interaction refers to organisations where individuals 
remain anonymous and mainly contribute via financial means with Greenpeace, Cancer UK, 
or Caritas Internationalis being prime examples. Despite the potential overlapping of these 
three ways of interaction, TSOs are generally dominated by one specific typology. Evidently, 
the larger in size and membership a TSO becomes, the more tertiary its interactions. Further, 
these interactions can  
 
“take quite different forms in different national settings, reflecting differences in 
cultural traditions, legal structure, and political histories” (Gibron, Kramer, & 
Salamon, 1992, pp. 2-3).  
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In the literature, TSOs are attributed with various responsibilities. As will be discussed below  
in more detail (see section 2.3.1), the literature illustrates the role of TSOs as providing public 
and quasi-public goods as social services in response to the crisis of the welfare state 
(Brenton, 1985; Green, 1987; Offe, 2000). However, in countries undergoing democratisation 
TSOs emerged as driving forces for political democracy (Mania, 1998; Stephenson, 2000). 
One strand of the academic literature on TSOs sees them as outcomes of political 
opportunities (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). TSOs are a result of the failure of the 
state to ensure a „good life‟. In response to these failings, individual citizens associate 
together in TSOs to complement the state‟s activities. In turn, this engagement in 
associational life opens up political opportunities that TSOs can use to improve circumstances 
and ensure a „good life‟. The participation of individuals enables TSOs to partake in public 
affairs and decision making. Frequently the literature characterises TSOs as institutions in the 
democratic process which provide marginal and disenfranchised groups (Mercer, 2002) with 
an outlet to voice their needs. Consequently, individual TSOs pursue a broad spectrum of 
agendas. However, as discussed above, their common characteristic is reflected in doing 
“things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often 
enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). No matter which activities TSOs pursue, whether they are the 
provision of welfare services or advancement of political interest, they contribute to 
pluralising the democratic arena (Mercer, 2002) as well as strengthening and deepening 
democratic governance (Linz & Stepan, 1996). TSOs, as areas of direct participation and 
indirect participation, become channels of interest representations and generators of social 
capital, and thus contribute to democracy. 
 
Through encouraging participation, TSOs strengthen civil society and thus democratic 
governance (Bratton, 1989). TSOs accommodate the conflicting interests, values, and views 
that are the basis for democratic societies (Dahl, 1982). As mentioned above, in particular 
western thought tends to associate and equate the third sector with TSOs (Salamon & 
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Anheier, 1997; Mercer, 2002). They are often seen as “officially established, run by employed 
staff (often urban professional or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more 
often the case international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced” 
(Mercer, 2002, p. 6). However, even though TSOs only represent a small part of civil society 
they are often equated with it. This results in the orthodoxy of TSOs = Civil Society = 
Democracy (Salmenniemi, 2008). Mercer (2002) argues that the merging of civil society and 
TSOs is problematic because:  
a) they are seen as the inherent bearers of democracy neglecting all other actors,  
b) they are understood and defined differently depending on the context which authors 
look at, and  
c) they do not necessarily deepen and widen participation and thus democracy.  
Therefore, TSOs need to be disentangled from civil society and they have to be understood as 
a lens and manifestation of it, rather than equal to civil society. In particular research from 
democratising countries such as Russia has shown that TSOs can often be  
 
“internally undemocratic, characterised by authoritarian or charismatic personalised 
leaderships, competitive, driven along class, gender, religious, regional, spatial and 
ethnic faultlines, and steered by either the state or donors, or both” (Mercer, 2002, p. 
13).  
 
Even though some TSOs will facilitate the rule of law, hold the state accountable and 
encourage voluntary association, TSOs are not democratic just because they are situated 
within the space of civil society (Mercer, 2002). In particular, within a democratising context, 
TSOs often fail to contribute to building an autonomous civil society space. Therefore, in 
themselves, TSOs do not guarantee the positive democratic contribution that is associated 
with civil society (see section 2.2).  
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For TSOs engaged in providing public and semi-public goods (see section 2.3.1), remaining 
internally democratic as well as building a civil society conducive to democratic governance 
poses a particular challenge. As illustrated in chapter one, Russia‟s transition process has been 
characterised by a withdrawal of the state, providing opportunities for TSOs to deliver public 
and semi-public goods. However, TSOs taking up such frequently service providing roles 
tend to receive the majority of resources for their activities from the state (Hall, 2002). This 
leads to TSOs becoming resource dependent on the state, which creates issues with regard to 
the ability of TSOs to advocate and hold the state accountable, ensuring democratic order. In 
particular, the discourse constructing TSOs as part of the „new public management‟ agenda 
highlights these issues with regards to transparency and accountability (Anheier, 2009). In the 
UK, the government has consciously expanded the use of TSOs to provide services by 
increasing funding to civil society organisations significantly (Chew & Osborne, 2009). As 
will be discussed in chapter three, Russian TSOs are facing a similar trend. The 
transformation of TSOs into public service providers has led Young (2000) to argue that 
relationships between the state and TSOs can be seen as substituting, complementing, or 
advocating. Whereas TSOs are not exclusively locked into a specific relationship (Young, 
2000), in the context of the Russian Federation (see Chapter 3) it could be expected that TSOs 
which are either substituting or complementing the state, are less likely to also engage in 
advocating activities.  
 
2.3.1 Third sector organisations as service providers 
Despite the existence of a broad cross-section of organisations, within the research literature 
on civil society, the focus is frequently on TSOs which can be considered as service providers 
(van Til, 2009) or which are also referred to as professional non-profit organisations (Richter, 
2002; Salamon, 1995; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). Several authors have attempted to outline 
and theorise the reasons why such organisations exist (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; 
Hansmann, 1987; 1996; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975). The majority of 
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these approaches came as a response to the difficulties faced by welfare states in the 1970s 
and 1980s and focused on TSOs „stepping in for the state‟. Economic and financial 
difficulties faced by the state and the rise of the liberal capitalist agenda (Friedman, 2002) 
meant that states began to withdraw welfare and social services provided in the past. 
However, these services were still required and alternative service provision channels were 
needed. Several alternative approaches were suggested (Brenton, 1985), all with the aim of 
pluralising welfare provision (Evers, 1995). Consequently, Salamon (1995) points out that the 
state evolved into a provider of funding rather than direct welfare services. Through grants 
and social contracting, the state engaged TSOs in providing public and quasi-public goods 
and services (Anheier, 2009). In effect, TSOs began to compete, supplement, and substitute 
for the state (Young, 2000).  
 
Considering the literature on TSOs as service providers is critical for the research objectives 
of this thesis (see chapter 1). Past research on Russian TSOs has focused on the 
environmental movement, women‟s organisations, human rights organisations, and trade 
unions (see chapter 1). Therefore, as illustrated in chapter one, this thesis investigates TSOs 
that pursue a health and educational agenda. This dovetails with the literature on TSOs as 
service providers, which frequently focuses on TSOs in health and education (Gilson, Sen, 
Mohammed, & Mujinja, 1994; Robinson & White, 2001). In the context of health, TSOs are 
often found to be working with the disabled, children, or acting as supports of research (i.e. 
Cancer Research UK), as well as engaging in advocacy to improve social integration, justice 
and equal treatment of the mainly marginal groups they represent (Tomlinson & 
Schwabenland, 2010). In the educational area, TSOs engage directly in the educational 
process by running schools (i.e. many private Schools in Germany or faith-based schools in 
the UK), as well as indirectly providing support and assistance in educational matters. 
Frequently, indirect educational activities are aimed at empowering the poor and marginalised 
groups of society.  
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Thus, generally TSOs should fulfil two functions: a) as members of civil society they act as a 
bridge between the state and the individual and b) as service providers they supersede or 
complement the state by providing public and semi-public goods. However, as stated above, 
in engaging in such activities TSOs rely on the state for resources and in particular funding. 
This resource dependency means that TSOs are responsible for the way services are delivered, 
but the state retains its ability to define who is able to receive services. However, Trudeau 
(2008) observes an important aspect of how TSOs conduct service provision. He illustrates 
that vital to the success of TSOs as service providers is their ability to considerably stretch the 
boundaries set by the state. Therefore, as Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz (2004) show, in 
a stable, developed and liberal democratic context such as the US, service-providing TSOs 
still managed to fulfil their political potential to strengthen democracy despite their resource 
dependency on the government (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; Mosley, 2009). Hence, regardless 
of engaging in such activities, these organisations still form the feedback loops of democracy 
(Habermas, 1996), and thus mediate between the individual and the state, pluralising political 
participation and strengthening democracy. In turn, in less autonomous civil society 
arrangements such as in the context of the Russian Federation, TSO resource dependency on 
the state is likely to limit the ability to generate these democracy conducive externalities.  
 
The potential of organisations situated within civil society for providing social services to a 
wider part of the population is not a recent consideration within literature or public policy 
(Pestoff, 1992). As stated above, enlisting TSOs as service providers became popular with 
neo-liberal reform agendas, promoting a shrinking and contracting welfare state (Salamon, 
1995). The post-Soviet transition agenda, as chapter one illustrated, reflected such 
developments, as the state frequently withdrew from service provision (Sil & Chen, 2004). As 
part of the neo-liberal reform agenda which many countries such as the US and the UK 
pursued in the 1970s and 1980s, the state began to contract out public service to TSOs, which 
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were considered to provide services that were more appropriate and more efficient. Supported 
by the argument of greater efficiency, such developments advocated welfare pluralism (Evers, 
1995), allowing service users more choice. TSOs providing services meant that services 
became more participatory, less bureaucratic, more cost effective (Kettl, 2000) and better at 
reaching the poor and disadvantaged groups within society (Bardhan, 1993; Brett, 1993). 
Consequently, by engaging in service provision, TSOs improved equality in particular with 
regard to access to services (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010). However, TSOs also need to 
be able to engage in activities which are “aimed at influencing the social and civic agenda and 
at gaining access to the arena where decisions that affect the social and civil life are made” 
(Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008, p. 582), thus they have to engage in advocacy type activities. In 
effect, it is the advocacy objectives of most TSOs that result in their engagement in service 
provision (Anheier, 2009).  
 
The shift into service provision has had a variety of impacts on TSOs. In order to “ensure 
survival” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 260) TSOs in countries such as the US or the UK have 
undergone a phase of „marketisation‟, transforming themselves into more business-like 
organisations (Anheier, 2009). Research in the third sector of the UK also indicates that the 
transition of service provision has been accompanied by TSOs adopting professional 
management practices (Chew, 2006). As will be highlighted in chapter five, some TSOs 
within this study do want to portray themselves as also having undergone a similar transition. 
In order to survive, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlight how TSOs changed their activities 
in response to resources for service provision. However, as argued above, subsequent research 
shows that this development has not constrained the political potential of civil society.  
 
Despite not affecting their political potential, the „marketisation‟ of TSOs means that these 
organisations are becoming less engaged in advocacy activity (Craig, 2009). Such activity has 
become the primary focus for smaller and less formally organised grass-roots organisations or 
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groups (Craig, 2009). Trudeau (2008) argues that another result of such „marketisation‟ is the 
increasing entrepreneurial nature of TSOs (in the literature this is often referred to as social 
entrepreneurship). As a result, TSOs now focus on aspects such as revenue management, 
marketing, and branding (Anheier, 2009), or the positioning of themselves in a „positive‟ light 
vis-à-vis public perception. Therefore, Anheier (2009) observes that in western democracies 
TSOs are moving from the space of civil society into the business space/the space of the 
second sector. Subsequently TSOs lose their position between the state and society and as a 
bridge between the state and the individual. However, despite such a change, TSOs still 
contribute to democratic governance by generating social capital (Putnam, 1995). The 
following section discusses the concept of social capital in more detail. 
 
2.4 Social capital 
2.4.1 Defining social capital 
Similar to civil society, social capital is now a widely used analytical concept (Portes, 1998) 
used across various disciplines and contexts. Social capital has served as a lens into a wide 
variety of issues, such as schooling (Coleman, 1988), democracy (Fukuyama, 2001), or 
economic development (for an overview see Woolcock, 1998 or Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). Despite the variety of applications, the basic tenets of social capital refer to the 
interaction of individuals and the resulting ties/bonds with each other (Granovetter, 1973). 
Therefore, social capital creates the bonds, which keep associations, networks, and thus 
societies together (Narayan, 1999). It explains how associations exist and why people interact 
with each other (Edwards & Foley, 2001). However, contrary to the other forms of capital, 
such as human, physical, or financial, stocks of social capital cannot be owned by an 
individual (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; Newton, 2001a; Norris, 2002; Robison, 
Schmid, & Siles, 2002), but are embedded within the networks of society.  
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Social capital is critical to understanding civil society and its contribution to democracy. It is 
relevant to civil society because it leads to “trust, norms [of reciprocity] and horizontal 
networks” (Marsh, 2000, p. 183), which facilitate the existence of civil society and TSOs. 
Further, social capital facilities collective action of networks and associations within civil 
society (Welzel, Ingelhart, & Deutsch, 2005). In effect social capital is what makes civil 
society and TSOs work (Inglehart, 1997). For Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) TSOs 
contribute “to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governance (…) because of their 
„internal‟ effects on individual members and because of their „external‟ effects on the wider 
polity” (pp. 89-90). Internally these TSOs organise in a democratic manner, encourage “habits 
of co-operation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness” (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993, pp. 
89-90), and thus nurture norms and values of democracy (Taylor, 2006). Externally, as 
discussed above, TSOs aggregate and represent the interest of the polity, and through that 
hold the state to account (see section 2.1).  
 
The concept of social capital was established by Bourdieu and Coleman (Edwards & Foley, 
2001). For Bourdieu, social capital helps to explain the different structures which societies 
have assumed (Edwards & Foley, 2001). Coleman, on the other hand, understands social 
capital by its function and “facilitating certain actions” of individual actors (Coleman, 1988, 
p. 98). This approach to social capital focuses on the ability of individual actors to access 
resources by “virtue of membership in a social network” (Portes, 1998, p. 6). The social 
network of an individual actor decides his/her social capital stock (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1988; Granovetter, 1973; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The structural 
approach often centres on the individual and their specific actions, rather than more macro 
aspects of social networks. Further, this perspective often neglects power and conflict  
(Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000), which as mentioned above are critical aspects of civil 
society (see section 2.1 & 2.2). Such individualistic approaches tend to understand social 
capital as always having a positive impact on democracy (Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000), 
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which is not necessarily the case. Therefore, for this thesis a more collectively orientated 
definition is required.  
 
Adler and Kwon (2002) find that definitions of social capital can be grouped into ones 
focusing on external relations (structural approaches) and ones focusing on internal relations 
(collective approaches). Internal definitions consider “social capital of a collective 
(organisation, community, nation)” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 21), and generally focus on the 
internal structures and its outcomes. These types of definitions are more collectively 
orientated. This thesis examines how TSOs, or networks of people, contribute to civil society 
and hence democracy. Therefore, in order to be able to examine social capital within 
manifestations of civil society, a collective definition is more appropriate. For that reason this 
thesis adopts Putnam‟s (1995, p. 67) definitions and understands social capital as “norms and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” and which 
manifests itself in “features of social organisation such as networks”.  
 
Within this thesis, networks are understood as the basis for TSOs, however within this 
section, both terms are used interchangeably. Networks consist of both direct/strong and 
indirect/weak ties between people (Granovetter, 1973). Amongst network members, norms 
govern cooperation and outline which actions are acceptable or unacceptable (Putnam, 1995). 
Woolcock (1998) refers to such norms as norms of reciprocity, which form one of the 
cornerstones of social capital because they provide meaning to exchanges as well as 
establishing a sense of fairness (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Further, for Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) trust is another cornerstone of social capital. Trust is defined as 
“socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of 
organisations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders 
that set the fundamental understandings for their lives” (Barber, 1983, pp. 164-165). Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) distinguish between personal trust and social trust. Personal trust 
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is associated with more direct or strong ties, and is frequently the basis for networks such the 
nuclear family (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). However, social trust is understood as 
being more indirect in nature, important for the development of weak/indirect ties (Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). It is social trust that must dominate for modern societies to 
function, as well as being central to social capital generation and conducive to contributing to 
democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Social trust enables the sort of de 
Tocquevillain networks of associations illustrated in chapter two, which are pivotal to an 
autonomous civil society space. Both types of trust facilitate reciprocity, and thus cooperative 
and coordinating behaviour. Further, reciprocity and networks of social organisation lead to 
the development of social trust (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). However, not all TSOs 
contribute to democratisation. Despite facilitating collective action, TSOs might not 
necessarily generate social capital because they might operate undemocratically internally 
(Diamond, 1994). For the positive relationship between civil society and democracy to hold, 
the possibility of generating social capital through associational life is pivotal (Newton, 
2001a; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1995). Therefore, the key to how civil society can contribute 
to democracy consolidation is the question of how social capital is generated.  
 
2.4.2 Social capital and civil society 
As discussed previously, civil society contributes to democratic governance through its 
variety of manifestations, such as “interest groups, intermediary associations, civic 
associations, social movements and voluntary organisations” (van Deth, 1998, p. 1). These 
manifestations generate social capital which facilitates democratic governance. Further, social 
capital is what makes these manifestations work. Thus, TSOs are a source (Chan, 2008; Field, 
Schuller, & Baron, 2000), as well as a manifestation, of social capital (Chan, 2008; 
Fukuyama, 2001; Inglehart, 1997).  
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The discussion of social capital and civil society pays particular attention to civic engagement 
and civic activity within TSOs (see section 2.2). Civic engagement is crucial to creating 
norms and values conducive to the creation of social capital (Putnam, 1995). On the one hand, 
Putnam (1995) argues that only active face-to-face participation within civil society is 
beneficial to social capital and democracy. Others disagree (Foley & Edwards, 1996), and 
subsequent research has highlighted the contribution that tertiary organisations make (see 
section 2.3 above; Minkoff, 2001; Newton, 1997). Others argue that the generation of social 
capital cannot be considered without the state (Berman, 2001; Booth & Richard, 2001; 
Edwards & Foley, 2001; Kenworthy, 2001; Levi, 1996; Skocopl, 1987; Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000). Proponents of this institution/state-centred perspective argue that social 
capital generated through civic engagement is an outcome of the institutional arrangements of 
the state (Berman, 2001; Levi, 1996; Warren, 2001). TSOs are only able to generate social 
capital if the institutional environment enables an autonomous civil society to exist. 
Nevertheless, with regards to TSOs‟ ability to facilitate democratic governance, the positive 
as well as negative outcomes of social capital need to be considered.  
 
2.4.2.1 Bonding and bridging social capital 
Clearly, the voluntary participation in TSOs and subsequent fostering of norms of reciprocity 
requires a state that ensures the autonomy of the civil society space. Nonetheless, aspects of 
social capital can result in negative outcomes such as exclusion (Whittington, 2001), the 
restriction of individual autonomy, and lead to the fragmentation of society (Portes, 1998). 
These are detrimental to democracy. Social capital leading to such outcomes is commonly 
referred to as bonding social capital. On the other hand, social capital that results in positive 
outcomes is referred to as bridging social capital (Rose, 2001). For Putnam (1995), this 
distinction between bonding and bridging is central to determining the contribution of social 
capital, hence TSOs to democratic governance. The distinction between bonding and bridging 
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types of social capital evolved from Granovetter‟s (1973) original idea of the existence of 
strong and weak ties in social interactions of agents.  
 
Bonding social capital links like-minded people leading to homogeneity and often resulting in 
the exclusion of others (Putnam, 1995). Extending Granovetter‟s (1973) strong ties to 
networks, the strong ties of these tight knit social networks are the basis for “thick trust” 
(Newton, 1997, p. 578), or social ties which bond networks together (Kearns, 2003; 
Widmalm, 2005; Putnam, 1995). The externalities of strong ties are the fragmentation of 
society and the detachment of networks from the broader public, which frequently leads to a 
lack of social cohesion at macro societal levels (Granovetter, 1973). Consequently, bonding 
social capital is usually negatively associated with democracy because it leads to social 
exclusion, the fragmentation of society, and atomised social networks and associational life 
(Newton, 1997; Widmalm, 2005; Portes, 1998; Adler & Kwon, 2002). Fukuyama (2001) 
argues that the persistence of such networks leads to rent-seeking behaviour, and results in 
associations which seek to appropriate public resources for their own benefit (Levi, 1996; 
Rose, 2001; Welzel, Ingelhart, & Deutsch, 2005). However, Putnam and Goss (2002) argue 
that such rent-seeking or other parasitic network behaviours are not exclusive to networks 
with high levels of bonding social capital. Such behaviour constitutes inward-looking social 
capital (Putnam & Goss, 2002). Inward-looking networks consist of exclusive ties, some of 
which can be „bonding‟ in nature (Putnam & Goss, 2002). These ties enable network 
members to „get by‟ rather than contributing to democracy consolidation. Such networks use 
their stocks of both bonding and bridging social capital to “promote the material, social, or 
political interest of their own members” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11) at the expense of the 
wider polity. This leads the networks to behave undemocratically, undermining the building 
of an autonomous civil society. Such considerations are critical in examining both historic and 
contemporary civil society arrangements in Russia, as they provide a lens for understanding 
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the internal democratic set-up of TSOs, as well as their potential to contribute to 
democratisation.  
 
Bridging social capital “refers to social networks that bring together people who are unlike 
one another” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11), and as such connects actors across social 
cleavages often leading to heterogeneity of, and within, networks. Bridging social capital is a 
reflection of dominant weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and credited with the democracy 
supporting role of civil society. Such interactions enable networks and associations to create 
“thin trust” (Newton, 1997, p. 578) and bridge across to others, embedding themselves in civil 
society and creating a bulwark against authoritarian tendencies within the state (de 
Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). Edwards (2004, p. 10) outlines bridging social capital as creating 
“horizontal trust and reciprocal connections between heterogeneous groups”. Bridging social 
capital makes possible the creation of civil society as an autonomous space, and strengthens 
this space through facilitating horizontal cross-network interaction. Thus, bridging social 
capital is vital to civil society‟s function of holding the state accountable (Evans & Boyte, 
1986; Putnam, 1993). Such networks are more likely to “concern themselves with [the] public 
good” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11), and are outward looking. In effect, such altruistic 
networks and organisations form the basis for the western understanding of TSOs. Hence, 
understanding and examining the ability of networks or TSOs to bridge with others, the 
private realm and the state, are vital to investigating how civil society contributes to 
democracy consolidation.  
 
As the discussion has outlined, the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is 
pivotal to the discussion of civil society. Frequently the civil society debate has focused on 
the quantity of TSOs, neglecting qualitative aspects such as ties within and across TSOs 
(Paxton, 2002; Stolle & Rochon, 1998). Bonding and bridging social capital helps to explain 
the organisation of networks and TSOs. These aspects are of particular importance within the 
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context of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). In particular, the deficiencies of strong ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) characteristic of inward-looking bonding social capital such as 
fragmentation have affected civil society development in Russia (see chapter 3.3). However, 
to gain a more comprehensive insight into how social capital is used within civil society, the 
bonding-bridging axis needs to be supplemented by aspects of the inward-looking and 
outward-looking usage of social capital. Bridging/bonding and inward/outward social capital 
provides a vital lens to understanding the contribution of networks, associations and hence 
TSOs to democracy building. 
   
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the construct of civil society by reviewing classic and contemporary 
literature relevant to this thesis and the research objectives (see chapter 1). The chapter draws 
on the concepts of civil society, third sector organisations, social capital and democracy, to 
present a theoretical and conceptual framework which allows the examination of 
contemporary civil society development and state-society relations in Russia. Understanding 
these constructs and their interdependencies are vital to the research question this thesis 
addresses, of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian 
Federation. Civil society is operationalised as the “space between the individual family and 
the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). As a separate space between the private and the state, civil 
society is autonomous, intermediary, and an institution of democratic governance (see section 
2.2). Further, civil society contributes to democracy through enabling citizens to learn the 
norms and values of democracy. As an autonomous sphere, it aggregates and represents 
interest, pluralising the democratic arena and counterweighing the state. Set within a 
supportive state, civil society is able to strengthen democratic practices and thus governance. 
However, as outlined in chapter one, in the context of the Russian Federation, the state is not 
conducive to an autonomous civil society space. Section two of this chapter illustrates the 
importance the state plays in enabling civil society. In turn to evaluating the effects of 
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legislative changes on civil society provides an insight into potential legal attempts to 
managed civil society (see chapter 1.1.2, objective 1).  
 
This chapter shows that civil society can be theorised at multiple levels, and in this study, an 
organisational level perspective is used. Thus, an autonomous space of civil society consists 
of “freely chosen intermediary organisations” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). From an empirical 
perspective, these third sector organisations provide a looking glass into civil society. TSOs 
represent the unit level of analysis, which allows us to make inferences about civil society 
more globally. TSOs are characterised by doing “things business and government are either 
not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). Through 
complementing the state (Berger & Neuhaus, 2003 [1977]), TSOs work with the forgotten 
sections of society and have the extraordinary opportunity to widen public discourse and 
integration (Habermas, 1996). TSOs build civil society, and contribute to democracy by 
pluralising polity and shaping civil society as an autonomous space (see section 2.3). 
However, research in the post-Communist context focused mainly on advocacy organisations 
within specific movements such as human rights or the environemental movement. 
Salamenmi (2008) observes that other organisations focused on service provision, often 
smaller or established during the Soviet period, have recived only little attention. Nonetheless, 
it is these organisations that often assume activities characteristic of TSOs. By investigating 
such TSOs, this thesis addresses this void within the literature. This chapter illustrates that in 
developed democractic contexts, TSOs act a substitutes for the state, maintaining their 
independence and autonomoy. Thus, elaborating the extent to which TSOs act as state 
substitutes forms another vital part in elaborating on managed civil society arrangements (see 
chapter 1.1.2, objective 2).   
 
As discussed in the section above (see section 2.4) the contribution of TSOs, and thus civil 
society, towards democracy is framed as generating social capital. The thesis operationalises 
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social capital as “norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). With its aspect of bonding and bridging social capital, as well 
as inward and outward looking usage of social capital, this analytical construct provides a lens 
into TSOs (see section 2.4.2.1). As outlined, social capital is pivotal to civil society‟s 
democratic contribution (see section 2.4.2). Nonetheless, not all forms of social capital lead to 
a democratic outcome (see section 2.4.2.1). Thus, not all activity within civil society 
contributes to democracy. Effectively, TSOs need to not only be a platform for broader social 
cooperation, but also build „norms and social trust‟. In particular, aspects of bonding and 
bridging social capital provide a lens to assess these aspects. Civil society that builds 
„positive‟ social capital makes democracy work and advances democratisation. However, 
democratisation is a process, and it requires the developments of several other aspects, only 
one of which is civil society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Therefore, developments within civil 
society provide a starting point to infer progress in other areas. Civil society literature 
recommends assessing civil society‟s contribution to democratisation by considering whether 
it is a space for inclusion and cooperation, whether it broadens participation, whether it 
pluralises the institutional arena and whether it legitimises the state‟s democratic efforts. 
 
2.5.1 Civil society strengthening democracy and democratisation  
Democratisation can be seen as “the creation, extension and practices of collective decision-
making based on the principles of popular control and political equality” (Uhlin, 2006, p. 18). 
As a result of the transitions of authoritarian regimes towards democracy, the issue of 
democratisation has become prominent within the literature (Uhlin, 2006). Frequently, 
democratisation is associated with a focus on the structural and institutional changes 
necessary, such as the establishment of a working parliamentary system, elections, or political 
parties (Uhlin, 2006). However, such considerations do not include the developments within 
civil society, and its contribution to both the process of democratisation as well as its 
outcome. Civil society ensures the working of formal democratic structures, as well as 
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widening and deepening of democracy through popular control and decision-making (Mercer, 
2002). This process of democracy consolidation is crucial for the sustainability of democratic 
governance (Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996). In addition, socio-economic 
developments (Diamond, 1994; Hadenius, 1992; Hadenius & Teorell, 2005; Lipset, 1959), 
societal cleavages (Berglund, Hellen, & Aarebrot, 1998), and power and class relations 
(Moore, 1966; Rueschmeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992) influence the democratisation 
process.  
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) outline five key areas that need to develop for democratisation to 
succeed. First, the existence of the rule of law, which mirrors early scholars of civil society 
who see it as a precondition for civil society (Hegel, 2003 [1821]; Lock, 1965). Second and 
third, political as well as economic society need to be democratic. Fourth, Linz and Stepan 
(1996) put forward the argument that the state bureaucracy needs to democratise. In effect this 
means that the state needs to become more responsive to the demands put upon it. Finally, 
civil society needs to become more democratic and a sphere of social inclusion and 
cooperation. The process of achieving such outcomes is subdivided into a transitory and a 
consolidation stage (Diamond, 1994; Mercer, 2002). According to Mercer (2002) during the 
transition phase, civil society acts juxtaposed to the state with the aim of promoting formal 
democratic changes. In the consolidation stage, civil society acts as an auditor of the state 
keeping authoritarian tendencies at bay (Foley & Edwards, 1996) and democratising society. 
However, a rich, strong and autonomous associational life does not necessarily mean a more 
democratic civil society (Uhlin, 2006), in particular when paternalistic power relations 
between the state and civil society exist (see chapter 3). If civil society itself does not become 
more democratic, more pluralistic and stronger vis-à-vis the state, it is likely to consolidate 
the political system it exists within (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). Hence, to contribute to 
the democratisation process, civil society needs to evolve into an autonomous sphere (see 
section 2.2). 
52 
 
Civil society is “said to promote the stability and effectiveness of democratic polity through 
both the effects of associations on citizens‟ habits of the heart and the ability of associations 
to mobilise citizens on behalf of public causes” (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 38). However, 
rather than driving democratisation, civil society is also a by-product of democracy (Berman, 
2001; Booth & Richard, 2001; Foley & Edwards, 1998; Kenworthy, 2001; Rose, 2001; 
Woolcock, 1998). This raises a fundamental analytical question for this thesis; whether or not 
civil society can exist within a managed democratic setting in which it is like to succumb to 
attempts of being controlled by the state, and maintain its contribution to further 
democratisation (see chapter 1). Therefore, as illustrated in chapter one, this thesis aims to 
elaborate on the limits of the state‟s ability to control and manage civil society arrangements 
and hence investigate the resilience of TSOs in acting as agents of democratisation (see 
chapter 1.1.2; objective 3).  
 
As illustrated above, the literature states that civil society strengthens democracy in three 
ways (Mercer, 2002). Firstly, civil society challenges state power and consequently 
legitimises the state‟s democratic governance structures (Mercer, 2002). Secondly, civil 
society broadens participation in the collective decision making process. Thirdly, civil society 
“pluralises and therefore strengthens the institutional arena” (Mercer, 2002, p. 8). As argued 
above, democratisation is not only a political process of creating the right set of institutions, 
but is also an adaptation of cultural norms and values (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) 
which reflect the incumbent “economic, social, and political trajectories”  (LiPuma & 
Koelble, 2009, p. 7). Further, Mercer (2002) notes that the language used within the 
democratisation discourse, namely that of strengthening or weakening civil society, “betrays a 
normative view of how democratic development should be „done‟” (p. 20). As a result, 
democratisation debates frequently neglect the context in which TSOs are embedded and how 
this affects their contribution to democratisation (Mercer, 2002). TSOs become the focal 
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actors, but relations with the state and their subsequent organisational impacts are neglected. 
This thesis address such issues in chapter three, where it expands on how cultural and historic 
legacies are indicative of  managed civil society arrangements in the context of the Russian 
Federation.  
 
Within the context of democratisation, literature on civil society illustrates the fact that civil 
society does not necessarily strengthen democracy or democratisation (Ossewaarde, 2006). 
Despite being credited with democratising Latin America, as well as Central and Eastern 
Europe (Hyden, 1997; Kocka, 2004), contemporary accounts such as the one presented in this 
thesis portray civil society as contributing less to democratisation than outlined above (see 
section 2.2). This has led to the critique of a model of civil society that emphasises autonomy 
and democracy (Chandhoke, 2007; Edele, 2005; Frolic, 1997; Hale, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; 
Kasif, 1998; Kubik, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001). Such an understaning has been branded as a 
western model reflecting the values, norms and political discourses that have shaped the civil 
society construct (Lewis, 2002). Because of the western experience, underlying this classic 
civil society conceptualisation, there is an argument to be made for the limited applicability of 
the concept outside this context (Blaney & Pasha, 1993). In particular the development 
literature argues that tranposing this model  into a non-western context such as Africa, Latin 
America or the post-Communist context should be done carefully (Lewis, 2002). 
Disheartened with what are considered normative restrains, empirical investigations in non-
western contexts focus on identifying institutional arrangements which perform similar 
functions to western civil society institutions, but which might not necessarily mirror their 
features (Kubik, 2005). However, Flynn and Oldfield (2006) argue that existing constructs 
and frameworks have an explicatory capacity to the changes taking place in post-socialist 
societies. Therefore, the western model of civil society is still of relevance because, even 
though TSOs‟ practices and activities might differ across contexts, it provides a lens into 
examining civil society‟s ability to contribute to democratisation (Lewis, 2002). 
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Consequently, in investigating how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the 
Russian Federation, it is this western model and its considerations of democracy that provide 
the three key areas which underpin the research objectives of this thesis (see chapter 1.1.2). 
Understanding state-civil society relations, that is legislative arrangements, TSOs as service 
providers, that is a substitute for the state, and the ability of TSOs to remain autonomous, that 
is the state‟s limitation to mould managed civil society, are essentially an evaluation of the 
potential of civil society to manifest its democratising externalities. Thus in examining the 
these objectives, the thesis answers the questions of how managed civil society arrangements 
are manifested in the Russian Federation.  
 
As discussed in this chapter, historical considerations have shaped our understanding of the 
constructs of civil society, third sector organisations, and social capital, and their relationship 
to the democratisation processes. In light of these insights, chapter three examines civil 
society development in the context of the Russia Federation. It reviews civil society 
development from a cultural-historic perspective, to outline historic antecedents and present 
day realities. Therefore, chapter three highlights the key particularities that have shaped civil 
society development in Russia, such as aspects of Soviet legacy and the effects of shock-
therapy, rapid democratisation, and the impact of civil society building. In so doing, chapter 
three firmly demonstrates the emerging nature of managed civil society arrangements in 
Russia.  
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CHAPTER 3: Russian Civil Society – Historical Antecedents and Present Day 
Realities 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined and defined key analytical and theoretical concepts positioning 
this thesis within the wider literary debate on civil society. Extending on chapter two, this 
chapter presents the chronological development of civil society in Russia in order to outline 
specific aspects that have impacted its development. Chapter two illustrates that civil society 
contributes to the establishing and working of an effective institutional environment, which 
acts as the lynch-pin for development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; 
Williamson, 2000). Therefore, civil society is the crucial hinge that makes modern societies 
work (Keane, 2005).  
 
This thesis operationalises civil society as a “the space between the individual and the state” 
(Neace, 1999, p. 150). Its agents, in this thesis specifically third sector organisations (TSOs), 
pluralise democratic participation (Mercer, 2002) and provide a space for “individuals to 
practise citizenship” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 737). Chapter two highlights that this is 
essentially a western model of understanding civil society (see chapter 2.5). Some 
commentators challenge the applicability of such western models in the context of the 
Russian Federation (Golenkova, 1999; Vorontsova & Filatov, 1997). Acknowledging these 
possible limitations, this thesis follows other scholars in operationalising a western model of 
civil society within the context of the Russian Federation (Crotty, 2009; Kennedy, Kawachi, 
& Brainerd, 1998; Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). Despite possible drawbacks, this concept of 
civil society and the historical perspective used in this chapter provide a useful lens to 
examine democratisation and the building of democratic structures and governance (Lewis, 
2002).  
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In order to present this development, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section assesses the legacies of Soviet state-society relations in order to illustrate historic 
antecedents that have shaped civil society ever since. The second section examines the 
development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia during 1990s, to illustrate the constraints 
that Russian civil society faced. It argues that specific cultural and societal norms with roots 
in the Soviet period continued to play a key role in shaping civil society arrangements in the 
post-Soviet period. The third section discusses contemporary civil society arrangements under 
the Putin/Medvedev administrations. In particular this section examines how recent changes 
in Russia‟s economic, political and legal environment have been reflected in shifts in Russia‟s 
contemporary civil society arrangements. The final section synthesises the previous 
discussion and issues in order to highlight the path-dependency of civil society development 
in the Russian context. In this section it is argued that, similar to Russian-style democracy and 
market economy, there are indications for emerging managed civil society arrangements. 
Within this model of civil society, its agents, networks and organisations are likely to develop 
and maintain strong and dependent relationships with the state. The propositions put forward 
in this section and throughout this chapter underpin the research objectives presented in 
chapter one.  
 
3.2 Civil society in Soviet Russia 
The chronological overview presented within this chapter compares and contrasts civil society 
in Russia with the western model outlined in chapter two. Such a chronological approach 
allows the tracing of cultural-historic legacies, and their effect on the development of Russian 
civil society. This section will elaborate on civil society in Soviet Russia to provide the basis 
for further considerations.  
 
In assessing civil society arrangements in the Soviet Union, civil society has been described 
as either non-existent (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Shlapentokh, 1989; Uhlin, 
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2006), or institutionalized (Evans, 2006a; Rose, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). Supporters 
arguing for the non-existence of civil society illustrate that civil society can only exist in an 
autonomous space (see chapter 2). However, such generalisations and macro-level 
considerations do not sufficiently explain the peculiar state-society relations that could be 
observed in the Soviet Union. Therefore, other authors argue that civil society was 
institutionalised as part of the state‟s power apparatus (Evans, 2006a; Rose, 1995; Mishler & 
Rose, 1997). They outline how the state organised institutions which took on similar roles to 
western TSOs, such as sports and social clubs (Evans, 2006a; Bernhard, 1996). However, 
because these organisations were created and operated by the state, Evans (2006a) argues that 
civil society in the Soviet Union was institutionalised within the structures of the state.  
 
These government-organised organisations/movements such as, for example, the Komsomol, 
served as monopoly organisations for their assigned constituency (Krainov, 1993). This 
“intricately organised series of state-controlled organisations” (Howard, 2002b, p. 293) meant 
that Soviet civil space was institutionalised within the political environment. Unlike Western 
(traditional) civil society arrangements, in the Soviet period the realm of „voluntary‟ 
associations representing civil society was not separate from the state. To Soviet citizens, 
these government-organised organisations were portrayed as spaces of participation and 
activism. However, rather than relying on voluntary participation, participation was 
mandatory and seen as a patriotic duty (Evans, 2006a). Subsequently, a culture of voluntary 
participation was prohibited from developing. Not only did this institutionalised nature of 
civil society leave a legacy of rejection of voluntary activity, but it also led Russians to fear 
“any association with independent collective activity” (Smolar, 1996, p. 33).  
 
Despite the autonomy in running themselves, these organisations did not set out to challenge 
the dominance of the state (Uhlin, 2006). A case in point is the environmental movement, 
which was the only autonomous movements permitted (Crotty, 2006). The All-Russian Union 
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of Conservationists was the only mass-movement to officially exist in addition to the 
Communist Party (Weiner, 1999). However, this movement did not aspire to engage in 
collective action but  
 
“hoped to persuade and enlighten bureaucrats to invite them into the circles of power” 
(Weiner, 1999, p. 10).  
 
Therefore many members of this movement opposed establishing organisations which would 
be completely separate and autonomous from the state (Evans, 2006a; Weiner 1999).  
 
The majority of government-organised organisations/movements aimed to provide services to 
Soviet citizens, and served as an administrative buffer between the state and society. 
Individuals received these services on the basis of their contribution to the Communist 
collective and not their need (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). As part of the nomenklatura system, 
the leadership of these organisations was appointed by the Communist party. Through this 
“étatisation” (Fish, 1991, p. 301) of civil society life, the state was able to organise “socio-
cultural life” (Migranian, 1988, p. 24) within the Soviet Union. Soviet civil space became a 
part of the vertical power structures the state used to coerce participation and monopolise 
public discourse (Stephenson, 2000). Therefore, and conversely to western civil society 
arrangements, the role of these organisations was to monitor society rather than monitoring 
the state (Bernhard, 1996). This nurtured mistrust towards the elites and the state (Howard, 
2002a), reflecting that civil society was a space of fear and conformity, rather than a space for 
free speech and controversy, which is integral to its aggregation of interest functionality (see 
chapter 2). 
 
Consequently, and alongside institutionalised civil society, small and personalised networks 
and mainly „illegal‟ grass-roots organisations existed (Fish, 1991). These independent 
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networks formed around intelligentsia circles, which consisted of “opposition-minded 
intellectuals” (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 57). They were “tight-knit, highly insular, and 
mutually suspicious circles” (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 57) and often met informally in 
the flats of members (Gibson, 2001). These “kitchen circles” (Gibson, 2001, p. 54) were 
outlets for discussions and the discourse which was unable to take place within the „official‟ 
civil society sphere. Furthermore, ordinary Russians relied on similar informal personal 
networks to offset arising shortages and uncertainty present throughout the Communist 
regime (Rose, 1995). Soviets used these networks to circumvent the continuous scarcity of 
basic consumer goods, as well as to gain access to other necessary resources (Ledeneva, 1998; 
Rose, 2000). Consequently, social interaction and activity of individuals took place in an 
informally and officially „illegal‟ setting (Uhlin, 2006). The constriction of the space of civil 
society via controlling its agents bred a culture that favoured “circles of intimacy and trust 
among family members and close friends” (Evans, 2006a, p. 47). In particular, Soviets 
became very proficient at circumventing authority and the state (Rose, 2000). In turn this 
further aggravated the mistrust vis-à-vis the state and the elites (Rose, 1995).  
 
In 1985 Gorbachev initiated a process that, amongst other reforms, aimed at democratisation 
(Moses, 1989) and liberalisation (Schroeder, 1989) of the Communist regime. This process 
aimed at democratising and pluralising the communist system, but fundamentally changing it 
(Evans, 2006a; Remington, 1989; Uhlin, 2006). The liberalisation which took place during 
this period resulted in the flourishing of alternative and more independent associations and 
organisations, leading to, for example, the strengthening of the environmental movement 
(Crotty, 2006), or the emergence of alternative political parties (Fish, 1991) and movements 
with specific political demands (Uhlin, 2006). However, the state remained closed and largely 
unreceptive to the demands of this emerging civil society (Fish, 1995; Uhlin, 2006). As a 
result, many of these organisations remained informal, and neglected their organisational 
development (Fish, 1991).  
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The perestroika period prompted the development of social movements rather than an 
institutionalisation of an autonomous civil society space which would manifest itself in the 
creation of TSOs acting as intermediaries between state and society (Fish, 1991). These 
movements, as historical events show, were able to command broad public support and 
participation (Fish, 1991). However, the aim of regime change led to the focus on one specific 
campaign, rather than the development of sustainable ways of interest aggregation and 
representation (Fish, 1995). Therefore, mass-participation in demonstrations and other of the 
movement‟s activities did not transfer into the formation of more „formal‟ representational 
arrangements. Autonomous and intermediary TSOs able to mediate, bridge, and 
institutionalise democratic ways of interaction with the state did not materialise. Even though 
the perestroika period led to the end of monolithic Soviet-style civil society, the result was 
not a space or middle ground for collective action which would bridge between the individual 
and the state. The lack of genuine democratisation of the state and its structure, and failure to 
fundamentally change state-society relations, meant that the informal ways of the past 
persisted. A majority of these informal networks often pursued undemocratic and “uncivil 
objectives” (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998, p. 2038). 
 
Even as democratisation and liberalisation progressed, public action was primarily taking 
place within the boundaries set and defined by the state. As discussed above, these 
arrangements were characterised by a lack of generalised trust and the reliance on informal 
networks at either end of the society (Evans, 2006a). Rose (1995) termed such societal 
arrangements as reflecting an hourglass.  
 
3.2.1 The hourglass society 
The hourglass society, by definition, consisted of two halves containing elites on one side and 
ordinary citizens on the other. The top-half was characterized by a rich political and social life 
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amongst the elites (Rose, 1995). Networks of cooperation existed in an informal manner, 
allowing individuals to secure their own (mainly political) goals. The bottom-half was also 
characterized by a rich social life (Rose, 1995). These networks were based around the 
nuclear family and friends. Effectively, the hourglass society made the private sphere and the 
state into two separate and isolated spaces (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). Networks outside the 
official structures were „illegal‟ or „anti-state‟, and therefore had to remain informal. 
Networks within the state were used for personal benefit and thus aimed to remain informal. 
The concept of the hourglass demonstrates that there was no civil space available for civil 
society to develop and act as a bridge between the individual and the state (see chapter 2).  
 
Notwithstanding the institutionalised versus absent debate in the literature, the concept of the 
hourglass society highlights the effect such arrangements had on societal as well as state-
society relations. Institutional arrangements that were meant to reflect civil society either 
existed within the top half, that is the state, or the bottom half of the hourglass (Mishler & 
Rose, 1997). Networks in the bottom half were dominated by personal trust (see chapter 2.4), 
and were informal in nature as well as suspicious of network outsiders and therefore isolated 
from each other. This created a society in which individuals were atomised and distrustful 
(Bahry & Silver, 1987; Smolar, 1996). Individuals relied heavily on social networks 
consisting of „strong ties‟ (Granovetter, 1973). These networks did not engage in collective 
public action, but focused on „individual action‟ for the benefit of the network and its 
members, (Rose, 2000) and served as a defence against the economic shortcomings of state 
(Rose, 1995; Gibson, 2001).  
 
The hourglass nature of society and its effects on state-society relations meant that civil 
society development and democratisation would always face a substantial challenge. The lack 
of outward-oriented social capital and dominance of inward-oriented social capital (Gibson, 
2001; Paldam & Svendsen, 2000) limited the potential of civil society networks to contribute 
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to democratisation (see chapter 2.4). Mistrust towards elites and the insulation of the top and 
the bottom halves of society did not allow a culture of collective action to develop (Smolar, 
1996), and resulted in the reliance on informal networks. In addition, voluntary collective 
action outside the state organised outlets was prohibited. The institutionalisation of civil 
society meant that a rejection of voluntarism and „formalised‟ civil society activity was 
cultivated. These effects persisted after the break up of the Soviet Union (Mishler & Rose, 
1997; Rose, 2008) and affected the development of civil society and the creation of 
intermediary TSOs in post-Soviet Russia (Rose, 2001). At the onset, the perestroika period 
promised to fundamentally change the underlying state-society relationship. However, the 
lack of change of the state meant that the hourglass nature of society persisted (Crotty, 2006). 
Drawing on this assertion, the following section examines civil society in the 1990s to 
highlight the impact that these legacies have had on the development of civil society in post-
Soviet Russia. 
 
3.3 Post-Soviet civil society in the Yeltsin era 
In the 1990s, as part of the „shock therapy‟ program, the Russian state implemented market 
economic reforms and continued with the process of democratisation (Schroeder, 1996). Over 
the course of this, the state withdrew from various activities and responsibilities which had 
been within its purview (Crotty, 2006). In particular, the provision of social services to 
vulnerable groups was affected by the withdrawal of the state, as it occurred without the 
emergence of institutions or organisations able to take on these roles and responsibilities 
(Poznanski, 2001; Wengle & Rasell, 2008). As illustrated in chapter two, in the democratic 
context it was the TSOs which took on these activities. Even though Soviet-style civil society 
organisations did not fit the classical conceptions of civil society (see chapter 2.3), from the 
perspective of Russians, they often provided services which were needed now more than ever 
before (Evans, 2006a). However, the state‟s economic difficulties (Hanson, 2003; Lavgine, 
2000) meant that resource support for the flagships of Soviet social activism all but ceased 
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(Evans, 2006a). In effect, the Russian state was unable even to contract out service provision 
to TSOs (see chapter 2.3). As a result, large parts of Russia‟s population, such as the disabled, 
veterans, and politically repressed were effectively „forgotten‟ by the state (Kennedy, 
Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Henderson, 2008). Despite this, many Russians still relied on the 
state, or at least expected it to provide many of these abandoned and often basic services 
(Crotty, 2003). These circumstances increased the uncertainties of daily lives (Dowley & 
Silver, 2002; Luong & Weinthal, 1999), forcing Russians to fall back on their tight-knit 
informal networks.  
 
Further, the democratisation process was aimed at the decentralisation of political power. This 
meant the transfer of decision making to regional power holders, which substantially 
weakened the power base of the Federal centre (Cappelli, 2008). Such political changes were 
accompanied with „market‟ reforms. These reforms resulted in a controversial process of 
privatisation of former state-owned businesses (Schroeder, 1996; Shlapentokh, 2003), which 
reduced the state‟s involvement in economic activity. It also allowed the members of the old 
nomenklatura to enrich themselves, re-enforcing distrust vis-à-vis the elites (Linz & Krueger, 
1996). This excessive cutting back of the state neglected the creation of structures and 
institutions that would be necessary to facilitate the development of a democratic society and 
state (Gel'man, 2004; Rose, 2000). Sil and Chen (2004) label all these developments as “state 
over-withdrawal” (p. 363). However, the state acting as a „rule‟ setter and enforcer is as 
important for the development of civil society as its acknowledgement of civil society as an 
autonomous space (see chapter 2.2). As the previous section indicated, the attitudes and 
structures needed to develop an autonomous civil society space were absent from the 
institutional memory of the Russian state. Consequently, the post-Soviet emerging 
institutional environment remained unreliable, unfair, opaque, and overly complicated (Rose, 
2000). Therefore, Soviet period mechanisms to „get by‟ and access necessary resources, 
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which served most so well in the past, persisted. Thus, Russians continued what they did best 
in the past, and relied on their informal networks (Rose, 2000).  
 
This “second economy and polity” (Gitelman, 1984, p. 241) helped individuals not only to 
insulate themselves from the state‟s institutions, but also allowed them to exploit the state. 
The use of these „anti-modern‟ tactics, for example personal connections, were pivotal to both 
coping with the uncertainties of transition and profiting from the transition process 
(Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 2000). Subsequently, the limited interaction between both halves 
facilitated by social movements that emerged in the perestroika period all but disappeared. 
Newly emerging TSOs, and TSOs that sprung out of former Soviet organisations, struggled to 
make ends meet and engrained themselves even more within either the top or the bottom half, 
which led to a polarisation of civil society (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998). As a result 
civil society remained intact as the hourglass society.  
 
3.3.1 The ‘building’ of civil society 
As discussed above, in an environment of over-withdrawal and rapid democratisation, civil 
society had the possibility to expand its constricted space by taking on and replacing activities 
formerly conducted by the state (see chapter 2.3). For the first time, voluntary associations 
and autonomous TSOs received legal recognition. This led western observers to argue that 
emerging civil society arrangements would support and stimulate political transition and 
democratisation (Lindenberg, 1999; Reiner, 1991). However, due to the cultural and social 
legacies inherited from the Soviet past, TSOs faced a number of problems which inhibited 
them and the development of an autonomous civil society. The following section examines in 
more detail the deficiencies of civil society development in the Yeltsin era. These deficiencies 
have been the key constraints that have hindered the development of civil society as an 
autonomous space conducive to democratisation (see chapter 2.2). 
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3.3.1.1 Constraint 1 – fragmentation  
As discussed, civil society life in the perestroika period was dominated by independent social 
movements seeking regime change (Fish, 1991). This was an objective that such movements 
shared with the broader public, and therefore they were able to mobilise mass-support. 
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and subsequent rapid democratisation, these 
movements lost their raison d’être and fragmented into many single issue groups and 
organisations. During the perestroika period, social movements were able to form by coming 
together around a common objective and goal that was shared by the majority of the 
population. However, the rapid development of the groups driving these social movements 
meant that they were unable to develop “a common identity” (Crotty, 2009, p. 89) that could 
sustain them beyond achieving the regime change objective. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, politicking within the various social movements which contributed to the 
downfall of the communist party meant newly emerging TSOs mistrusted one another (Evans, 
2002). The majority of these emerging TSOs focused on narrow and local issues, and found it 
difficult to connect with like-mined groups elsewhere in the country, the same region, or even 
the same city (Crotty, 2006). These TSOs formed around personalised networks (Baglione & 
Clark, 1998; Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), and faced with economic difficulties, pursued 
objectives that served the core group and not a wider constituency (Evans, 2002), thus re-
enforcing the fragmentation process. However, in order to create an autonomous civil society 
space that is able to bridge between the individual and the state, collaboration amongst TSOs 
is vital (see chapter 2.2 and 2.4). 
 
The tight-knit and personalised nature of the networks at the heart of TSOs meant that they 
were reluctant about participation of people outside the core network. This hindered them in 
devising and implementing strategies to acquire new members (Salmenniemi, 2005) and thus 
broader public support. Very often networks engaged in „anti-modern‟ behaviour, focusing on 
advancing the economic or political interest of their core group rather than the needs and 
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demands of their designated constituency (Evans, 2002). As discussed above, this reflects past 
practices. Now, such inward-oriented networks (see chapter 2.4) often use the funding they 
receive to “provide services to a selected number of acquaintances” (Sundstrom & Henry, 
2006, p. 311). As a result, TSOs mistrust not only the state but also each other and thus have 
lost their legitimacy as aggregators and representatives of public interest. 
 
The failure of TSOs to institutionalise themselves as intermediary organisations which any 
individual could join freely and voluntarily limited their ability to bridge between the 
individual and the state (see chapter 2.2). Furthermore, it exacerbated the fragmentation of 
civil society. After a short period of dominant social movements, (Fish, 1991) civil society 
reverted to consisting of atomised networks unable to come together to form meaningful, 
influential, and broadly supported movements building an autonomous civil society. The 
fragmentation of civil society, and the subsequent behaviour of TSOs, meant that they are 
unable to act as intermediary organisations able to initiate collective action between the state 
and the individual. The failure to move from „institutionalised‟ Soviet civil society to 
institutionalising civil society as an intermediary sphere (see chapter 2.2) meant that TSOs‟ 
contribution to the democratisation process was limited. TSOs did not seek to position 
themselves in between the state and society, but continued to exist within the upper or lower 
half of the hourglass. Therefore, similar to civil society in the Soviet Union, there were no 
TSOs bridging between the two halves of the hourglass. 
  
3.3.1.2 Constraint 2 – lack of public support 
The absence of public support and participation was a central deficiency that impeded the 
development of TSOs in the „middle ground‟ between the state and the individual. Broad 
based support and participation are critical for interest aggregation, representation and 
mediation (see chapter 2.2). The lack of public support not only constrained TSOs‟ ability to 
conduct activities, but also limited their legitimacy to engage in interest aggregation and 
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collective public action. During the perestroika period, social movements enjoyed broad 
participation.  However, as discussed, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union this mass-
support faded away. The lack of public participation has substantially limited the ability of 
TSOs to institutionalise a civil society sphere that is both a counterweight and an equal 
partner to the state. Without public support TSOs were „invisible‟ to the state and lacked the 
ability to participate in policy making (Crotty, 2009).  
 
For Russians, past government-organised organisations/movements were the most relevant 
because they provided much needed services (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). However, due to 
their past association with the communist regime, they were unable to attract support. 
Furthermore, as participation used to be mandatory in these organisations, these TSOs lack 
the capabilities and skills to attract participation. TSOs that emerged during the perestroika 
period or thereafter were also unable to solicit public support. On the one hand, as discussed 
above, this was a result of the tight-knit personalised structure of the networks at the heart of 
such organisations (see chapter 3.3.1.1). These TSOs were often parochial in nature, and thus 
could not be the playground for practicing democratic values (Chapter 2.3). On the other 
hand, these TSOs often represented and advanced issues which did not address the needs of 
ordinary Russians at the time. Only when TSOs addressed issues of concern for the wider 
population were they able to mobilise people outside the core network (Sundstrom, 2005). 
Nonetheless, such events were a rare occurrence (Henry, 2006). Subsequently, TSOs did not 
appeal to ordinary Russians and were unable to establish themselves as aggregators of public 
opinion, a crucial role of TSOs in order to bridge between the individual and the state (see 
chapter 2.2). 
 
Another factor inhibiting participation and thus the institutionalisation of democratising and 
effective civil society arrangements, were the effects of forced participation in Soviet social 
organisations. As argued above, Russians had no experience of, or will to, volunteer or be 
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active in formalised TSOs (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). This culture of anti-voluntarism was 
further accentuated by disappointment and disillusionment with political change since the end 
of the Soviet Union (Luong & Weinthal, 1999; Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). As illustrated in 
chapter two, volunteerism is pivotal to the development of both civil society and activities of 
TSOs. However, TSOs themselves did not engage in countering this anti-volunteering culture 
(Smolar, 1996). Furthermore, Soviet period distrust towards the state evolved into distrust 
towards newly emerging democratic structures including TSOs (Shlapentokh, 2006; 
Sundstrom & Henry, 2006), which, in a similar way to new „market‟ economic structures, 
were seen as serving the old elites. Therefore, membership in TSOs remained low and public 
support limited. 
 
Such organisational weaknesses constrained TSOs when engaging with local communities 
and authorities (Crotty, 2009; Luong & Weinthal, 1999), and as a result civil society was 
unable to institutionalise itself as a separate intermediary sphere. Social and political life 
continued to persist within either the lower or top half of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006). As a 
consequence, this inhibited TSOs to act as bridges between the state and ordinary citizens - a 
central role of TSOs in modern democratic societies (see chapter 2.2). Therefore, the 
contribution of TSOs to the process of democratisation and democracy consolidation was 
limited.   
 
3.3.1.4 Constraint 3 – resources poverty 
In addition to the fragmentation and lack of public support, civil society development in post-
Soviet Russia faced limited availability of domestic resources (Evans, 2002). Domestic 
support through the state was insufficient, and channelled into basic services (Richter, 2002) 
and uncontroversial charitable causes (Rutland, 2006). Such support was often used to keep 
afloat former Soviet social organisations of TSOs closely associated with the state. For other 
TSOs, foreign funding offered the possibility to circumvent this lack of resources, and 
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Russian TSOs quickly became reliant upon it (Hemment, 2004). However, all too often 
foreign support resulted in the development of vertical networks between donors and TSOs, in 
which the latter focused on competing for foreign grants rather than creating civic 
communities or stimulating collective action (Henderson, 2002; Mendelson, 2001; 
Sundstrom, 2005). This “principle clientelism” (Henderson, 2002, p. 140) discouraged TSOs 
from working as agents of Russian society. Further, TSOs dependent on foreign funds were 
seen as “creatures of foreign agitation and unsuited to Russian conditions” (Sundstrom & 
Henry, 2006, p. 313) by the state. 
 
Under the auspice of the “good governance agenda” (Richter, 2008, p. 278), foreign donors 
provided both funding and ideological support (Crotty, 2003). Nonetheless, in a similar way 
to which western style corporate governance structures and frameworks were imported into 
the Russian business environment (McCarthy & Puffer, 2008), this imported model of civil 
society neglected the historical-cultural norms, values and institutions already in place. 
Foreign support often meant that TSOs reshaped their priorities, and subsequently donors set 
the agenda of TSOs (Sundstorm & Henry, 2006). Hence activities pursued by TSOs were not 
grounded within the values and norms of Russian society, and did not reflect what Russians 
needed (Crotty, 2003). At the heart of foreign supported activities were agendas that 
promoted advocacy and the counterweight functionality of civil society (see chapter 2.2). As 
discussed above, the lack of building democratic institutions meant that appropriate channels 
within the political environment for such advocacy activities were missing (Henderson, 
2008). Conversely to its intentions, foreign support often meant that TSOs did not “reach out 
to the Russian public” (Crotty, 2009, p. 91). Consequently, TSOs receiving foreign support 
were unable to connect with either the public or the state. Even though they positioned 
themselves in the „middle ground‟, they lacked the legitimate recognition and societal 
grounding to bridge the gap between the individual and the state (Richter, 2002).  
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Nevertheless, foreign support for civil society in post-Soviet Russia has had some success in 
contributing to the development of organisational capabilities (Mendelson, 2009) and 
democratising TSOs (Mendelson, 2001). However, even though the space for public 
interaction was available, existing organisations were not developed enough to take advantage 
of this. Foreign funding on a micro-level improved the capabilities and capacities of specific 
TSOs in an organisational sense, and helped them to survive (Crotty, 2009; Sundstrom, 2006). 
On the macro-level, foreign funding only had a minimal effect on the progress of 
democratisation (Crotty, 2009; Mendelson, 2009). Foreign support failed to contribute to the 
institutionalising of civil society or triggering of fundamental changes in societal 
arrangements and state-society relations (Weigle, 2000). Activists turned to foreign funding 
not because they agreed with the western civil society arrangements, but because they lacked 
domestic resources to develop their own model of civil society arrangements. Thus it was not 
surprising that such a western „built‟ civil society was a model that was often far different 
from what Russian activists envisioned (Hemment, 2004). 
  
3.3.1.5 Impacts on post-Soviet civil society development 
The three constraints discussed above have far reaching consequences, and are the reason why 
civil society remains weak and constricted. Civil society is unable to participate in policy 
decision-making processes, which is critical to democracy (see chapter 2.2). The chronic 
fragmentation of civil society has limited TSOs from coming together to form strong social 
movements able to aggregate and articulate particular interest. As a consequence, TSOs are 
unable to pluralise public discourse. Further, the lack of public support and resources has 
limited TSOs to occupying the role of intermediaries bridging between the individual and the 
state. Thus, effectively TSOs remained in either the lower or top half of the hourglass. Even 
though foreign support encouraged TSOs to become intermediary organisations and 
counterweights to the state, the way such support was distributed meant that they remain 
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disconnected from the public and the state (Crotty, 2009). Overall these three constraints 
meant that TSOs lack legitimacy as representatives of civil society.  
 
TSOs are unable to contribute to either building civil society or the democratisation of the 
formal institutional environment (see chapter 2.3). Therefore civil society is assessed as weak 
(Hale, 2002), and its development stalled (Howard, 2002a; Simon, 2004; Maxwell, 2006). 
Despite the will to break with Soviet practices of personalized networks and a paternalistic 
state, the reality of civil society development means that this did not materialise (Richter, 
2008). The cultural and societal norms which developed in the Soviet period continue to stall 
the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. Consequently, TSOs as agents of civil 
society were unable to develop and institutionalise civil society as a space and a key actor of 
Russia‟s emerging democratic governance structure. Russia‟s historic legacy and specific 
institutional traits resisted reform (Hedlund, 2008). This hindered civil society arrangements 
in which TSOs would be situated in an autonomous space, and could act as an intermediary 
between the state and the individual. Civil society as an autonomous space (see chapter 2.2 
and 2.5) insufficiently addresses the cultural-historic trajectories of a dominant state (Hyden, 
1997). In particular, the idea of a relatively limited role of the state in society is something 
that is arguably historically and culturally alien in Russia (Hedlund, 2006). In addition, the 
development of civil society was constrained by the lack of state-building and subsequent 
absence of structures, institutions and state-society relations which would facilitate civil 
society arrangements; for example a functioning and independent judiciary, a system of social 
contracting or formalized ways for state-civil society interaction (Henderson, 2008). The 
combination of these factors have “hindered the development of a robust civil society” 
(Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 58). 
 
In summary this section has outlined the critical constraints to the development of a vibrant 
civil society as outlined in chapter two. Despite the „kernel‟ of civil activism that contributed 
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to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Crotty, 2009), this section has outlined that they have not 
materialised into the development of civil society as an autonomous space. Subsequently, 
civil society has only made a limited contribution to democracy consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 
1996). TSOs are weak and unable to connect with the public to date, or act as bridges between 
individuals and the state (see chapter 2.2). Further, ordinary Russians, as well as the elites, 
continue to rely on personalised networks, which keep the hourglass nature of Russia intact. 
These circumstances weaken civil society. As will be outlined in the following section, such 
weaknesses of civil society provide the state with ample opportunities to manage civil society.  
 
3.4 Civil society under Putin/Medvedev 
Following Putin‟s ascendance to power in 2000, the state‟s influence over economic and 
political life in Russia has increased (Balzer, 2003). Russia has become wealthier compared to 
the 1990s, but not more democratic (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). Many formal aspects of 
democracy have been abolished, such as the division of power (Shlapentokh, 2008). Russian 
voters have witnessed a decrease of political options in elections (Konitzer & Wegren, 2006), 
as well as an increase of security service and military control over the administration (Benz, 
2006; Rivera & Rivera, 2006). Once again a party of power has been established which 
assumes the role of ensuring institutional conformity, at least of formal governance 
institutions (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008), and the implementation of government policy across 
Russia‟s many regions (Easter, 2008; Gel'man, 2006; Remington, 2008). After what the state 
saw as the privatisation of political power by regional officials and businessmen 
(Krystanovskaya & White, 2005), these new developments constitute a forceful 
recentralisation of power (Squier, 2002). However, thus far the success of ensuring 
compliance is patchy (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008). Nonetheless, as argued in this section, the 
active curtailment of civil society activity creates an additional channel for the strengthening 
power of the state (Taylor, 2006).  
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The recentralisation of power has led to a “sovereign” (Shlapentokh, 2009, p. 318) or 
“managed democracy” (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007, p. 1025), in which society and all social 
structures are deemed to be subservient to the state (Oversloot, 2007). In this Russian style 
democracy, the state or gosudarstvo plays a directing and managing role. Involvement and 
participation of citizens in politics is limited and only possible within clearly defined 
boundaries (Gill, 2006). The ideology of putting the state first has become the driving 
ideology behind the state‟s re-engagement with civil society. In extending such arrangements 
to civil society, TSOs need to become “gosudarstvenniki” (Oversloot, 2007, p. 43), which 
loosely translates as „supporters of the state‟, to facilitate strengthening the power of the state 
and the creation of statehood (gosudarstvennost). In the economy, the resurgent state 
manifests itself into the emergence of a Russian-style market economy in which the state 
plays a dominant role, which results in state-corporatism (Hanson & Teague, 2005). This 
development has subsequently reinvigorated Soviet norms of paternalism (Hedlund, 2006; 
Rosefielde, 2005). This consolidation and strengthening of the Federal power impacts the 
future of the democratisation process in Russia (Hashim, 2005). Further, TSOs as agents of 
democratisation (see chapter 2.3), experience a more restrictive approach (Domrin, 2003; 
Evans, 2006b; Hudson, 2003; Maxwell, 2006) and a curtailment of activity (Crotty, 2009). 
Yet, as previously discussed, these developments are facilitated by both the Soviet period and 
the Yeltsin era. Ever since Putin ascended to power, he has proactively sought to control the 
activities of TSOs. The first attempt to draw TSOs in and make them subservient to the state 
was the „civil forum‟ (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002). This was followed by the implementation 
of a legislative framework aimed at gaining influence over TSOs. Pivotal to this process was a 
law entitled „On Introducing Amendment into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation‟ (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2009), which is commonly 
paraphrased as the 2006 NGO law or Russian NGO law (Crotty, 2009), and is outlined in the 
following section. 
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3.4.1 The 2006 NGO law 
The 2006 NGO law has refocused civil society development as a process driven by domestic 
forces. With the argument that TSOs are harbouring foreign spies (Reynolds, 2007), as well 
as the fear of a colour revolution similar to the ones that took place elsewhere in the region 
(Ambrosio, 2007; Parfitt, 2006; Reynolds, 2007), Russia‟s political elites moved to restrict the 
freedom of TSOs. Whereas the threat of colour revolutions might have been at Russia‟s 
doorstep, the main aim of the new legislation was to restrict foreign influence over civil 
society (Maxwell, 2006). The NGO law clearly outlines the boundaries and threshold 
conditions that TSOs need to fulfil in order to legitimately participate in Russian civil society, 
one of which is the limitation of foreign funding (see section 3.3.1.4 for agency issues related 
to foreign funding). The restrictive nature of the 2006 NGO law serves to encourage the 
exchange of the former foreign principles by the state, or structures/organisations under close 
control of the state (Livishin & Weitz, 2006,) and thus provides the state with leverage to 
manage civil society. 
 
Mirroring changes in politics and the economy, which provide the state with more influence, 
the Russian government introduced this new law to govern TSOs. These changes regulate 
TSOs in four specific ways. Firstly, the legislation granted authorities far-reaching grounds to 
deny registration to both newly established TSOs, as well as incumbents who were compelled 
to seek re-registration (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2009). The necessary 
documentation requires detailed personal information of all members and founders. Second, 
the law also provides supervisory authorities with far reaching powers to audit TSOs. 
Authorities have the power to request all internal financial statements, as well as attend public 
and private meetings of TSOs. Furthermore, the supervisor authorities check on an annual 
basis whether TSOs adhere to their own stated goals (Maxwell, 2006). Furthermore, the law 
makes a clear distinction between foreign and domestic TSOs. The former are subject to more 
stringent monitoring and reporting requirements. This power incorporates the ability to view 
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and amend governance structures of TSOs. Third, the NGO law also regulates the funding 
TSOs receive and how they use it, in particular if funds are provided by foreign donors. In a 
recent amendment to the law, donations, be they domestic or from abroad, are taxed at 24% if 
the donor is not on a government approved list (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit 
Law, 2009). Fourth, the NGO law also regulates the membership criteria of TSOs. The law 
clearly outlines people who are a) able to form and run TSOs, and b) allowed to participate in 
the activities of TSOs. Furthermore, the law regulates the liquidation of TSOs, which do not 
meet reporting and registration deadlines or are deemed to violate the law in other ways.  
 
The overall judgment on whether or not the 2006 law will be the end of an independent civil 
society is yet to be made (Maxwell, 2006). It has to be acknowledged however that the law 
strengthens the state‟s powers vis-à-vis TSOs, in particular those which take up advocacy and 
regime critical roles (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). The law also affects organisations 
conducting activities similar to those of government structures, i.e. organisations that take up 
activities and roles from which the state has previously withdrawn (for example in areas such 
as health and education). However, it should be recognized that this encroachment of the state 
might have positive repercussions. Proponents of the NGO law argue that Russian civil 
society has been weak and its development slow for some time now (Maxwell, 2006). They 
argue that the 2006 law will improve, stabilise as well as make the working environment for 
TSOs more predictable (Maxwell, 2006; Reynolds, 2007). Consequently, within this 
environment, the state encourages TSOs to focus on their organisational deficiencies, 
addressing structural and organisational issues which have hindered voluntary mass 
participation (Henderson, 2008; see section 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). It seems that in a Foucauldian 
manner, the law creates an incentive system that directs TSOs to act according to the roles 
envisioned for them by the state. Hence, it is the NGO law‟s nature which provides the state 
with necessary legal leverage to manage civil society. As part of these civil society 
arrangements, the state has brought to life more structured and formalised ways for TSOs-
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state interaction (Richter, 2009). Despite the restrictive approach vis-à-vis funding and 
activities, these more formalized ways of interaction grant TSOs more access to the state and 
possibly influence in policy-making (Henderson, 2008). Nonetheless, in an environment 
where personalised networks are dominant, structured and formalised access allows the state 
to make this access more exclusive (Oversloot, 2007). However, empirical evidence of the 
law‟s impact on TSOs is lacking - a void addressed in this thesis when examining the 
„external‟ conditions for managed civil society arrangements (see chapters 1 and 5). However, 
the law is only one pillar of emerging managed civil society arrangements. In addition to the 
legislative framework, the state also curtails civil society activity by controlling and directing 
TSOs directly (Crotty, 2009). 
  
3.4.2 Curtailment of organisational activity 
According to Crotty (2009), curtailment of organisational activities takes place via marionette 
organisations. TSOs which are controlled and directed by the state are referred to as “pseudo” 
(Crotty, 2006, p. 1324) or “marionette” (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006, p. 34), and are defined 
as “artificially constructed TSOs controlled by the state bureaucracy” (Cook & Vinogradova, 
2006, p. 32). Such organisations are characterised by their proximity to the authorities and 
inherent lack of independence. They display their closeness by legitimising, complementing 
and supporting the state‟s ideological standpoint. Marionette organisations are able to survive 
because they maintain mutually dependent and profitable relationships with the authorities, 
portraying themselves as independent, yet at the same time acting in accordance to the strings 
which are being pulled by their puppet masters. However, such organisations are not new 
within the context of the Russian Federation. Marionette organisations are a legacy of the 
Soviet variant of civil society (Uhlin, 2006). Many contemporary marionettes have sprung out 
of former „institutionalised‟ actors of Soviet civil society. They survived the Yeltsin period 
due to their inherent embeddedness in elite structures (Uhlin, 2006). Now under the 
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Putin/Medvedev presidencies, marionette organisations are becoming more prevalent within 
Russia‟s civil society landscape (Evans, 2006b). 
 
Marionette organisations can be seen as competitors to independent TSOs. Their aim is to 
limit the influence of latter in civil society, and ultimately assist the state to control and 
manage social activity (Hedlund, 2006). These government affiliated organisations are key to 
help “demonstrate unity of opinion between the administration and the public” (Nikitin & 
Buchanan, 2002, p. 149). Therefore, they serve the objectives of the Russian state, to only pay 
lip service to civil society (see chapter 1). As mentioned previously, the leeway that the new 
NGO law provides in terms of implementation means that the political elites can use the law 
to ban and dismantle independent TSOs in order to allow their own marionette organisations 
to take up these roles. At the same time, the state aims to capture and influence the leaders of 
TSOs, creating hybrid marionette organisations.  
 
Hybrid marionettes are dependent on the state, but also have the capabilities and capacities, if 
necessary, to challenge local political elites and bureaucracy, and bring them in line with the 
priorities of the Federal centre. Contrary to marionettes, which are associated with specific 
political networks, factions, or individuals, frequently at local or regional level, the 
allegiances of such hybrid marionettes lie with the policies and ideologies of the Federal state. 
It is the allegiance of hybrid marionettes to the Federal state which enables them to challenge 
state authorities on a local level (see chapter 2.2 for an outline of the importance of 
considering state power at various levels in Russia). Unlike marionettes, hybrid marionettes 
are not directly controlled by state bureaucrats. The state manages such hybrid marionettes via 
their ideological buy-in and provision of resources. As will be illustrated in chapter seven, 
section two, the Federal state has created various incentive systems to achieve such 
ideological buy-in. Mirroring what are understood as multi-purpose hybrid TSOs (Hasenfeld 
& Gidron, 2005), hybrid marionettes are thus not catalysts for social change but maintainers 
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of the paternalistic cultural logic shaping civil society arrangements, acting as invaluable 
service providers in light of state withdrawal. Consequently, these are independent 
organisations, which behave like gosudarstvenniki. Therefore, by encouraging TSOs to 
become hybrid marionettes, the Federal state is providing a tool to enforce political power 
structures (Taylor, 2006) and controlling social activity (Hedlund, 2006; Rosefielde, 2005). 
Thus such developments are indicative of the emergence of civil society arrangements that are 
fundamentally different to the understanding of civil society as an autonomous space.  
 
These recent trends, in combination with the constraints that affected civil society 
development (see section 3.3.1), have created a difficult working environment for TSOs. 
Their ability to build a vibrant civil society able to facilitate further democratisation is in 
doubt. However, these contemporary developments are the manifestation of past and deep 
rooted civil society arrangements. These circumstances will provide the state post-ante the 
Soviet period with the ability to manage civil society. This renders many TSOs merely 
servants to the state, providing particular services (see chapter 2.3), and effectively becoming 
shadow structures of the state. As the authorities are looking for the best political value for 
their resources, TSOs which address unpopular issues such as HIV/AIDS will find it even 
more difficult to access necessary resources. It is against this background of emerging 
managed civil society arrangements that this thesis investigates how such arrangements are 
manifested (see chapter 1).  
  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a chronological review of civil society development in Russia, 
outlining the constraints that have limited development. The overview clearly shows that a 
civil society as presented in chapter two does not exist within Russia. Therefore, Russia‟s 
civil society has thus far only made a limited contribution to democracy development in 
Russia. Civil society arrangements in Russia are not yet the space “between the individual 
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family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). Chapter two describes civil society as consisting 
of intermediary organisations that are able to bridge the gap between the individual and the 
state. However, post-Soviet Russia was faced with societal arrangements in which the 
networks at the heart of such TSOs were positioned at either end of the hourglass (see section 
3.2.1). Traditionally TSOs are able to cooperate with the state, and at the same time hold it 
accountable, acting as a counterweight to it (see chapter 2.3). Russia‟s peculiar arrangements 
mean that civil society is constricted and limited in its ability to act as a counterweight to the 
state (see chapter 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). Nevertheless, the underlying ability to bridge across leads 
TSOs to create social capital that facilitates democratic practices, and hence contributes to 
democratic consolidation (see chapter 2.1 & 2.5). Consequently, this thesis addresses how 
managed civil society arrangements, outlined throughout this chapter and the following 
paragraphs, manifest themselves in the context of the Russian Federation? 
 
The literature points out that TSOs in post-Soviet Russia have been affected by three major 
constraints outlined within this chapter (see section 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). These constraints have 
limited the institutionalisation of civil society as an autonomous space, bridging between the 
individual and the state and keeping the state in check. With the Russian state now managing 
all “levers of power and patronage” (Cappelli, 2008, p. 554), it has become dominating, 
directing and all-encompassing. As a result actors, structures, and institutions of civil society 
are required to maintain strong, structured, and ultimately dependent relationships with state 
structures. These peculiar civil society arrangements are rooted in Russia‟s cultural-historic 
trajectories. Therefore, to underpin the research objectives (see chapter 1.1.2) this section will 
draw on chapters two and three to discuss state „guided/managed‟ civil society development 
in Russia.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, section two, civil society and the state are autonomous of each 
other, however their cooperation on equal terms strengthens democracy (Taylor, 2006). 
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Nevertheless, the development of civil society outlined within this chapter shows that civil 
society arrangements in the context of the Russian Federation do not resemble those outlined 
in chapter two. Thus, parallel to the changes in the political and economic environment, 
Russian civil society arrangements are indicative of managed civil society arrangements. 
Comparing civil society development in Russia with the theoretical understanding outlined in 
chapter two illustrates that the ability of civil society to contribute to democratisation remains 
limited. Further, it shows that the state has taken on a directing and managing role when it 
comes to civil society development.  
 
Civil society as outlined in chapter two relies upon the participation of individuals and the 
state‟s responsiveness to this grass-roots impetus. However, in the post-Communist context, 
civic activity and participation remain low (Howard, 2002a; Salmenniemi, 2008), and similar 
issues are encountered in the African and Latin American context (Chandhoke, 2007; Kaldor, 
2003). The assumptions of a state responsive to bottom-up impetus is culturally alien to many 
„non-western‟ contexts, such as, for example China (Frolic, 1997), India (Chandhoke, 2007), 
or many African countries (Lewis, 2002). Within the context of the Russian Federation, the 
paternalistic traditions of the state and the “supremacy of the state in all aspects of social life” 
(Avtonomov, 2006, p. 3) suggest that an equal partnership between civil society and the state 
are unlikely to occur. Therefore, civil society in Russia might be an intermediary but not 
necessarily autonomous space.  
 
However, as outlined in chapter two, the separation, in terms of content, activities, and 
agendas, between the state and civil society is central to liberal democracy (Held, 1993). This 
is not necessarily the case in the Russian managed democracy variant. Managed democracy 
does still need a civil space, but not one that is able to stimulate social change and 
democratisation. Within liberal democratic civil society arrangements, TSOs offer the ability 
to engage and participate in decision-making that goes “beyond periodic voting” (Held, 1993, 
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p. 25). In this way TSOs „drag‟ ordinary people out of their private sphere, making them 
active citizens in the process (Held, 1993). Similarly, a managed Russian civil society might 
encourage participation and activities, however rather than „dragging‟ people out of the 
private sphere, TSOs exist to deliver services to them. This reflects a political mentality of the 
state, which is not about creating „active citizens‟ that can challenge the state, but about 
creating „taken care of citizens‟. Therefore, if TSOs embrace these managed/controlled civil 
society arrangements, it would challenge these epistemological assumptions which have been 
the driving forces of much civil society and democracy theory (see chapter 2). 
 
The second section of this chapter outlined underlying issues in societal structure, the role of 
social networks and traditions of social engagement in the Soviet Union. These have limited 
the ability of TSOs to contribute to democratisation. As a result, on the one hand TSOs do not 
assume the role of transmitting values and norms of democracy (see chapter 2.3). On the other 
hand, TSOs fail to encourage the positive social capital generation that would enable civil 
society to contribute to democratisation (see section 2.4). The Soviet period resulted in an 
hourglass society (see section 3.2.1), which meant that norms of cooperation for mutual 
benefit did not extend beyond the personalised and closed network, and thus social trust was 
severely limited (see section 3.2.1). However it is these aspects of social capital which are 
seen as the building blocks of democracy (Putnam, 1995).  
 
The legacy of the Soviet Union means that civil society is fragmented and TSOs do not 
interact with each other (see section 3.3.1.1). Thus, civil society is unable to establish itself as 
a middle ground between the private and the public (see chapter 2.2). Civil society remains 
constricted and unable to act as a counterweight to the state (see chapter 2.2), restricting its 
ability to contribute to the democratisation process. Russians lack trust vis-à-vis TSOs, which 
hampers their efforts to recruit new members. This results in a lack of public participation. 
Thus TSOs are unable to aggregate and represent the interests of society vis-à-vis the state, 
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and so TSOs are unable to bridge the gap between the individual and the state (see section 
2.1).  
 
Further, TSOs remain restricted to pre-existing social networks which are inward-looking (see 
chapter 2.4) and unable to advance the activities of their organisations (Salmenniemi, 2008; 
see section 3.3.1.2), and suffer from a shortage of resources (see section 3.3.1.3). Foreign 
support provided some relief in the past, but its reach and effect in establishing civil society as 
a middle ground and bridge between the individuals and the state remained limited (see 
section 3.3.1.3). Hence TSOs are unable to create “public [collective] action between the 
individual and the state” (Richter, 2002, p. 30). This means that civil society is not an 
autonomous, intermediary space which counterweights the states and subsequently 
contributes to democratisation (see chapter 2.5). The literature on civil society and TSOs in 
Russia shows that both are weak, offering some platform for social cooperation, but failing to 
generate social capital conducive to contributing to democracy and pluralising the democratic 
arena (see chapter 2.5). This explains the limited impact that civil society has had in the 
democratisation process in post-Soviet Russia. As established in chapter two, civil society‟s 
propensity to generate democratic externalities is dichotomously opposite the state‟s ability to 
manage civil society. In light of the literature discussed in this chapter, this raises questions of 
the potential for the emergence of a „managed‟ civil society underpinning research objective 
three of this thesis (see chapter 1.1.2). Therefore, this thesis investigates the characteristics of 
a state managed civil society, and the limits of the state‟s ability to control and mould civil 
society in such a particular way (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 3).  
 
As outlined in the preceding section, the weaknesses of civil society provide the state with 
various ways to assert its influence. For civil society, this process of encroachment has thus 
far culminated in a legal framework that provides authorities with ample leeway to limit the 
independence of TSOs. The intention behind such developments is not to dispose of civil 
83 
society, but to subordinate it to the state. Other than in traditional civil society arrangements 
which centre on the advocacy of issues by independent TSOs (Henderson, 2008), state-civil 
society relationships in Russia are likely to lead to subservient TSOs. The legislative changes 
discussed in this chapter provide a potential foundation for such a renationalisation of civil 
society. Consequently, civil society arrangements are characterised by strong and dependent 
relationships between TSOs and the state. In the context of the NGO law, it is likely that 
TSOs will focus on complementing and extending the state, rather than creating an 
autonomous space for action between the individual and the state. These trends have 
similarities to the Communist regime of Russia‟s past (Hedlund, 2006; Rosefielde, 2005). In 
the context of Russia‟s present day political set up, this effectively leads to a civil society that 
is less confrontational and more supportive of the state (Evans 2006b). Chapter two 
demonstrated that despite cooperating with the state, TSOs should aim to remain autonomous 
and independent in their activities to be able to act as agents of democratisation. The NGO 
law limits this ability. Therefore, to understand the effects of the NGO law, this thesis 
investigates the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day workings and modus 
operandi of TSOs in Russia (see chapter 1.1.2). This will enable this thesis to explore the 
limits of this legal framework in furthering the Russian state‟s agenda vis-à-vis a 
managed/controlled civil society (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 1).  
 
Shifts in political as well as economic arrangements provide the state with the necessary 
influence in the respective areas (Frye, 2002). However, the lack of “organised civil society” 
(Richter, 2009, p. 49) means that during the transition period, civil society was no longer 
integrated within power structures (Hedlund, 2006). Therefore, re-capturing the leadership of 
civil society actors (TSOs) and integrating them into a governance system is vital for the 
emerging political regime of Russia. It allows the state to cement and extend its dominance 
(Mann, 1984). This capture of civil society actors provides the state with alternative routes for 
the mobilisation of citizens in accordance with its own agenda. It allows the state to direct 
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civil society activities and encourage activism that centres on issues of “patriotism rather than 
political protest” (Henderson, 2008, p. 18). In turn, this could effectively lead to the sidelining 
of organisations which fail to mobilise around the priorities of the state. This chapter outlined 
that the Russian state has withdrawn from service provision (see section 3.3), meaning that 
organisations focusing on service provision are increasingly important. Because such service 
providing organisations are able to deliver public and quasi-public goods they are more likely 
to be resource dependent on the state (Hall, 2002). Chapter two highlights such organisations 
as pro-typical TSOs. Thus their ability to engage in their activities, which theoretically 
substitute the state, (see chapter 2.4) provides an important manifestation of civil society 
arrangements. Investigating such TSOs underpins the research objective of examining the 
extent to which such organisations act as a substitute for the state (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 
2).   
 
This chapter outlines that civil society in Russia is shaped by the trajectories and tensions 
created by Soviet legacies, demands put upon TSOs in post-Soviet Russia, as well as recently 
emerging contextual constraints such as the 2006 NGO law. These trends are indicative of a 
managed civil society which is investigated in this thesis. At first glance, such civil society 
arrangements characterised by strong, structured, and dependent relationships between TSOs 
and the state, reflect Hale‟s (2002) statist model of civil society development. However, at the 
same time, the institutionalisation of „constructive cooperation‟ between TSOs (see section 
3.4) and the state highlights the evolution of more liberal facets (Johnson, 2006). Therefore, 
these managed civil society arrangements have to be seen as being distinctly different from 
western civil society arrangements (see chapter 2), or the statist arrangements of the Soviet 
period (see section 3.2). Consequently, answering the research question of how managed civil 
society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation enables this thesis to make a 
unique contribtuion to the literature on civil society, both in Russia as well as more 
generalistic considerations (see chapter 8.3.3) 
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In summary, the outlined issues in this chapter show that the state is now in a more dominant 
position vis-à-vis civil society. As noted above, this will facilitate the growth of organisations 
that past research has singled out as being marionettes. The majority of these, similar to the 
Soviet period, will be embedded within the elite structures. Other social networks will remain 
within the private sphere. Therefore, the literature on Russian civil society development is 
indicative of the emergence of a Russian-style civil society which is managed by the state. 
Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence in the literature that supports such a proposition. 
In addressing three specific research objectives (see chapter 1.1.2), which relate to exploring 
the NGO law, examining TSOs acting as substitutes for the state, and investigating the 
characteristics of a state managed civil society, this thesis provides empirical findings that 
demonstrate such managed arrangements. This managed civil society facilitates the 
consolidation of today‟s Russia as a society exhibiting all of the common traits of a 
quintessential hourglass society. The roots of this development stretch back further than the 
Presidencies of Putin and Medvedev. Civil society development in the 1990s was impaired, 
and unable to address and reconfigure Soviet period societal arrangements and state-society 
relations. The development of arrangements aimed at creating “public [collective] action 
between the individual and the state” (Richter, 2002, p. 30) were not embraced by the Russian 
state, Russian civil society activists, or the Russian populace. Thus a managed civil society 
space in Russia represents a case of “continuity theory” (Hedlund, 2008, p. 204), where 
cultural-historic institutional traits have resisted fundamental change and have thus provided a 
fruitful ground for such arrangements. The empirical chapters five, six and seven will further 
explore the research question and objectives illustrated in this chapter as well as chapters one 
and four. Before these findings are discussed however, the study‟s research design and 
methodology are presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters two and three elaborate on traditional civil society theory (see chapter 2.5) and 
Russian civil society development (see chapter 3.5). Specifically, chapter three illustrates that 
post ante the Soviet Union, Russian civil society development has faced several limitations 
and inherent weaknesses. Such insights mirror the continuing dominance of cultural historic 
traits which facilitated the Russian state‟s attempts to manage civil society (see chapter 3.5). 
Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: 
 
How does managed civil society manifest itself in the Russian Federation? 
 
In order to address this question, the experiences of respondents are important. It is the 
experiences of organisational decision makers which shape their decision-making (Simon, 
1955), and therefore these insights will enable this thesis to demonstrate facets of managed 
civil soceity. This thesis aims to explore respondents‟ experiences of running TSOs in Russia, 
as a construction and rationalisation of their realities, and how this is actually representative 
of macro-level changes in social arrangements in Russia.  
 
Chapters two and three have illustrated the importance of civil society to democratic 
governance and democratising contexts such as the Russian Federation. As an industrialised 
country with membership of the G8, as well as being in possession of nuclear weapons, 
understanding Russia‟s governance structures, of which civil society forms a part, is 
particularly important. Russia aims to portray itself as a democratic country (Shlapentokh, 
2009), and consequently an autonomous third sector that subjects the government to scrutiny 
and holds it accountable is important. However, as illustrated in chapter three, the cultural-
historic trajectory, as well as present day developments indicate both the susceptibility and 
87 
emergence of a managed third sector. Chapter one and three highlight that this has not yet 
been carefully investigated.  
 
To fill this void, this thesis examines three aspects of civil society. First, the literature on 
Russian civil society is lacking an assessment of the effect of legislative changes on TSOs. As 
the discussion in chapter three demonstrates, these legislative changes represent a potential 
legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. This thesis explores the legislative changes, 
and addresses this gap in our understanding of Russian civil society. Second, the thesis 
investigates organisations active in health and education, which have only received limited 
attention within in the literature thus far (see chapter 3). Since the end of the Soviet Union, 
the state has withdrawn from service provision (see chapter 3) and continued with such 
neoliberal reforms (Hemment, 2009). This retreating state is likely to have a bigger impact on 
organisations within the health and education areas, increasing the demand for such 
organisations to offset the retreating state, and therefore making such TSOs more susceptible 
to being captured and managed by the state. In so doing, the thesis address the void in our 
understanding about the work of „pro-typical‟ TSOs (see chapter 2.3) in the context of the 
Russian Federation. Third, chapter three illustrates that the Russian state traditionally 
infiltrates civil society by creating marionette organisations. Juxtaposing such insights with 
the state‟s attempt at managing civil society, this highlights that formerly independent TSOs 
are likely to be turned into marionettes. The potential of the state to effectuate this process 
provides the thesis with an insight into the ability of the state to manage civil society. In so 
doing, the thesis contributes to our understanding of the Russian state‟s ability to manage civil 
society. These three aspects are synthesised into the following research objectives (see chapter 
1.1 and 3.5):  
 
Objective 1: To investigate the impact of legislative changes on the day-to-day 
workings of TSOs in Russia, and establish the limits of these laws on furthering the 
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Russian state‟s agenda vis-à-vis a managed or controlled civil society and/or third 
sector. 
 
Objective 2: To establish the impact of Russia‟s retreat away from state service 
provision, in particular in the health and education sectors, on TSOs operating in these 
sectors. To what extent do TSOs now act as state substitutes? 
 
Objective 3: To investigate the characteristics of a state managed civil society, and to 
establish the limits of the Russian state‟s ability to control or mould civil society in 
this way. 
 
Chapters five, six, and seven will look at each of these objectives in turn. However, before 
presenting the results, this chapter, in five sections, will outline the methodological and 
analytical approach employed. First, the chapter establishes the ontological and 
epistemological understanding which underpins this study. Second, it illustrates the selection 
of the research strategy employed. The compliance of the research process to ethical 
standards, as well as data collection methods, are discussed. Further, the chapter details the 
selection criteria used when deciding on participating organisations, as well as offering a 
description of the cases. Third, the chapter presents the data analysis procedure and specific 
techniques employed. The analysis is based on three units of analysis: the sector the 
organisations are active in, the regions in which the organisations are located, and the type of 
organisations they are. As shall be outlined, data analysis was conducted thematically (King, 
1994), illustrating three major themes which are discussed in more detail. Fourth, the chapter 
demonstrates the rigour and robustness of the research design. Finally, a chapter summary is 
provided.  
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4.2 Ontology and epistemology of the study 
The research question and objectives illustrated above (see also chapter 1) incorporate 
implicit assumptions about the ontology (the way we think about the world) and epistemology 
(our understanding of what constitutes knowledge). Considerations of ontology and 
epistemology are vital in assuring that the most appropriate research methodology has been 
chosen (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Further clarifying these aspects helps to explain not only 
the specificities of the research methodology, but also facilitates the determination of the 
workable techniques within the design (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2003). Thus, in 
order to establish the rigour of the analytic process and improve the empirical argument 
(Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010), outlining the underlying paradigm is of similar importance to 
establishing the broader theoretical discourse (see chapter 2 and 3). The view of the world and 
knowledge informing this study is positioned within the paradigm of social constructivism 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
 
Social constructivism‟s key assumption is that that reality and its manifestations are socially 
constructed (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The experience of individuals as they engage with the 
world leads them to develop a multitude and variety of meanings and understandings of the 
world (Creswell, 2009). Hence, in terms of epistemology, understanding and knowledge 
emerge from social interactions, of which the researcher is a part (Bryman & Bell, 2003; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Ontologically, this perspective considers that the individuals‟ 
consciousness consists of multiple realities, which are an outcome of interaction (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This perspective encourages the researcher to explore 
these multiple meanings (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, this paradigm favours the use of 
interpretative studies in which the researcher engages with the research subject. This way, the 
researcher is able to gain an insight into the understandings and meanings the subject 
attributes to the investigated phenomena (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The aim is to draw upon 
the participants‟ view of a situation (Creswell, 2009).  
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In this research, research subjects are individuals who act as agents or representatives of 
TSOs, and thus construct the social reality of these organisations. In engaging in TSOs, these 
individuals participate in constructing civil society arrangements in the Russian Federation. In 
exploring the understanding of human action and following the social constructivist 
perspective, the methodological choices of this research are rooted within 
hermeneutic/phenomenological traditions (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). In adopting this 
tradition, scholars are interested in the interpretation of text (Prasad, 2002) and the social-
cultural forces that influence these texts (Moustakas, 1994), and thus reality. This study 
adopts a particular strand of the hermeneutic/phenomenological tradition, descriptive 
empirical phenomenological research, which encourages the focus on the individuals‟ textual 
accounts such as transcribed interviews, to identify the essential and underlying structures of 
the world of the research subject (Moustakas, 1994).  
 
Following Eisenhardt‟s (1989) and Yin‟s (2003) seminal work legitimising case study 
methodology, studies grounded within the social constructivist perspective have increased 
(Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009). Specifically, management studies (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007), studies of organisations (Chia, 2000), or as relevant to this thesis, studies of 
organisations in countries in transition (Abbott & Wallace, 2007; Crotty, 2003; 2009) 
frequently adopt methodologies aligned with a social constructivist perspective. Specifically, 
for examining contexts with limited theoretical knowledge, the use of inductive strategies, 
which are grounded in the social constructivist perspective, are recommended (Eisenhardt, 
1989). As chapter three illustrates, traditional literature on civil society and its related 
constructs seems to have only little relevance in the context of the Russian Federation. 
Further, studies of Russian civil society have been limited to specific parts of, and movement 
within, civil society. By reinvestigating traditional civil society theory in a Russian context, 
this thesis deconstructs fundamental assumptions (i.e. democracy-civil society orthodoxy, see 
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chapter 2), and presents insights into social arrangement in this and similar contexts 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Therefore, this thesis investigates an area where theoretical 
knowledge is limited in explaining specific phenomena. Consequently, adopting a social 
constructivist perspective, and subsequent research strategies, allow the researcher to gain a 
fuller and more in-depth understanding. 
 
As illustrated above, this study focuses on the realities that shape TSOs‟ activities, which in 
turn depend on the individual respondent‟s perception and rationalisation of these realities. 
Seeing realities as socially constructed phenomena reveals new insights into how civil society 
theory operates in the Russian context (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In line with the social 
constructivist perspective and consideration of building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), this 
thesis‟s methodological approach is that of a case study.  
 
4.3 Research method – case study approach 
In order to explore Russian civil society arrangements a multiple case study approach was 
operationalised (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). A multiple case study approach allows for 
comparisons between the accounts and experiences of individuals across different cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Each of the cases serves to explore the activities, events, and processes 
that shape TSOs (Creswell, 2009) in the context of the Russian Federation. Case studies in 
particular lend themselves to qualitative research techniques, which are most relevant if 
exiting theory does not allow feasible answers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003), as 
is the case for TSOs and civil society in Russia (see chapter 3.5 and section 4.2). The multiple 
case study approach allows the research process to account for potential idiosyncrasies within 
each of the cases, and enables broarder theoretical considerations, therefore providing more 
substantiated arguments for modifying and refining civil society theory (Siggelkow, 2007). 
Further, a case study approach is helpful when the research question begins with pronouns 
such as why, what, and how (Yin, 2003). Consequently, in line with the social constructivist 
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perspective and considerations of the voids in the literature, a case methodology is the most 
appropriate research strategy for this study. The following sub-sections detail the data 
collection process. These sections present ethical considerations relevant to the study, the 
selection of cases, participants, and description of the case sites. Further, the various sources 
used for data collection: observations, interviews, textual publications are outlined. 
  
4.3.1 Ethical considerations 
The ethical behaviour of the researcher and an ethically sound research process are important 
in social science research (Miles & Huberman, 1994), in particular when operationalising 
qualitative techniques (Silverman, 2001). In order to ensure this, and before fieldwork was 
undertaken, the study was submitted to and approved by the Aston Business School‟s 
Research and Ethics Committee. This review process provided valuable insights into 
developing the consent form (see Appendix C), as well as ensuring good quality interview 
questions (see Appendix D for the semi-structured interview protocol used in this study). 
Aston Business School‟s Research Ethics guidelines adhere to the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) Research Ethics Framework which governs social science research 
studies in the UK.  
 
Access to organisations was sought via telephone, and during the course of a call the study 
was outlined (see Appendix C for a consent form that incorporated the information used in 
such conversations; see also section 4.3.2 for a detailed description of how cases and 
respondents were selected). There were no obvious hazards associated with the study. In order 
to minimise any potential hazards to the respondents, their confidentiality and anonymity was 
assured. During the telephone conversation to establish access, as well as before the formal 
interview took place, respondents were reminded of the no-commitment basis of the 
interview, and that they were allowed to withdraw at any time. The usage of a recording 
device was crucial because the interviews were conducted in Russian, and a record of the 
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interview facilitates the translation process. However, before the interview, the researcher also 
established whether the interviewee would be comfortable with being recorded. Furthermore, 
each respondent was provided with a consent form to sign (see Appendix C). In most 
organisations, interviews were only conducted with the director, leader, or key decision maker 
of this particular organisation. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to interview all 
members or all staff from all organisations. Interviewees agreed voluntarily to take part in the 
study. Before each interview, not only was the respondent‟s consent obtained, but they were 
also informed about the purpose of the study (i.e. that it was part of a PhD thesis research 
project of the researcher), as well as again being offered to be able to withdraw at any time. 
All interviews, after clarifying and receiving the approval of respondents, were taped in order 
to allow the researcher to be more involved within the interview process. After the interview, 
respondents were debriefed.  
 
In addition to the agreement put forward in the consent from (see Appendix C), for each 
participant oral confidentiality and anonymity agreements were reached. Most respondents 
and organisations agreed that for the purpose of this thesis and academic publications, their 
position, as well as organisational name could be used. For participants and organisations that 
did not agree to the usage of their organisational name, the name has been substituted with a 
short and relevant description of the organisation. Therefore in order to ensure anonymity, all 
organisations were coded, for example Org01Sam for organisation one in Samara, or 
Org01Per for organisation one in Perm. Consequently, no real identities of participating 
individuals are revealed. Furthermore, any organisational material collected, which is not in 
the public domain, is treated confidentially. The collected data, that is the interview data as 
well as the transcribed interviews, are stored on a password protected computer which is 
located in a locked room not accessible to unauthorised individuals. The guidelines outlined 
here shaped the case selection and data collection process described in the following sections.   
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4.3.2 Case selection  
As is appropriate to the study‟s focus, an ethnographic approach is adopted, allowing data to 
be collected via observations and interviews (Yin, 2003). Informed by the voids in the 
literature (see chapter 2, 3 and section 4.1), the research strategy, and thus case selection, 
aimed to examine the perception, experience, and understanding of health and educational 
TSOs, which have only received little attention thus far. The following sections outline the 
selection of both TSOs as well as the distinct geographical locations in which these 
organisations were recruited.   
 
4.3.2.1 Selection of Regions  
Replicating other research studies of TSOs in transitory contexts (Abbott & Wallace, 2007; 
Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty & Crane, 2004), this study investigates distinct 
geographical locations in Russia. For the purpose of this study, three geographical locations 
were selected. These regions are Samara, Sverdlovsk, and Perm. A justification for choosing 
these regions will now be discussed.  
 
A primary concern of fieldwork in the Russian Federation is the regional differences both in 
political and economic terms which are widely discussed in the literature (Bradshaw & 
Prendergrast, 2005; Dienes, 2005; Hanson & Bradshaw, 2000). There are 83 so called Federal 
subjects within Russia which, as part of the recentralization of power discussed in chapter 
three, are organized into seven Federal districts (Dienes, 2005). These 83 subjects vary with 
regards to their political autonomy and economic activities. Whereas a specific discussion of 
the various economic activities are beyond the scope of this thesis, Bradshaw and 
Prendergrast (2005) argue that subjects can generally be classified as either being primarily 
extractive, agricultural, industrial or service based. The 83 Federal subjects can be divided 
into 46 Oblast’s (regions) and nine Kraii (territories) where the President of the Russian 
Federation proposes a governor then elected by the regional government. Furthermore, there 
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are 21 Respubliky (republics) amongst the 83 Federal subjects which enjoy a more 
autonomous status within the Federation. The remaining Federal subjects are classified into 
four Avtonomny Okrugy (autonomous areas), one Avtonomaya Oblast’ (autonomous region) 
and two Goroda Federal'nogo Znacheniya (Federal cities). These Federal cities are Moscow 
and St. Petersburg. Hanson and Bradshaw (2000) argue that most of the development of 
Russia‟s financial sector has taken place in these Federal cities, which makes them unique not 
only in terms of their political status but also with regards to their composition of economic 
activities, these being predominantly now service based. Indeed, the urban centres of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg are considered to be more developed economically (Hanson, 1997), and 
thus do not provide a mirror of provincial and industrialized Russia (Crotty, 2003). Given that 
the aim of this thesis is to investigate managed civil society arrangements in the Russian 
Federation, Moscow and St Petersburg were therefore not considered as suitably 
representative case regions for the fieldwork. Therefore, the objective of selecting regions to 
examine TSOs was to find typical regions outside the urban centres of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, more autonomous republics and autonomous areas within the Russian Federation. 
Given the recentralisation of power, regions now have little freedom of action (Bradshaw & 
Prendergrast, 2005) in particular vis-à-vis fiscal autonomy (Dienes, 2005). Therefore focusing 
on Oblast’s or Kraii allows this thesis to examine the Federal state attempts to develop and 
manage civil society. This captures a more representative setting amongst Federal subjects. 
Further it enables minimising regional factors to act as explanatory influences which a 
selection of republics or autonomous areas would most certainly entail due to their political 
autonomy and typical organisation along ethnic lines (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005). 
Hence focusing on Oblast’s and Kraii also provides a more representative setting of typical 
Russian regions.  
 
The next stage in selecting case Oblast’s and Kraii was to locate similar regions in different 
Federal districts or different regions within the same Federal district. Due to time and 
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resource constraints (discussed in-depth in chapter 8.3.1.1) the final selection of regions relied 
heavily on the willingness of potential partner universities to participate in the research (see 
section 4.3.2.2 for a discussion of access negotiations with the partner universities). 
Nevertheless, the selection process adhered to the basic considerations of Federal districts (i.e. 
meso-administrative and political factors) and economic factors. The composition of 
economic activities was particularly important because the regional economy was a 
significant factor in 1990s which regions used to establish the level of regional political 
autonomy from the Federal Russian state (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005). With regards to 
the economic dimension, the selection of case regions focused on regions within the same 
Federal district. The researcher was able to draw upon personal networks to establish a 
partnership with the Samara state university (see section 4.3.2.2); Samara Oblast‟ was 
selected as a case region. The economy of the Samara Oblast‟ operates primarily on a 
manufacturing/industrial base (Hanson et al., 2000) and thus the second region within the 
Volga Federal District needed to have a different economic profile. Therefore, Perm Krai, 
with its predominant resource extractive economy, lent itself well as the second site for 
research. This provided the study with two geographical regions with different economic 
profiles within the same meso-administrative set-up. As illustrated before this middle level of 
state administration has been introduced to centralise Federal state power. Therefore, by 
selecting a third region from a different Federal district the thesis was able to investigate 
similarities amongst TSOs and civil society arrangements across different meso-levels of state 
administration. This resulted in the selection of Sverdlovsk Oblast‟ as the third and final case 
region. Consequently, in selecting these regions, this study was able to examine contrasts and 
similarities between these regions. In particular, the latter considerations enabled this thesis to 
draw conclusions about the representativeness of civil society arrangements, as illustrated in 
the empirical chapters five to seven.  
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Overall, despite the recentralisation of power under Putin (see chapter 3.4), Dienes (2005) 
argues that Russia‟s regions are still fragmented and therefore regional factors such as 
ethnicity, economic activity, regional power holders and regional identity might act as 
explanatory factors. This dovetails with the assertions made within the civil society literature 
discussed in chapter two. There is the possibility that the civil society arrangements in which 
TSOs are active at the regional level are influenced by the aforementioned regional factors. 
Table 4.1 summarises the key economic, social and political aspects of the three regions 
selected for this study. 
Region Social and Economic Parameters 
 Population 
in million 
(2002) 
GRP 
in bln 
GRP per 
capita and 
rank in RF 
(2008) 
Unemployment Per capita 
income 
(per 
month) 
Higher 
education 
(thousand) 
Perm 2.7 609.2 224,532 
(19) 
10,1% 16723 105.4 
Samara 3.1 706.5 222,726 
(20) 
6.1% 18175 174.4 
Sverdlovsk 4.2 (2010) 823.8 n.a. 8.8% 20351 n.a. 
 Political Parameters 
 Type District/Governor Ethnic 
Composition 
Nature of TSOs 
    Health Education Other 
Perm Krai Volga 
Appointed 2004 
70-80% 
Russian 
14 7 3 
Samara Oblast‟ Volga 
Appointed 2007 
70-80% 
Russian 
13 9 2 
Sverdlovsk Oblast‟ Ural 
Appointed 2009 
70-80% 
Russian 
24 7 0 
Table 4.1: Key ecomomic, social and political parameters of the three case regions 
All data December 2009 in ruble unless otherwise stated. RF stands for Russian Federation. Education refers to 
enrolment at beginning of academic year 2008/2009. Data from Gosgomstat and its regional divisions: Sverdlosk 
Oblast‟: http://sverdl.gks.ru/default.aspx. Perm Krai: http://permstat.gks.ru/default.aspx. Samara Oblast‟: 
http://www.samarastat.ru/default.aspx. Ethnic data based on 2002 Russian Census. TSOs data from Appendix E.  
 
As Table 4.1 illustrates the three case regions are fairly similar along key social, economic 
and political indicators and hence regional factors which might account for why the results are 
also similar. Despite the influence of regional factors, all three regions have undergone 
continuous democratisation, economic development, and modernisation which have together 
created similar pressures across the regions, specifically on TSOs, to address past social 
problems stemming from the withdrawal of the state, and emerging issues such as the 
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HIV/AIDS epidemic (Hoppenbrouwer, Sergeyev, & Nitzsche-Bell, 2005) or social integration 
of the disabled (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). TSOs in the areas of health and education are more 
likely to experience the impact of such pressures, specifically in terms of the demand of their 
services (see chapter 2). Considering the emergence of state managed civil society 
arrangements explored in this study, as the potential demand for their service and thus 
existence increases, it is likely that such organisations will be more significantly impacted by 
such changes. The following section discusses the selection of TSOs. 
 
4.3.2.2 TSO selection 
With regards to selecting participating organisations, theoretical considerations illustrated in 
chapter 2, and context specific insights (see chapter 3), guided this process. Using a 
theoretical approach to selecting participating TSOs, the organisations were chosen depending 
on their activities and objectives, focusing on prototypical and similar organisations across the 
three regions (see section 4.3.3 for detailed description of participating organisations). Before 
the fieldwork period, the researcher used web-based resources (such as: http://www.nko-
ural.ru/, http://www.perspektiva-inva.da.ru/), personal correspondence during May 2008 with 
the USAID Russia office, and a consultant working for the BEARR Trust to indentify contact 
details of approximately 35 organisations across the three regions (see Appendix A for a full 
list of organisations which participated in this study). During the fieldwork period, the 
snowballing technique was used to increase the number of potentially participating 
organisations, which also provided the research with an understanding of the interaction 
amongst TSOs in the various regions. During this process, the definition of TSOs and 
theoretical selection criteria was deliberately understood loosely in order to include all types 
of organisations prevalent in the context of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). This 
enabled the research to gain a better and more precise understanding of what civil society 
would emerge (Dörner, 2008). Therefore, in this study the key selection criteria applied were 
whether or not organisations can be attributed to the educational or health realm, as well as 
99 
whether or not they understand themselves as third sector organisations (i.e. obschestvenii 
organisatii). The potential ambiguities that such a selection process entails are considered a 
strength of this approach, as it ensures that the study includes cases (TSOs) which are at the 
periphery of civil society. Understanding such „outlier‟ cases adds depth and insight into 
understanding the Russian civil society space.  
 
In order to recruit the identified organisations, the assistance of local Russian partner 
Universities in Perm, Samara, and Yekaterinburg was sought. Access to partner Universities 
was established through personal networks (Cassell, 1988) as well as „cold‟ calling (see 
Appendix B for the access letter sent to universities that declared an interest). Over a period 
of two months, successful access negotiations took place with the Perm State University, 
Samara State University, and Ural State University. During the fieldwork period, these 
universities assisted in organising accommodation, visa procedures, providing support with 
negotiating access to TSOs and scheduling interviews. As project partners, the Universities 
assisted in verifying contact details of organisations and provided support in contacting and 
arranging interviews with TSOs.  
 
Initially TSOs were contacted via telephone. The aim of this contact was to set up an 
interview date with the leaders, directors, or senior decision makers of the TSOs. During the 
telephone conversations, the details of the research study were used to inform and recruit 
TSOs (see Appendix C for the Consent Form, which participants signed, and which formed 
the basis for the information provided in telephone conversations). Most phone conversations 
were concluded with the agreement of a date and time convenient for participants to take part 
in a face-to-face interview with the researcher. If the relevant person was unavailable, 
messages were left and return calls were made. The majority of interviews were scheduled to 
take place on the premises of the TSOs. If TSOs did not have premises, then the interview 
was arranged to take place in a quiet coffee place conveniently located for the respondents, or 
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in some cases in the homes of respondents. This process gave the selection and recruitment of 
participating TSOs a pragmatic nature (Barley, 1990). The cut-off point for data collection 
was due to time and funding constraints, which meant fieldwork was restricted to one month 
per region. In the cumulative time period of three months, respondents from 82 organisations 
were interviewed across the three regions (see Appendix F for a detailed list of all 
respondents). The next section presents the various data collected during the fieldwork period.  
 
4.3.3 Data collection and generation 
Following the qualitative methodological techniques employed in this study, the research 
process collected data from a variety of sources (Yin, 2003). These sources can be either 
classified as generating naturally occurring data, or data provoked by the researcher 
(Silverman, 2001). Naturally occurring data was generated by observations, published 
materials, as well as artefacts such as other materials provided by TSOs for example banners, 
stickers, or internal documentation. These were partly captured in the researchers‟ reflective 
fieldwork diary. Research provoked data was generated via interviews. Using these two types 
of data provided a basis for triangulating data sources (Yin, 2003). The following two sections 
describe the practicalities of collecting these two types of data.  
 
4.3.3.1 Naturally occurring data 
As indicated by the category, this data exists without the researcher‟s need to intervene. Such 
data does not only hold analytical value, but also enables researchers to familiarise themselves 
with the setting, and can potentially indicate thematic developments for the analytical process 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). The main sources of such data are publicly available, and also 
from internal documentation provided by the participating organisations. This data sometimes 
includes „outcomes‟ of the work of TSOs, such as books they published or the ability to look 
through photo albums documenting their activities. Key insights gained from this data, such 
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as the actual activities of organisations or their communication to „outsiders‟ of the 
organisations, provided a basis for the analysis presented in this thesis.  
 
In addition, naturally occurring data was also collected via the researcher‟s detailed and 
reflective observational notes. The notes include the physical setting of the organisations‟ 
premises (if they had some) or the interview environment. Further, these notes include 
observations about participants and the emphasis and content of informal discussions before 
and after the interview. The notes were typed up immediately after each meeting and 
facilitated contextualisation of the analytical process. Such naturally occurring data also 
assisted in the reflective periods of the data collection process (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000).  
 
4.3.3.2 Researcher provoked data 
Contrary to the naturally occurring data, this category would not exist without the present and 
active engagement of the researcher (Silverman, 2001). In line with the adopted research 
paradigm (see section 4.2), such data is created by the interaction of the researcher and 
participants of this study. In this study, the researcher engaged in two ways to generate data: 
informal conversations and semi-structured interviews.  
 
Informal Conversations. Preceding and following interviews, and whenever possible the 
researcher extended the stay at the research site for observations and/or informal 
conversations with organisational members. This served to not only build a rapport with 
respondents, making them more at ease in the interview, but also provided contextual nuances 
which were recorded in a field work diary, and provided helpful background information 
when analysing data. Such informal discussion also allowed the researcher to break the ice 
with participants to create a more „trusting‟ environment for the interview. Furthermore, 
informal conversations following formal interviews served to verify impressions as well as 
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establishing contacts with gatekeepers to operationalise the snowball sampling technique (see 
section 4.3.2).  
 
Semi-structured Interviews. The central data source for this study was semi-structured 
interviews. A semi-structure interview protocol (see Appendix D for an example of the 
interview protocol) was used, because during such an interview approach the researcher is 
able to retain a relatively neutral position within the data generation process (Blaikie, 2000). 
The interview protocol, and hence fieldwork, is informed by theoretical considerations such 
as the nature of civil society or civil society development in Russia (see chapter 2 and 3), to 
ensure that the data generated is relevant for the subject of this study (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2007). As the study aims to establish the participant‟s perception and understanding of their 
reality, open and interpreting questions characterised the interview protocol (see Appendix 
D). The interview protocol also contained probing questions to facilitate a “reliable 
framework for cross-case analysis” (Perry, 1998, p. 792).  
 
Following Cook and Vinogradova (2006), the interview protocol focuses on four specific 
organisational aspects as well as three theoretical considerations relevant to this thesis. The 
organisational aspects under consideration focused firstly on the background of TSOs, hence 
their objectives, activities and staff/members as well as funding and the history of the 
organisations (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Second, relationships with the public were a 
feature of the interview protocol (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Third, the interview protocol 
inquires about the relationship and interactions with the state, state authorities and institutions 
(Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Fourth, the protocol also enables participants to illustrate the 
„effectiveness‟ of their organisations, be it in influencing policy, increasing membership, or 
access to funding sources (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Theoretically, the interview protocol 
encouraged interviewees to elaborate on issues with regard to the legislative changes which 
have taken place (see chapter 3 for a discussion on the proposition of legislative change and 
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its impact on TSOs and chapter 5), the issues of „third sectorisation‟ of Russian civil society 
(i.e. the change of TSOs from advocates of society to service providers), the potential for 
crowding-out of the state by TSOs (see chapter 2 and chapter 6), and aspects surrounding the 
role of marionette organisations (see chapter 3 and chapter 7). In so doing, the interview 
protocol allowed the generation of data to examine the research objectives of this thesis (see 
section 4.1). The following section provides a detailed overview of participating organisations 
in order to illustrate the cases which provided the basis for analysis.  
 
4.3.4 Case descriptions 
Adhering to Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) in this section, the chapter details the cases that 
have formed the basis for analysis. This enabled the study to outline the commonalities and 
differences across organisations and regions, and forms the basis for cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The majority of organisations participating in this study were formed after 
the collapse of the communist regime. However, some participating organisations evolved out 
of the social organisations established by the Soviet regime (see chapter 3.2). A full list of 
participating organisations is available in appendix A, and full list of respondents is presented 
in appendix E (both of these lists are anonymised). The following sections offer descriptions 
of the various organisations within the three different regional research sites.  
 
4.3.4.1 TSOs in Samara region 
During the Soviet period, Samara was known as Kuibyshev and played an important role in 
Soviet manufacturing, specifically in the automotive and aerospace industries. Following 
relatively higher levels of foreign investment in the transition era, the Samara region has 
evolved into an area of relative prosperity (Hanson, 1997). Similar to other regions, and as 
illustrated in chapter three, TSOs in this area were classified into either grass-roots 
organisations, policy/advocacy organisations or marionette organisations (Crotty, 2003; 2006; 
2009). For this study, 24 senior representatives of TSOs were interviewed, most of whom 
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were located in Samara city, the capital of  the Samara region. Ten of these organisations 
were situated within the educational sector, and twelve in the health area (see Appendix E.1). 
Two organisations were characterised as other types, and refer to TSOs in Samara which 
consider themselves as „funding‟ and „building‟ civil society (see Appendix E.1). These 
organisations were interviewed for two reasons: first they were able to provide a good starting 
point for snowballing (see section 4.3.2.1), and second, these organisations‟ insights into the 
activities of other TSOs frequently enriched the picture and added depth to the understanding 
of other TSOs, and thus civil society in Samara.  
 
The majority of organisations in the health category (see Appendix E.1) emerged after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and most of them were formed in the early 2000s (see Appendix 
A). These organisation were mainly membership based and frequently did not have paid staff. 
In this study, the majority of health TSOs engage in either disability related issues or issues 
related to substance abuse. The former, specifically TSOs founded following the Soviet 
Union, developed out of parental initiatives. An exception is Org16Sam (see Appendix A), 
which was founded a group of wheelchair users. TSOs which engage in issues relating to 
substance abuse, are mainly a result of the engagement of medical „professionals‟. From the 
organisations participating in Samara, Org14Sam was an exception in the health area, because 
it was founded by as a self-help group of people suffering from HIV/AIDS. Only after this 
group formalised itself into a legally recognised organisation did „professionals‟ such as 
social workers and lawyers enter the organisation. In the health category, there are also TSOs 
which are successor organisations to past Soviet civil society organisations (see chapter 3). 
These include Org15Sam, Org17Sam and Org24Sam, which are all local chapters of 
organisations that are active nationwide. Despite its focus on helping children (see Appendix 
A), the local chapter of Org24Sam has to be understood as a health TSO, as its key activity 
consists of providing humanitarian and medical aid to children‟s homes. In contrast to the 
majority of post Soviet TSOs, these organisations have good office facilities resembling 
105 
bureaucratised/professionalised non-profit organisations (Mercer, 2002). Furthermore, these 
organisations have closer relations with state authorities, displayed in photos with local 
politicians or material textual evidence of cooperation with authorities on specific projects.   
 
TSOs engaging in educational activities, of which as, outlined above, there were ten amongst 
the participating organisations in Samara, reflect a similar pattern to the group of health 
TSOs. The majority of educational TSOs were also formed after the Soviet Union. The 
Org05Sam was the only organisation that understands itself as a successor to a Soviet era 
social organisation, namely the Soviet period youth organisation (see chapter 3). Similar to 
the health organisations participating in this study, the majority of TSOs were located within 
the vicinity of the city of Samara. However, in order to recruit participating organisations that 
could be characterised as within the educational field, some flexibility in the understanding of 
„educational activities‟ was required. Thus, organisations attributed to the educational sector 
engage in a wider range of activities than health TSOs. The activities of educational TSOs 
range from providing additional language training to socially disadvantaged children, to 
engagement with adolescents and children in an educational setting focusing on, for example, 
developing volunteerism or providing citizenship education. Org06Sam (see Appendix A) 
was the only organisation that despite understanding itself as a health organisation also 
engaged directly in educational activities. Overall, both the educational and health TSO 
groups of participating organisations reflect a broad cross-section of TSOs in the Russian 
context.  
 
4.3.4.2 TSOs in Perm region 
Similar to Samara during the Soviet period, Perm was a centre for industry and manufacturing 
with a focus on the production of chemicals, aviation, and the extraction of natural resources 
(mainly oil and potash). In the transition period, the privatisation process resulted in the 
private, mainly Russian ownership of most parts of the oil extraction and refining industry in 
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Perm. During most of the Soviet period, Perm was a closed city, meaning that no foreigners 
were allowed to enter, and even Russians needed special permits to leave the city. However, 
following the opening of the city in the Soviet period, there was increased interest, 
particularly from the UK, which led to the Oxford-Perm Fund. This collaboration organised 
cultural exchanges, but most relevantly for this study, also commissioned seminars, work 
shadowing, and „master-classes‟ for TSO leaders in order to stimulate civil society 
development. In particular, during informal conversations respondents frequently referred 
back to these „civil society building‟ activities. 
 
Fieldwork in Perm followed the fieldwork period in Samara. A reflective period preceded 
data collection in Perm. The approach to recruitment and access to TSOs was similar to that 
taken in Samara (see section 4.3.2.1). Due to the similarity of Samara and Perm in terms of 
population, 23 TSOs were interviewed, all of which were located in Perm, the capital of Perm 
District (Permsky Krai, see Appendix E.2). Similar to Samara, the majority of participating 
organisations can be characterised as active within the health area focusing on substance 
abuse issues and disability. Apart from Org05Per, Org08Per, and Org23Per - again local 
chapters of disability organisations active Russia wide (see Appendix A), disability TSOs 
developed post ante the Soviet Union. In contrast to Samara, where there were several TSOs 
focusing on specific „disorders‟, such as Down Syndrome or autism, in Perm there was a lack 
of such specialist health TSOs. Further, and different from Samara, the researcher was unable 
to locate TSOs, which solely focus on HIV/AIDS issues. However, organisations such as the 
Org21Per, which dealt with drug related issues such as rehabilitation, were also involved in 
the HIV/AIDS thematic. Nevertheless, this was generally not their main objective.  
 
In comparison with Samara, out of the 23 TSOs in Perm only five can be characterised as 
being active in the educational sector. The key issue for this weak representation was that 
despite extensive use of snowballing and active help from the local University, the researcher 
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was unable to find educational TSOs. This can be explained by a two factors. First some of 
the organisations found by the researcher or the University contact could not be located. 
Second the population of educational TSOs seemed generally weak. However, similar to 
Samara, in Perm several organisations characterised in the health area, due to their specific 
client group, engaged in extensive educational activities, such as Org07Per, which provided 
skills training for the disabled. In contrast to Samara, in Perm it was more difficult to separate 
organisations into either the educational or health category. Many organisations portray 
themselves as primarily „rights‟ protecting in nature (see chapter 6 for a discussion of 
advocacy amongst TSOs within this study).  
 
Another aspect that differs between TSOs in Samara and Perm was that more organisations in 
Perm highlight the receipt of regular income from a wide variety of different sources (see 
chapter 6 for an examination of funding provision). Therefore, this might create an impression 
that overall TSOs in Perm are more „professional‟ or better-resourced, potentially resulting in 
specific bias when conducting analysis (see chapter 8 for a discussion of specific limitations 
and how they were addressed). However, it also reflects the potential lack of grass roots type 
organisations, which in itself is of analytical importance (see chapter 8).  
 
4.3.4.3 TSOs in Sverdlovsk region 
Yekaterinburg (formally Sverdlovsk) served as an industrial and administrative centre and the 
door to Siberia in the Soviet period. During the transition period, Yekaterinburg became the 
trading centre and transportation hub between European and Asiatic Russia. Trade in precious 
materials such as gold and fur brought relative prosperity and development. However, similar 
to Samara and Perm, these developments have also led to social issues which fall into the 
categories which TSOs within this study ought to address (see chapter 2 for a discussion of 
normative assumptions about the activities TSOs „should-be‟ doing, and their relevance to 
this study). Similar to Perm and Samara, the majority of organisations participating in this 
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study were within the vicinity of Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Sverdlovsk Region (see 
Appendix E.3 for a list of all respondents). Amongst all three case cities, Yekaterinburg is the 
biggest and economically most developed city. Reflecting the larger size of Yekaterinburg, 34 
organisations participated in this study (see Appendix E.3), 22 of which are active within the 
health area and nine organisations which can be characterised as being active within the 
educational area. The fewer participating organisations which can be characterised as 
educational in both Perm and Yekaterinburg does reflect the difficulty the researcher had in 
both localities in locating, accessing, and subsequently recruiting such organisations for this 
study (see section 4.5 on aspects of quality and limitations of this study). Similar to Perm and 
Samara, educational TSOs in Yekaterinburg also focused on children and adolescents. Only 
the organisation Org29Yek (see Appendix A) engaged in educational services targeted at 
adults, for example Yoga classes.  
 
Similar to Samara and Perm, health TSOs consisted of organisations which developed from 
past Soviet social organisations (for example Org11Yek or Org26Yek), as well as 
organisations founded post ante the Soviet Union, in particular in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Similar to Perm but different from Samara, there was a lack of „disorder‟ specific 
TSOs (see section 4.3.4.2). However, mirroring the other regions, the group of health TSOs 
focusing on disability issues were dominated by organisations dealing with movement 
disabilities such as Org03Yek. With regard to health TSOs focusing on medical issues, 
Yekaterinburg was more similar to Perm in the fact that the majority of the organisations 
aimed to deal with issues of substance abuse. However, similar to Org14Sam in Samara, the 
organisation Org05Yek focused specifically on the HIV/AIDS problem. Therefore, the three 
regions reflect a similar composition of health TSOs.  
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4.3.4.4 Education and health TSOs 
Thus far this chapter has highlighted the „geographical‟ cases, describing the regional context 
and specificities of the make-up of participating organisations in each region. Due to the 
sometimes significant differences across Russia‟s regions (Tragakes & Lessof, 2003), such 
considerations are important. Equally, an overview of the communalities and characteristics 
of educational and health TSOs are important. These are illustrated in this section. Out of the 
80 organisations which participated in this study, 48 are active in the health area and only 24 
can be allocated to the educational sector (see Appendix E.1 – E.3). As mentioned above, this 
primarily reflects the difficulty in locating the educational organisations. Eight organisations 
in the study can be classified as other types, which include human rights organisations, civil 
society support organisations, and local foundations. However, all of these have either 
educational activities or activities related to health issues (see Appendix E.1 – E.3). 
Therefore, all organisations in this study are either directly or indirectly located in the area of 
health and education, which is the focus of this thesis.  
 
The majority of health organisations in this study work in the field of disability, engaging in 
activities from protecting rights to running and managing large disability workshops. The 
majority of these TSOs focus on physical disabilities, in particular on people in wheelchairs.  
Only a few organisations across the participating TSOs engage with more challenging 
disabilities such as autism or Down‟s Syndrome. Such organisations typically emerged from 
parental initiatives and remain within such an „initiative grass roots‟ setting (see Appendix A 
for a list and description of all TSOs participating in this study). The other major group of 
health TSOs in this study are active within the HIV/AIDS problem and/or drug related issues. 
In general, such organisations are larger and better resourced, and only a few of such health 
TSOs can be characterised as grass roots type organisations.  
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Educational TSOs have a larger variety of activities they engage in, such as additional 
language education, running of museums, or providing citizen education. Further, the 
majority of such organisations also engage in various other activities, such as providing after-
school activities or activities on weekends to children with the aim to fostering volunteerism. 
As illustrated above, locating such TSOs has been more difficult, which suggests that there 
are fewer organisations engaging in such activities. The majority of such organisations can be 
classed as „youth and children‟, and range from the successor organisations of the Soviet 
Komsomol, to student organised volunteering associations. The nature of the organisations 
described thus far clearly demonstrates that the majority of participating organisations will 
help this thesis to address the void within the literature and our understanding of health and 
educational TSOs in Russia. Following the description of the case and the data collection, the 
subsequent section presents the way this data has been analysed.  
 
4.4 Research method – data analysis 
As illustrated above, this research looks at the emergence and manifestation of managed civil 
society arrangements in Russia. Taking on board Hedlund‟s (2008) insights into cultural 
continuity, as well as Crotty‟s (2006) observation of a constricted civil society space, the 
study examines various aspects of TSOs‟ activity to elaborate on potential intended and 
unintended consequences for future development. In theoretical terms, this research looks at 
the relevance of traditional civil society thinking (see chapter 2), with regard to how 
respondents understand their organisations and the environment in which they operate, in the 
context of the Russian Federation. An analytical category that enables us to capture this social 
construction of life and their world is that of discursive aspects (Silverman, 2001). In its 
original understanding, discourse analysis takes into account the environment of respondents 
and is therefore an analysis of what people do (Potter, 1996), which is critical for being able 
to make inferences about civil-society state relations and arrangements. The semi-structured 
interview protocol allows for capturing the narratives and discourse constructed by each 
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participant. It reflects the respondents‟ description of reality and the participants‟ subjective 
perception of it, which is critical for understanding and analysing the macro-discourses to 
which participant subscribed. This in turn illustrates the subjectively perceived 
„state/situation‟ of civil society that guides the decisions of individuals (Simon, 1955). In 
order to enable the analytical process to achieve these objects, the analysis uses several units 
of analysis.   
 
4.4.1 Units of analysis 
This section illustrates the interrelated units of analysis: a) individual respondents‟ accounts; 
b) geographical location; c) textual artefacts.  
 
The first unit of analysis is the individual respondents‟ accounts reflecting on their 
organisations, activities, and civil society developments. It refers to the perception, narrative, 
and understanding that respondents aim to portray in their response to the interview questions. 
While these accounts might elaborate on experiences not associated with the organisation, or 
illustrating aspects more positively, this unit of analysis only refers to accounts that have an 
opportunity to highlight organisational issues and issues regarding civil society.   
 
The second unit of analysis is geographical location. Geographical location refers to the 
region in which organisations are located as well as the „sector‟ to which they can be 
assigned. This provides a distinct unit of analysis, as it allows for analytically separating 
organisations and constructing the specific impressions within a geographical location. This 
enables comparison across geographical locations and activities, thus providing a unique 
insight, as well as conclusions that are more representative. 
 
The third unit of analysis is textual artefacts. Textual artefacts are not the individual accounts 
referred to above, but are made up of naturally occurring data sources such as textual 
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publications, internet pages, brochures or flyers. Generally textual artefacts are considered as 
background material, however this study follows Silverman‟s (2001) recommendations and 
regards them as part of the social interactions. The materials provide additional information 
about activities, social relations, potential funding sources, and the „image‟ that organisations 
aim to create. The latter is of particular importance, as it is potentially indicative of managed 
civil society arrangements based on how organisations want to be seen by the state. The 
insights emerging from this unit of analysis also assist with triangulation during the analysis 
process.  
 
4.4.2 Analytical method 
In line with the descriptive empirical approach outlined above (see section 4.2), and reflective 
of the social-interpretative approach (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) of this study, the analytical 
approach was to transcribe interviews, code the resulting data into themes, and then draw 
conclusions from these themes regarding Russian civil society. This section will elaborate in 
more detail on these aspects. As is typical for qualitative research, the analytical process of 
this study went through two analytical stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998); coding and interpretation. The data analysis is informed by the proposition of the 
emergence of a managed variant of civil society and the three research objectives (see section 
4.1).  
 
4.4.2.1 Coding phase 
Following the data collection process (see section 4.3), the interviews were transcribed and 
translated in situ. Following this process, coding began, which is central to case research, and 
provided the basis for further analytical work (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
As illustrated above, a thematic or template approach to coding was operationalised (King, 
1998). This is most appropriate in a setting where data is studied for common themes (King, 
1998) as set out by the three research objectives. However, this approach allows less in vivo 
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coding and categorising than other qualitative coding and analysis methods (King, 1998). 
Despite, the research objectives providing predetermined key themes (Bryman & Bell, 2003), 
in vivo coding, thus the emergence of codes from the data, is still possible within the premise 
of these themes (King, 1998). This study‟s coding focuses on three themes emerging from the 
literature, which needed clarification in order to explore potential managed civil society 
arrangements: legislative changes, the retreat of the state and TSOs acting as service 
providers, and the characteristics of a managed civil society and the limits of the Russian 
state‟s ability to mould civil society in this way.  
 
This coding process facilitates the interpretation process (King, 1998), and consequently the 
coding process becomes part of the analytical process of this study. Another important aspect 
of thematic coding is the need to organise emerging in vivo codes hierarchically (King, 1998). 
Reflecting grounded theory‟s axial coding (Bryman, 2001), this means that codes are 
clustered together in order to produce higher categories or subthemes within specific themes 
(King, 1998). It is these subthemes that create a structure which facilitated the presentation of 
the data in the subsequent chapters (see chapter 5, 6, and 7). Following Bryman (2001) the 
interview data was coded to generate three levels. The first level established the preference of 
the respondent, enabling the study to gain an insight into the „category of organisation‟ (see 
case descriptions in section 4.3.1), potential „group‟ allegiances, and focused on developing 
new in vivo codes. The second level focused on the content of the respondent (Bryman, 2001) 
which illustrated the narratives respondents‟ created, the discourses they contributed and 
ascribed too, as well as the opinions, ideas, and hence constructed reality of these 
respondents. This stage of coding also produced new in vivo codes (a list of codes and related 
coding hierarchy after 20 interviews is available in Appendix F.1). Reflecting grounded 
theories selective coding, the third level of coding related the information to the broad 
analytic themes (Bryman, 2001) in order to determine core categories to guide the empirical 
story presented in chapters five, six and seven. Furthermore, parallel coding of segments of 
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interview data, i.e. the classifying of segments into two or more codes was also practised 
(King, 1998).  
 
The coding scheme (see Appendix F.1) was further refined and developed and, as illustrated, 
provides a structure for the presentation of the data. In order to develop the codes and 
categories, the coding process consisted of reflective periods in which the researcher 
consulted the literature as well already coded interviews. Over the course of reflective 
thinking and discussions with field experts, coding categories were re-classified into different 
themes. The emerging categories were, in consultation with the supervisor team, the literature, 
and content of the interview at hand, subordinated to the three key themes. The legislative 
changes theme and its coding categories provides the basis for chapter five answering the 
research question of how legislative changes have impacted TSOs in this study. 
Operationalising Eisenhardt‟s (1991) proposition of comparative logics the researcher turned 
to the literature on non-profit management, and the American tradition of third sector 
organisations, which emerged from traditional forms of understanding civil society (see 
chapter 2 and chapter 6) in elaborating the categories for the „TSOs as service providers 
theme‟. This facilitated the creation of higher category codes within the „TSOs as service 
providers theme‟, and enabled a comparative approach in the interpretation phase of the 
analytical process. The „limits of the Russian state‟ theme provides the basis for chapter 
seven, pulling together the categories that enable elaboration on the ability of the state to 
mould civil society and incentives in place for TSOs to subordinate themselves to the state.  
 
To assist with managing the rich dataset during the coding process, the researcher used the 
computer assisted programme for qualitative research NVIVO 8, as well as MS Excel 
spreadsheets. NVIVO 8 was primarily used to group transcribed accounts geographically as 
well as tracking changes to the coding framework. Thus this software was only an aid to the 
organisation of empirical material, however it provided the researcher with an invaluable „one 
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stop-shop‟ overview of all the data, an effective way of managing this data. Coding itself was 
conducted within MS Word, where passages were coded and then copied and pasted into an 
Excel spreadsheet, organised in accordance with the coding framework, to have an overview 
over all relevant passages. 
 
4.4.2.2 Interpretation phase 
The interpretation phase refers to the process of drawing inference from the empirical data 
(Symon & Cassell, 1998). The social-constructivist perspective adopted in this thesis assumes 
that the researcher is not neutral in the generation of the data, and therefore the phenomena 
which are under scrutiny (Mir & Watson, 2000). The interpretation of results needs to account 
for this and therefore needs to draw on existing theory (Mir & Watson, 2000). This 
interpretation and inference process is the second phase of the analysis within this study and 
this section illustrates the various methodological techniques used in this interpretation 
process.  
 
The guiding principle of the interpretation process was to „inference to the best explanation‟, 
which requires the researcher to select the theoretical best fitting explanation (Ketokivi & 
Mantere, 2010). The guiding principles in this process are interestingness, usefulness and 
simplicity, and conservativeness (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). This process relied on the 
contextualisation of the coded material. However, the process of coding reduces material and 
thus de-contextualised empirical data (Bryman, 2001). By the means of using the researcher‟s 
research diary, empirical contextual issues remained in consideration throughout the 
interpretation process. Throughout the empirical chapters of this study (chapters 5, 6, and 7), 
such empirical contextualisation (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010) was supplemented by 
theoretical contextualisation, meaning that theory (see chapters 2 and 3) was used to “justify 
particular explanations” (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010, p. 324). In particular, the considerations 
illustrated in chapter three are important as they illustrate the contextual idiosyncrasies. 
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According to Sklar (1975), such theoretical contextualisation is a widely accepted approach to 
consolidate and hence extend theoretical discourse as is done in this thesis. Similar to the 
refinement of the coding categories, the process of interpretation also incorporated reflective 
phases (Alvesson, 2003).  
 
In addition to the theoretical contextualisation, the interpretation process was guided by the 
question: If a respondent said this, what does this suggest about their experience of the world? 
An appropriate way to examine data in such a particular way is the use of discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis helps to understand the broader discourses that are reflected within the 
response of the respondent (Potter, 1996). It can be used on both interviews and other text 
(Silverman, 2001), the former constituting the main data source used within this study. 
Discourse analysis tends to operationalise the analytical concepts of interpretative repertoires, 
stakes, and scripts. Interpretive repertoires help to identify the broader discourse reflected in 
the respondents‟ narrative (Silverman, 2001), thus the story that respondents tell. In an 
analytical sense, this ensured that the researcher looked for similarities within the individual 
accounts of respondents. However, both Potter (1996) and Silverman (2001) criticise 
institutional repertories as too broad and only relevant in well established settings. As chapter 
two highlights, generally civil society is characterised as a somewhat fuzzy concept 
(Ehrenberg, 1999). Taking into account these considerations and Silverman‟s (2001) 
recommendation, discourse analysis in this thesis focuses on the concepts of stakes and 
scripts. Insights from operationalising these two constructs then assist in creating the 
repertoire of respondents (Silverman, 2001).  
 
The first concept is that of stakes. Considering stakes in the analytical and interpretation 
process enabled the incorporation of the language respondents. Stakes represent the choice of 
words or sentences, which aims to “discount the significance of an action” (Silverman, 2001, 
p. 183). Effectively it provided an insight into the positionality of the respondent with regards 
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to the broader discourse uncovered in the analysis process. Following is an excerpt from the 
interview with Respondent 16 from Org17Sam (see Appendix A and E.1), with language 
signifying a „stake‟ in bold. 
 
Researcher 
What is your opinion of the Public Chamber? 
Respondent 16  
I have heard of it. But we are not part of it. I think that if we were more active than we 
would be part of the Public Chamber. But I do not really believe in the Public 
Chamber anyway. 
Researcher 
Why do not you believe in it? 
Respondent 16 
I do not know, probably because I do not believe that they [people in the Public 
Chamber] will listen to me there. On the whole I am sceptical about the chamber. I 
personally think that a lot is built on personal relationships. I am afraid that if you are 
too active, then someone might not like it, which would mean difficulties. So it‟s 
better not to be in the Public Chamber. On the other hand, I have acquaintances in 
the administration that could help us, if we need help.  
 
In this excerpt Respondent 16 displays his opposition to the Public Chamber and discounts 
this institution as creating potential difficulties for his organisation. Thus the concept of stakes 
helped the researcher to determine, for example, whether respondents were for or against 
particular aspects. The insight gained by considering stakes facilitated the process of inference 
and interpretation in establishing explanations.  
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The second concept is that of scripts. Scripts, similar to stakes, also focus on the language and 
content of the account of respondents. Respondents use scripts to  
 
“invoke the routing character [of] events in order to imply that they are features of 
some general pattern” (Silverman, 2001, p. 184).  
 
Following is an example of a script from an interview in Perm (interview with Respondent 28 
from Org04Per). 
 
Researcher  
You mentioned earlier that you cooperate with the department of sport… 
Respondent 28 
Yes, yes our organisation is under the patronage of it [the department of sport]. We are 
a separate organisation, a non-commercial organisation [common term used for TSO], 
but we, with the department of sport, it is not called department but agency. With them 
we sign a contract about cooperation each year. This contract enables the agency [the 
department of sport] to give us funds [for activities]. 
 
In this instance Respondent 28 implies that his organisation‟s regular contract with the state is 
something replicated across the whole third sector. However, as will be illustrated in chapter 
six, this is not the case. Consequently by using scripts, respondents construct their narrative to 
provide moral acceptance for their actions, (Silverman, 2001) indicating the 
„institutionalisation‟ of the observed developments reflected in the various discourses. The 
combination of the use of these concepts during the coding process helped to analyse the 
underlying issues, motives, and beliefs that influence the answers of respondents, and 
therefore reflect their reality. Further, during the coding process the application of these 
techniques facilitated coding itself. Textual artefact served to triangulate the responses, as 
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well as assisted in interpreting stakes and scripts. During most parts of this discourse-analytic 
process, the researcher worked on the transcribed and translated accounts. However, as part of 
the analytical process, the researcher went back and listened to the recorded data during 
analysis (Silverman, 2001). 
 
Following these analytical considerations, short geographical case descriptions around the 
three themes were produced (Eisenhardt, 1989). These were considered as standalone cases in 
order to gain an insight into any potential regional specific results that needed consideration. 
The next step was to systematically search for issues within each single theme that reoccurred 
across each geographical region as well as sector. This way, critical constructs and patterns in 
the data were determined (Eisenhardt, 1991), which informed the interpretation and 
explanation presented in chapters five, six, and seven. As illustrated above, using theory and 
quotations from the interviews the interpretative conclusions are justified. The interpretation 
phase combined the analytical considerations of the coding process with more fine-grained 
considerations of the language used by respondents (i.e. discourse analytical considerations). 
This provided the basis to look at differences and similarities (in terms of content), as well as 
sub-groupings (in terms of TSOs) within the data, providing in-depth and nuanced insights 
into the research questions.  
 
4.5 Quality of research 
Weick (1989) highlights that all studies, this one included, have limitations. To ensure that 
potential limitations are addressed, demonstrating the study‟s rigour and quality is important. 
A discussion of the specific limitations of this study, including that of methodological ones 
can be found in chapter eight. This section aims to outline the rigour of this study to facilitate 
the understanding of the reasoning process, which is otherwise difficult to demonstrate 
(Lipton, 2004; Kuhn, 1996). This chapter has thus far illustrated the methodological approach 
and techniques used. Nevertheless, in demonstrating the quality of this study, this section 
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strengthens the validity and reliability of the research informing this thesis. However, as 
concepts of a positivistic research paradigm, reliability and validity are considered 
inappropriate for the evaluation of qualitative methods (Symon & Cassell, 1998) as 
operationalised in this study. Guba and Lincoln (1985) suggest that instead qualitative 
research needs to be evaluated against its own set of criteria. They suggest four specific 
categories, which make up the trustworthiness of qualitative research: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and conformability. These concepts and their relation to the 
research are now discussed in turn. An explicit discussion of these criteria and how the 
research adheres to them is pivotal to illustrate the quality of this study (Cepeda & Martin, 
2005).  
 
Credibility in qualitative research can be established by considering the match of the 
respondent‟s account of a phenomenon to the researcher‟s representation of the same 
phenomenon. In this study, this was ensured in the following five ways. First, the analysis 
examined the respondents‟ views on various aspects of civil society. In case of ambiguities, 
during interviews the researcher asked the participant to clarify using prompts which were not 
part of the interview protocol such as „What do you mean?‟ This way, meaning and 
clarification was provided by respondents and did not depend on the inference of the 
researcher. Communalities across accounts indicated similar perspectives and thus groupings, 
whereas diverging opinions highlighted opposing understandings. Second, collected and 
analysed interview data was triangulated with data from other sources such as textual 
artefacts. Furthermore, the constant use of theoretical contextualisation provided a consistent 
basis to match the various analytical patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Third, reflective 
periods during data collection and analysis shaped the researcher‟s understanding of the study 
context and content (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000; Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). Fourth, the 
recordings of interviews enabled the transcription of the original conversation. Translations of 
transcripts were verified with Russian native speakers as well as experts in the field. Fifth, 
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findings were verified with experts in the field via presentations and discussions at relevant 
conferences. In turn this enabled the conformation and extension of proposed interpretations.  
 
Transferability refers to the contextualisation of the findings and their potential transferability 
to other contexts. Thus, this refers to the contextual uniqueness and generalisation to 
theoretical propositions. In this study, transferability was ensured by keeping a research diary 
during the data collection period recoding events and instances. This diary was updated 
regularly and formed the basis for a thick case description for analysis. Further, the analytical 
inductive approach meant a „back-and-forward‟ consideration of theory and data as part of 
theoretical contextualisation during the analytical process.  
 
Dependability is concerned with the consistency of the empirical material and its explanation. 
Vital to ensuring dependability is the traceability of theories, data, and questions underlying 
interpretation over the course of the research process. This study ensures dependability in two 
ways. First, during the data collection process, interview protocols, transcripts, and 
observations were documented and discussed with the researcher‟s supervisory team to 
determine the continuous course of action. Second, during the data analysis phase, an analysis 
diary kept track of analytical choices made. To assess theoretical inferences, initial findings 
and analytical developments were discussed with the researcher‟s supervisory team.  
 
Confirmability refers to the fact that the findings can be confirmed by the data itself, rather 
than reflecting the bias which is embedded in the researcher‟s interpretations. In order to do 
so, the research needs to illustrate how conclusions, interpretations, and recommendations are 
traced back to the data. Reflecting best practice in qualitative analysis (Silverman, 2001), the 
analytical process was made up of deductive as well as inductive inference periods. The 
theoretical considerations provided the key themes for the analytic process in a deductive 
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manner. In addition, confirmability was also ensured by extensive in vivo coding throughout 
the refinement of the coding scheme assisting with inductive inference.   
 
4.6 Summary to chapter 4 
Chapter 4 illustrated the research methodology operationalised, defended, and rationalised its 
selection. In order to do so, the chapter started by outlining the ontological and 
epistemological perspective guiding data generation, collection, and analysis. A qualitative 
approach was deemed most appropriate because it allowed the researcher to look beyond and 
beneath currently held knowledge, as well as gain an in-depth and nuanced view of how civil 
society in Russia is developing, and thus answering the research question addressed. The 
chapter shows that qualitative methods are useful for an environment such as Russia due to 
the dynamics that make this context so unique. As part of illustrating the methodology, the 
chapter specifically presented the selection of cases, the collection of data, and the analytical 
methods in use in this study. The study adopted a multiple case study investigating health and 
educational TSOs in three Russian regions, addressing specific gaps in our understanding 
outlined in chapter three. Each of the cases was described to provide additional contextual 
information. For the cases, data was collected and generated in two ways. On the one hand, 
naturally occurring data was collected, which included documents and observations. On the 
other hand, researcher provoked data was generated via interviews with respondents of TSOs. 
The data analysis process focused on three analytical units; textual interview accounts, 
geographical location and textual artefacts. This process consisted of two phases. In the 
coding phase, data was coded into themes informed by the literature and research objectives 
(see chapters 1, 2 and 3 as well as section 4.1). In the interpretation phase, theoretical 
contextualisation established the best explanation of the finding. As in all qualitative research, 
these phases took place in parallel to each other. The quality of research was evaluated using 
Guba and Lincoln‟s (1985) framework. Overall, this chapter has illustrated the 
appropriatability of the methodology operationalised to answer the research question of how 
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managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian Federation (see section 
4.1). Now that the method has been presented, this thesis will embark on presenting the 
empirical section of the study. These will illustrate the research objectives presented at the 
beginning of this chapter, and will begin with objective one (see chapter 1 and section 4.1) 
investigating the impact of the NGO law on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia in 
chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Effects of the 2006 NGO Law 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have outlined the theoretical frameworks operationalised within this 
thesis (chapter 2), the development and present-day realities of Russian civil society (chapter 
3) as well as the research design of this study (chapter 4). This chapter builds on these 
considerations to present the empirical findings of this study. Specifically this chapter 
investigates objective one of this thesis namely assessing the impact of the legislative changes 
on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia (see chapter 1.1.2 and chapter 4.1). In doing so 
it elaborates whether the legislative framework is a legally mandated attempt to manage civil 
society. With regards to the research question of how managed civil society manifests itself in 
Russia, examining legislative changes outlines the legislative facet of the state‟s agenda to 
manage civil society. In particular, this chapter focuses on the impact of legislative changes, 
also known as the 2006 NGO law. As illustrated in chapter three the NGO law significantly 
shapes the legal environment of TSOs. Chapter three demonstrates that the 2006 NGO law 
aims to rein in TSO activity and therefore in assessing its impacts this chapter will be able to 
provide one facet of how managed civil society manifest itself on the context of the Russian 
Federation. In order to do so this chapter answers the following two interrelated questions: 
 
How does the NGO law impact the day-to-day workings of TSOs? 
 
How do respondents portray the NGO law and its effects on TSOs? 
 
Addressing these two questions this chapter presents its findings in two sections. The first 
section examines the respondent‟s understanding of the NGO law presenting findings on the 
effects of registration and reporting requirements. This section presents and analyses the 
various discourses that respondents construct to explain and rationalise the impact these 
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requirements have on TSOs. The second section discusses these findings in light of the 
literature reviewed in chapters two and three and the proposition of the NGO law representing 
a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society arrangements. 
 
5.2 The impact of the 2006 NGO law 
The objective of this section is to present the empirical evidence for the first theme 
established in the analysis process (see chapter 4.4.2.2 and Appendix F.2). In examining the 
impacts of the 2006 NGO law (see chapter 3.4) the primary focus is to outline the potential 
changes to the day-to-day activities which have come as a result of the law. Chapter three 
highlights the law‟s restrictive nature, which is said to lead to the closing down of TSOs, or at 
the very least mean that the majority of organisations remain unregistered and informal 
(Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). Consequently, such TSOs would be deprived of access to 
resources, domestic or foreign, which would reduce their ability to hold the state to account 
(Crotty, 2009). Even though informal groups and organisations are vital to civil society 
(Putnam, 1995), well developed formalised and registered TSOs, which are recognised by the 
state and able to interact with it are equally important for the democratisation potential of civil 
society (Taylor, 2006). The laws restrictive nature is based on the tight regulation of four 
specific aspects which affect TSOs. Firstly, the NGO law requires all TSOs to complete new 
registration documents, detailing personal information of each member and founder. 
Secondly, TSOs must report all donations, specifically foreign ones, and outline how these 
resources have been spent (Maxwell, 2006). Thirdly, the law only allows domiciles of the 
Russian Federation to establish and participate in TSOs. Fourthly, the NGO law extends the 
supervisory powers of the state enabling it to see all TSO‟s documentation, such as internal 
memoranda, financial statements as well as attendance at organisational meetings, including 
private policy meetings and campaigning activities (Maxwell, 2006). Not adhering to any of 
these requirements allows state authorities to shut down and liquidate TSOs. Therefore, and 
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as highlighted in chapter three, the 2006 NGO law is criticised for leading to the closure of 
TSOs as well as the end of autonomous civil society space (Maxwell, 2006).  
 
Reflecting earlier anecdotal evidence (Vinogradov, 2006), and highlighted in appendix A, the 
majority of TSOs participating in this study remained registered. These superficial findings 
are counterintuitive in particular given the criticism levied against the NGO law (see chapter 
3.4). Therefore, illustrating the perceptions of respondents of the NGO law needs further 
examination. Remaining on the register of non-commercial organisations, that is adhering to 
the legislative requirements of the NGO law, reflects a reoccurring discourse amongst  
respondents outlining the importance of being on said register. Membership on this „register‟ 
is important so TSOs „can participate in grants‟ (Respondent 4, Org04Sam, Samara) and for 
survival as otherwise „you will not be able to exist‟ (Respondent 66, Org17Yek, 
Yekaterinburg). Despite the importance of remaining registered, TSOs portray the impact of 
the NGO law in different ways and in doing so constitute three different groups. These groups 
can each be characterised according to the amount of staff or the amount of members of 
TSOs, their organisational type (see chapter 3) and whether TSOs portray themselves as being 
able to win grant funding from the Federal centre or only from the municipal level. The 
perception and portrayal of the law of each of these groups are described in turn. 
  
5.2.1 ‘Professionalising’ TSOs 
The first group that can be established are organisations that in various ways highlight the 
NGO law as „professionalising‟ their organisation. In effect, this discourse argues that the 
NGO law leads to improved effectiveness of TSOs through the establishment of professional 
structures and ways of operating as organisations. This group, as summarised in table 5.1, 
consists of 15 organisations. On average TSOs which belong to this group are „older‟, with 
the majority being founded in the late 1990s or during the Soviet period. Furthermore, they 
are also larger in size, most of them state having more than 6 staff members or highlight that 
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they have a large membership base. This group of organisations encompasses both marionette 
organisations (see chapter 3.4.1) as well as organisations which are best classified as “policy 
or advocacy organisations” (Crotty, 2009, p. 90). In addition, many of these organisations 
describe themselves as having received foreign donations and having the ability to secure 
Federal grants.  
 
Number 
Organisational 
Code 
Registered  
Date, 
Membership/Staff 
(current) 
1 Org01Sam YES 1991, 8 S 
2 Org07Sam YES 2003, ca. 20 M 
3 Org15Sam YES 2005 (1988), 2 S 
4 Org16Sam YES 1998, 23 S 
5 Org04Per YES 1995, 6 S 
6 Org08Per YES 1926, 22 S 
7 Org22Per YES 1998, 3 S 
8 Org23Per YES 1988, ca. 15 S 
9 Org04Yek YES 2000, 5 S 
10 Org15Yek YES 1999, 22 S 
11 Org16Yek YES 1995, 2 S 
12 Org26Yek YES 1988, 5 S 
13 Org27Yek YES 1961, 4 S 
14 Org29Yek YES 1998, ca. 40 S 
15 Org32Yek YES 2005, ca. 20 S 
Table 5.1: TSOs portraying the NGO law as professionalising 
 
In order to portray the „professionalization‟ discourse this section is divided into four sub-
sections. First, it outlines how repsondents in this group portray the effect of registration 
requirements. The second sub-section elaborates on refences made to funding issues when 
discussing the NGO law. The third section examines the respondents perception of the effects 
of government supervision. The fourth sub-section is concerned with investigating the 
adjustments respondents highlight their organisations made in responds to the NGO law.  
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5.2.1.1 Registration requirements 
As illustrated above the registration requirements are characterised as providing the state with 
the ability to bar TSOs from formally operating (Maxwell, 2006). Contrary to this, TSOs in 
this group depict the NGO law as a catalyst for improving the way organisations operate, 
portraying themselves as having achieved the necessary level of „professionalism‟ to pass 
registration requirements. Consequently, the discourse constructed by this group of TSOs 
highlights that they registered „without problems‟ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara). 
Extending this assessment of no problems in the registration process is the portrayal that the 
law had „little impact on the activities and structures of our TSO‟ (Respondent 65, Org16Yek, 
Yekaterinburg) and constitutes an important process in „bringing to paper‟ (Respondent 65, 
Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg), that is formalising the work of TSOs. Therefore, for this group of 
TSOs the NGO law presents an important pillar for the development of civil society. They 
highlight that the NGO law provides the state with control over civil society ensuring the all 
organisations are active.  
 
I think that this law is very important because in the third sector there are many 
organisations but there are very few which are actually active. That is why the 
government has to have a control over the third sector. Now everyone will be able to 
know which organizations are active and which are not. Those organisations which 
handed in their documents to the registration office are written down into the register 
of TSOs, so you know straight way, who is active and who is not. 
Respondent 7, Org07Sam, Samara 
 
For TSOs in this group, in order for civil society to develop, the state needs to ensure that it 
consists of organisations which are active. Such active organisations have „already a very 
developed management system‟ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg) and „you [have 
to be] professionally organised‟ (Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm). In this case „filling in this 
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[registration] document is not a problem‟ (Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara). These 
portrayals of the NGO law suggest that organisations in this group consider TSOs which are 
not able to adhere to the law as not good enough or not active enough to be members of civil 
society.  
 
Today the law requires of TSOs the same as of commercial organisations, but the level 
of development, the level of the people that work in many TSOs is not always on that 
level. But we have no such problems. 
Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm 
 
Thus, respondents from this group illustrate the NGO law as „cleaning‟ civil society of 
organisations which they understand as not being active. However, contrary to the criticisms 
of a substantial amount of TSOs closing (Maxwell, 2006; see chapter 3.4) respondents do not 
consider this cleaning as a problem because as far as „I am aware only 10% [of organisations] 
closed‟ (Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara). Furthermore this group of TSOs highlights the 
responsibility for closure lies with TSOs themselves.  
 
The fact that some organizations were not re-registered is true, but not because there 
were obstacles in the process, but because they have ceased to exist. These 
organisations just did not want to carry on. They stopped working, but not because 
they had to be re-registered.  
Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara 
 
In effect TSOs in this group argued that the majority of organisations, which did close down 
following the new registration requirements were „inactive‟ and thus they were not shut down 
for political reasons. By illustrating the law in this particular way, TSOs hope to highlight that 
the law has not had the predicted negative impact. The surprising aspect to this is that TSOs 
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constituting this group encompass both marionettes as well as organisations which would 
previously has considered been as independent (Crotty, 2009). Going by the assessment of the 
NGO law in chapter three, the latter type of TSOs should have portrayed the law as more 
restrictive in nature. However, neither „past autonomy‟ nor „ideological‟ (i.e. marionettes) 
allegiance seems to matter when TSOs within this group highlight the effects of the law. 
Consequently, respondents in this group demonstrate that in their perception the effects of the 
law‟s registration requirements are weaker then the criticism of the law illustrated in chapter 
three. Hence, for respondents of this group the NGO law does not represent the end of civil 
society (Maxwell, 2006). Furthermore, for this group of TSOs, the NGO law is an 
encouraging development as it ensures that TSOs become more professional in response to 
the NGO law.   
 
5.2.1.2 Funding requirements 
Chapter three highlights that the NGO law limits the ability of TSOs to access funding, in 
particular from abroad. The group of TSOs understanding the NGO law as professionalising 
organisations outlines that the NGO law has improved transparency vis-à-vis the state. By 
being a „transparent organisation, [because] we adhere to the law‟ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, 
Perm) and „because we are open‟ (Respondent 14, Org15Sam, Samara), TSOs consider 
themselves as more eligible for resource support from the government.  
 
But if we want to have government funding, if we want to be equal partners, then we 
need to provide information about us.  
Respondent 65, Org16Yek , Yekaterinburg 
 
Another similar  respondent  
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We are very good at writing grants and this [law] imposes a discipline on us, and 
makes sure that the money does not disappear; that we are responsible for what we say 
we do. This makes organisations become more professional. 
Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Thus, TSOs in this group identify that because they adhere to the law, they are able to access 
resources and in turn the NGO law makes them more professional and accountable. This 
suggests that TSOs „sell out‟, by adhering to the law, in order to survive and use the 
professionalization narrative as a way to highlight themselves as the future agents of civil 
society. They are adjusting to the state‟s wish to manage civil society. 
 
For TSOs in this group acquiescing to the law makes them more transparent to the state, in 
turn demonstrating that they do not pursue „misaligned‟ objectives (i.e. democratisation or 
holding the state to account) which have motivated the NGO law (Reynolds, 2007; see 
chapter 3.4). It is because of „how foreign TSOs [used to] work, this is why we have these 
controls‟ (Respondent 78, Org29Yek, Yekaterinburg). Nevertheless, this group of TSOs 
understand this law as important.  
 
I was very happy about the law, because it shows that the government takes a more 
serious approach with regards to TSOs. 
Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
For respondents of this group, the law not only represented the managing of civil society but 
they also understand such arrangements as fundamental to their ability to interact with the 
state. Not only does this group acquiesce to access funding but their acquiescence is also 
motivated by, it seems, the potential of working in alliance with the government. 
Acquiescence and working with the government is a narrative that extends the 
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professionalization discourse when considering the stricter government supervision associated 
with the NGO law (see chapter 3.4) 
 
5.2.1.3 Government supervision  
Chapter three highlights that the NGO law has introduced stringent government supervision 
of TSOs. In addition to the „professional approach‟ TSOs in this group portray vis-à-vis the 
registration requirements, their portrayal of the yearly reporting requirements, which form the 
heart of the law‟s government supervision agenda is similar. TSOs in this group also consider 
that they „never had a problem with anything [regarding the reporting requirements]‟ 
(Respondent 49, Org01Yek, Yekaterinburg). It is their ability to „be a professional 
organisations‟ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg), which means they have no 
problem with these requirements. However, TSOs in this group understand such 
„professionalism‟ not necessarily the adoption of „business-like‟ structures (see Anheier, 2005 
and chapter 2.3). For TSOs in this group it is the presence of „professions‟ such as 
accountants and lawyers. 
 
We have a qualified accountant, my daughter, and a lawyer. Therefore, we were able 
to adapt our structures and had no problems with the law. This level of 
professionalism helps us to adapt our structures so that we can work within the 
requirements of the legal system.  
Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
In particular the presence of an accountant is associated with being professional as well as 
able to conform to the NGO law. The phrase „we have an accountant‟ (Respondent 14, 
Org15Sam, Samara) or „we have a very good accountant‟ (Respondent 75, Org26Yek, 
Yekaterinburg) is reoccurring amongst the majority of TSOs in this group with regards to the 
requirements of adhering to the NGO law. For these TSOs, the NGO law‟s requirements have 
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encouraged them to attract such „professions‟. However, as indicated in the above quote, such 
professions are often recruited from within the family or social network at the heart of such 
organisations. Thus recruiting such professions does not demonstrate an increasing ability of 
such TSOs to attract the broader public, a crucial constraint to civil society development in 
Russia (see chapter 3.3.1.2). It also lends support to the argument that the majority of civic 
engagement and participation remains confined to the realm of private networks (Cook & 
Vinogradova, 2006; Salmenniemi, 2008; see chapter 3.3.1). These findings mirror 
observations made in other research, which found that TSOs have increasingly become an 
outlet for various „professions‟ such as teachers, accountants, and lawyers (Salmenniemi, 
2008). Even though this group of TSOs wants to portray the law as having led to more 
„professional‟ organisations, the understanding of „professionalism‟ carries a different 
meaning to how „professionalism‟ is understood within the academic literature (Chew & 
Osborne, 2009; see chapter 2.3).  
 
Further, TSOs portraying the NGO law as „professionalising‟ highlight that new reporting 
requirements create synergies with the requirements of various other supervisory bodies. For 
this group of TSOs, complying with the NGO law is only one aspect of the complex Russian 
regulatory environment. Therefore, stringent annual requirements for the registration service 
assist TSOs with the requisites of other state authorities.  
 
It [the law] forces us to be organised. Often TSOs do not have secretaries or similar 
staff and we neglect our paperwork. But thanks to such requirements, we are able to 
get our paperwork in order. Following the annual accounts to the FRS [Federal 
Registration Service], we also have tax inspections. We need to prepare these 
documents anyway. I think that the law professionalises the way TSOs do their work; 
at least now most of them are on top with their paperwork. 
Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg 
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In effect, this group of organisations argues that adhering to NGO law leads to improved 
effectiveness of TSOs through the establishment of professional structures and ways of 
operating as organisations. In turn this portrays the NGO law as a catalyst for improving the 
(micro)organisational level of Russian civil society. Effectively TSOs use their 
„professionalization‟ discourse as a way to justify their acquiescence to the NGO law. 
However, the ability of the state to „impose‟ such changes via the NGO law reflects the 
legislative attempt to manage civil society. Whether or not such changes can address the 
limitation to civil society development (see chapter 3.3.1.1 – 3.3.1.4) is questionable. These 
aspects become clearer when examining how respondents from this group portray the NGO 
law‟s effect on their day-to-day activities.  
 
5.2.1.4 Protraying the day-to-day impact of the NGO law 
Despite portraying the NGO law as „professionalising‟ their organisations, respondents from 
this group of TSOs do not perceive the law as affecting their day to day activities. TSOs 
within this group consider the law as having influenced only the formal aspects of their 
organisations.  
 
Most changes [required by the law] only concerned the formal part of the organisation. 
Now we have the duty to hand in information on our activities from the previous year. 
Filling in this document is not a problem for us.  
Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara 
 
Because they are „professional‟ in filing annual accounts this is not a problem and „does not at 
all influence our work‟ (Respondent 15, Org15Sam, Samara). Therefore, respondents portray 
their organisations as doing the activities that „we did, we are still doing them the same way‟ 
(Respondent 74, Org27Yek, Yekaterinburg) and „as we have worked before we are working 
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now‟ (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). Hence despite illustrating the impacts of the NGO 
law as professionalising their organisations, respondents did not feel that these impacts had an 
impact on their activities. In effect respondents of this group portray the law as „just paper 
work‟ (Respondent 28, Org04Per, Perm). Actually, respondents of this group of TSOs portray 
the law as having had no real impact. This provides insights into the activities of TSOs active 
in the health and education sector. First, it highlights that their activities have not been 
political in the past, hence they do not challenge the sovereignty of the Russian state (see 
chapter 3.4.1). Not only does this set out a signal of the activities of TSOs that enable them to 
adhere to NGO law, but also ensures that TSOs remain depoliticised and do not encounter 
problems with the law and its requirements. This highlights that the NGO law is a legally 
mandated attempt to manage civil society. Second, the assertion of „no effect on TSO 
activities‟ dovetails with the literature suggesting that Russian TSOs have made a limited 
contribution to democratisation (Crotty, 2009; see chapter 3.3.1). Given the restrictive nature 
of the NGO law (see chapter 3.4), the inability of TSOs to contribute to the democratisation 
process provides the only viable explanation for their portrayal of the law not impacting their 
activities. It is indicative of the fact that, at least TSOs in this group, do not understand or do 
not want to understand themselves as agents of democratisation. On the contrary, they like the 
resulting arrangements as it enables them to interact with the state, something they would be 
unable to do if they would not register or adhere to the law. Clearly respondents 
understanding the NGO law as professionalising TSOs, see their acquiescence as providing 
benefits to their organisations, in particular resources. Therefore, this group of TSOs feels 
comfortable within arrangements in which the state manages civil society.  
 
Further, in adopting this „professionalization‟ discourse TSOs can represent themselves as 
flourishing in the eyes of the state. However, at the same time this is indicative of the 
mechanism the NGO law creates so that the state can manage civil society arrangements. As a 
result of adopting such a specific rhetoric, TSOs in this group hope to position themselves as 
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viable partners for the state. Thus in effect TSOs in this study consider themselves as 
„assistants‟ to the Federal state helping it to ensure Russia‟s socio-economic development. In 
turn TSOs contribute to the stability of the „Federal‟ state. TSOs within this 
„professionalization‟ group do not directly attribute such a development to the NGO law, but 
highlight the assumption that only organisations that are able to adhere to the law can take up 
the state‟s offers of cooperation (see chapter 7 for an illustration of state-TSO interaction). 
 
This professionalization discourse clearly points out that some Russian TSOs want to be seen 
as professionally organized and effective working organisations. Compliance with the NGO 
law serves as their narrative to portray this image. Despite this rhetoric, as discussed above 
when compared against the limitations of civil society development in Russia, this effectively 
shows that TSOs subordinate themselves to the state. This group of TSOs use the NGO law as 
a way to highlight how well they operate rather than outlining the law‟s actual effects. As a 
result the only effect that the professionalization discourse attributes with the NGO law is a 
change of the forms, structures, and staffing of TSOs, trends which seemed to have already 
commenced prior to the law‟s introduction. By highlighting such „cosmetic‟ changes, TSOs 
hope to show their support for the state and its policies. The desire to highlight the „benefits‟ 
of the NGO law also show that the state is clearly in control of civil society. TSOs 
contributing to the „professional‟ discourse are very much situated in the upper half of the 
hourglass, as frequently evident from their well-established relations within state institutions. 
The „professionalization‟ discourse and the group of TSOs promoting this discourse also 
indicates that an increasing number of previous “professional policy or advocacy 
organisations” (Crotty, 2009, p. 90) move into the upper half of the hourglass. Past research 
has attributed these types of organisations as the only few, which inhabit the Russian civil 
society space (Henry, 2009). Thus, effectively the professionalization discourse highlights 
that Russia‟s civil society space remains constricted (Crotty, 2006). The professionalization 
discourse outlines those TSOs that portray the NGO law as a good development as they 
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consider it strengthening civil society. However, this is not the case, because it enables the 
state to manage civil society or at the very least have an intimate knowledge of their activities. 
Consequently, the NGO law is a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. 
Nevertheless, the professionalization discourse only represents one group of TSOs within this 
study. As mentioned above TSOs engaging in this discourse are already „professionalised‟ 
TSOs or marionette organisations. However, other and frequently smaller organisations 
construct the effects of the law as increasing bureaucratisation. Their „bureaucratisation‟ 
discourse is illustrated and discussed in the following section.  
 
5.2.2 Bureaucratising TSOs 
When examining how TSOs portray the NGO law, the second group emerging from the data 
collected are organisations that describe it as bureaucratising their organisations. This argues 
that the NGO law means that TSOs are becoming more bureaucratic because they are 
burdened with more formal requirements. This group is summarised in table 5.2 and consist 
of 16 organisations across all three regions. The bureaucratisation group of TSOs are on 
average newer than the organisations making up the „professionalization‟ discourse. There are 
no organisations that can be classed as Soviet successor organisations. Most of these 
organisations have at most 6 staff members and a small membership base. This group of 
TSOs highlight that once in a while they have received foreign funding in the past. Only some 
of the TSOs in this group portray themselves as receiving municipal funding which is enough 
to survive. None of these organisations state that they have received grants or funding handed 
out at a regional or Federal level. The group thus consisted of what are quintessential formal 
groups or grass-roots TSOs.  
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Number 
Organisational 
Code 
Registered  
Date, 
Membership/Staff 
(current) 
1 Org13Sam YES 1998, ca. 15 M 
2 Org23Sam YES 2000, ca. 60 M 
3 Org07Per YES 1993 , 4 S 
4 Org09Per YES 1997, N.A. 
5 Org13Per YES 2000, 60 M 
6 Org14Per YES 1997, 70 M 
7 Org20Per YES 1994, 11 S 
8 Org02Yek YES 2005, 1 S 
9 Org03Yek YES 1999, 1 S 
10 Org05Yek YES 2001, 10 M/S 
11 Org07Yek YES 2002, ca. 30 M 
12 Org12Yek YES 1998, 1 S 
13 Org17Yek YES 2002, 9 M 
14 Org21Yek YES 1992, 8 S 
15 Org28Yek YES 1998, 1 S 
16 Org31Yek YES 2004, 3 S 
Table 5.2: TSOs portraying the NGO law as bureaucratising 
 
5.2.2.1 Registration requirements 
TSOs portraying the NGO law as bureaucratising their work, highlight that the law has put 
additional requirements on their organisations. It requires of them to organise their paperwork 
and in effect they outline that this means that they need to be much more bureaucratic. For 
some respondents in this group the registration requirements create such much additional 
work that „we could not deal with it ourselves, too much paperwork‟ (Respondent 18, 
Org19Sam, Samara). Such organisations needed to find resources to pay a law firm to 
facilitate the registration process. TSOs that were unable to access such resources outline 
themselves as enduring the bureaucratic pressures. They had to dedicate their time to achieve 
registration and one respondent outlines it as taking „six months to register‟ (Respondent 38, 
Org13Per, Perm) and that „there were very many problems‟ (Respondent 33, Org09Per, 
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Perm). It is thus not surprising that this group of TSOs portrays the NGO law and the 
registration process as difficult and time consuming.  
 
Under the new law it was very difficult to register, there are so many requirements. 
For example if you are a TSO, you want to register, you write yourself a mission and 
collect all the necessary documents. You hand them in and they find a small mistake, 
some inaccuracy, a misprint, then you have to start again.  
Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Despite these considerations, as illustrated in Appendix A and table 5.2 above, respondents in 
this group also highlight that their organisations have remained registered. Rather than 
protesting against the difficulties and remaining unregistered, it seems that TSOs in this group 
consider being on the register as important as the professionalising TSOs. The registration 
requirements do not deter TSOs in this group from registering, despite the burden on time and 
resources this creates. Hence it seems that TSOs in this group conforming to the NGO law, in 
expectation that membership on the TSO registers provides benefits to their organisations.  
 
5.2.2.2 Funding requirements 
Chapter three highlights that the NGO law limits the ability of TSOs to access funding in 
particular from abroad. However, due to the fact that this group of TSOs has had limited 
access to foreign funding, this group of respondents does not consider any financial 
implication in terms of the yearly reporting requirements.  
 
The only problem for everyone is the financial reporting requirements and the very 
bureaucratic system of complying and handing in accounts. 
Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg 
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It is the state‟s requirement for annual accounts that presents problems to such TSOs. 
However, for this group of TSOs this is only an exercise in filling in forms because „we 
receive very little funding‟ (Respondent 22, Org23Sam, Samara). Consequently the majority 
of them hand in „empty declarations, I mean I just put a zero everywhere‟ (Respondent 22, 
Org23Sam, Samara). The motto of this group of respondents seems to be no funding, no 
problem. Nevertheless, they seemingly want to remain as a registered organisation, primarily 
to be able to access the little funding they do receive. For these TSOs, consideration of 
funding is just another bureaucratic hurdle that they need to overcome in order to conform. 
Acquiescence enables them to receive some resources and support, but in effect this reflects 
their existence as afternoon tea and coffee clubs without the means to challenge the state.  
 
5.2.2.3 Government supervision 
For TSOs in this group, the yearly reporting requirements, and thus supervision by the state 
are the most challenging. Similar to the registration process, TSOs in this group portray the 
law as formalising order and structure within civil society and straining their resources. 
Respondents in this group portray reporting as „very tight now, which makes life difficult‟ 
(Respondent 53, Org05Yek, Yekaterinburg). For them these reporting requirements are „so 
difficult, I was tearing my hair out‟ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg). TSOs find in 
particular the required time commitments as difficult because the law „makes you submit all 
your protocols, they want so many documents that a year is not enough to get them all 
together‟ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg). Alternatively TSOs need to maintain 
back office operations, which means that „you need to have computers and maintain quite few 
staff‟ (Respondent 45, Org20Per, Perm) something which the majority of TSOs in this group 
are unable to do. This group of TSOs highlights that the audits following the submission of 
their annual statements are „very tough, [and] you need a lot of time‟ (Respondent 31, 
Org07Per, Perm). Consequently for TSOs in this group, the yearly reporting requirements 
have been more than just an annoyance and straining the organisations resources.  
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Generally, when they were introduced these new rules gave us a headache. We are not 
able to keep an accountant on staff, but we had to hire one and take some of the 
money we use for projects to pay him. 
Respondent 24, Org13Sam, Samara 
 
Furthermore, TSOs illustrating the effect of the NGO law as bureaucratising highlight that 
supervisory authorities do not aim to support TSOs but manage them. TSOs that understand 
the effect of the law as bureaucratising emphasise the presumption of guilt under which they 
feel the NGO law operates. They highlight that it is „your responsibility to fill the reports 
correctly‟ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg) and even „if it they make a mistake, 
you have to proof that they were wrong‟ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg). Hence 
TSO in this group feel they have to work for the state authorities.  
 
But it should be the other way around, we should not work for them but they should be 
working for us. 
Respondent 33, Org09Per, Perm 
 
Adhering to the NGO law allows TSOs to prove their worth to the state which  means they 
have to overcome these bureaucratic hurdles. Hence, the presumption of guilt seemingly 
embedded within the law looks as if it is crucial to TSOs portraying the NGO law as 
bureaucratic. Because of the NGO law TSOs are required to keep a record of every single 
activity and all aspects and issues relating to them. This in turn means „so much paperwork, 
this stretches your organisations‟ (Respondent 77, Org28Yek, Yekaterinburg). Respondents in 
this group portray the NGO law as even governing the semantics, which they can use in their 
own organisational documentations.  
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Now we have four projects, we call them this way, but apparently, it is not correct to 
say so. Because a project has to be written, it has to have a beginning and an end, and 
all sorts of other details, all the financial details have to be written out. So now we 
have to call what we do directions.  
Respondent 66, Org17Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
TSOs feel that the NGO law does not facilitate their work. Instead of being able to pursue 
their objectives or carry out their activities, they are made to fill out forms and use specified 
language to describe their work. As a result, respondents have to spend significant amounts of 
time away from the activities of their TSOs. Nevertheless, despite seeing this as 
bureaucratising their activities, respondents in this group do adhere to these requirements 
ensuring their organisations remain registered. It seems that this way, respondents in this 
group hope to portray themselves as credible partners of the state. One reason for such silent 
acceptance might be the lacking organisational capacity to challenge the law. However, when 
considering smaller TSOs dealing with disability issues, these organisations do seem have the 
capacity to challenge legislative changes they do not agree with. Reflecting the observations 
of other researchers (Henderson, 2008; Wengle & Rasell, 2008) and examples concerning 
legislative changes monetising welfare benefits provided by Org07Yek, these organisations 
are able to take up positions and activities challenging legislative changes. However in the 
case of the NGO law and specifically with regards to the increasing resource strain, TSOs 
seem to have chosen to remain neutral and silently accept these changes and their 
implications. This is indicative that respondents within this group of TSOs understand civil 
society as subordinate to the state; arrangements that are firmly established with this new 
NGO law. Hence respondents, despite not being happy with the NGO law, accept it as a 
framework to guide their activities. In as such the state is succeeding in its legal attempt to 
manage civil society. With regards to civil society development this demonstrates that, similar 
to their „professionalization‟ counterparts, TSOs within this group do not consider themselves 
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as challenging or opposing the state. Their acquiescence to the NGO law highlights the 
superiority of the state and the acceptance that the Russian state has the right to manage civil 
society (see chapter 3.5). Effectively this highlights that respondents do understand the need 
for the development of civil society as an autonomous space (see chapter 2.5) and catalyst for 
democratisation. Such insights are substantiated when examining how TSOs in this group 
portray the law‟s impact on their day to day activities.  
 
5.2.2.4 Protraying the day-to-day impact of the NGO law 
This group of respondents has portrayed the NGO law, rather than creating transparency, 
accountability, professionalism, or facilitating the development of civil society, as 
increasingly bureaucratising and formalising their work. Similar to the group that illustrates 
the NGO law as professionalising TSOs, respondents in this group highlight that „it does not 
impact our work as such, [however adding that] it just takes a lot of time‟ (Respondent 80, 
Org31Yek, Yekaterinburg). Similar to the TSOs portraying the NGO law as professionalising 
TSOs, this group of respondents portray the law as „creating more paperwork‟ (Respondent 
70, Org21Yek, Yekaterinburg). The bureaucratic nature of the law means that respondents 
outline, once this paperwork is out of the way they are able to pursue their activities as they 
did before.  
 
Honestly speaking, it [the law] did not affect us very much. (…) But they [supervisory 
authorities] do not look at what work organisations do, what good things they do, what 
incredible projects they have. They look at whether there is an annual [members] 
meeting in a year, are there minutes for that meeting. They only control the formal 
aspects.  
Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg 
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Contrary to the professionalization discourse (see section 5.2.1), this section suggests that the 
NGO law has not lead to an improvement in the activities that TSOs do. Also, the 
bureaucratisation discourse cannot be understood as criticisms of the state. Many of the 
organisations in this group portray the NGO law as „introducing a more stringent 
accountability, but I thought that this was very good‟ (Respondent 39, Org14Per, Perm). In 
this train of thought the bureaucratisation discourse can also be seen as a way of TSOs to gain 
legitimacy as viable partners for the state. Once TSOs are able to overcome the hurdle of the 
NGO law, they become eligible and legitimate participants in civil society and therefore a 
potential partner. The answer to question of why TSOs choose to take on these bureaucratic 
hurdles is best captured in the following quote. 
 
Of course we have to be registered, because now everything is more structured. 
Without adhering to the official requirements you will not be able to exist. If we have 
people coming to our courses, they want a certificate, so we have to be official so we 
can get paid.  
Respondent 66, Org17Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
TSOs within this group acquiesce to the NGO law in order to function, a clear indication of 
the management of civil society. Respondents in this group of TSOs perceive the law as 
creating unnecessary hurdles making TSOs more bureaucratic. This highlights how the NGO 
law has started a transformation of TSOs into organisations that at some point might resemble 
state authorities rather than voluntary and autonomous institutions of civil society. In 
particular, smaller TSOs illustrate that the NGO law and adhering to it puts considerable 
strain on resources both human and financial. However, rather than closing down or 
remaining unregistered, the majority of TSOs have a „do-it-yourself‟ attitude when it comes to 
the NGO law and are willing to sacrifice time and resources to comply with it. For many 
respondents, in particular in smaller TSOs, these organisations not only form an outlet to 
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socialise but consist of a vital part to access key information and resources (Evans, 2002). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the more bureaucratic aspects of TSOs work has not 
deterred them from running their organisations. The bureaucratisation discourse is also 
indicative of the increasing power of the state (see chapter 3.4). Further, it demonstrates that 
the state is able to leverage its power in order to „manage‟ civil society. Thus, the 
bureaucratisation discourse indicates the reshaping of civil society-state relations and hence 
civil society arrangements (see chapter 3.4). No longer does it seem viable to expect Russian 
civil society to develop into an autonomous sphere situated between the state and the 
individual (see chapter 2.2). The bureaucratisation discourse and the fact that most TSOs in 
this study chose to remain registered shows that activists understand adherence to the laws 
„bureaucratic‟ registration and reporting requirements as a threshold condition to be part of 
Russian civil society. The bureaucratisation discourse is constructed of TSOs traditionally 
found within the lower half of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006). For these organisations which 
remind one of afternoon „tea and coffee‟ friendship circles or clubs, the NGO law does 
resemble a „bureaucratic‟ roadblock to their usual modus operanti. However, they still adhere 
to the law, because they consider it as important for their existence and do not see a link 
between the administrative burden and it deflecting them from „holding the state to account‟ 
(Taylor, 2006). Nevertheless, the professionalization and bureaucratisation discourses only 
represent two of the three groups portraying the effect of the NGO law that can be 
distinguished. The TSOs remaining unregistered highlight their decision as a response to the 
law and will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5.2.3 Protesting the NGO law  
The third group that can be established are the organisations that in protest to the NGO law 
have not re-registered. They argue that the NGO law limits their ability to function as civil 
society organisations. This group, consists of only four organisations. This protest group are 
primarily small grass-roots type organisations similar to the ones making up the 
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bureaucratising group of TSOs. The majority of these organisations want to remain 
unregistered to avoid the bureaucracy associated with the law and to ensure that they continue 
their work and activities as before. Adhering to the NGO law, that is being registered, would 
be too much paper work which is „a problem and we do not have the resources to do this‟ 
(Respondent 21, Org22Sam, Samara). Thus for some of the TSOs in this group it is the strain 
on resources and paperwork that has prompted them not to register. 
 
All though it would make a lot of sense form one point of view to register Org10Per as 
an official charity in Russia. But we just do not want to do it because the amount of 
bureaucracy and paperwork that we would have to go through.  
Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm 
 
However, outlining the protest nature of this group, they highlight the NGO law was „one 
reason why we left this sector‟ (Respondent 58, Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). This group of 
TSOs highlight that they feel „that everything became too organised, there are too many 
controlling structures‟ (Respondent 57, Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). Consequently, for this 
group of TSOs the law has „a very restricting effect‟ (Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm). In 
turn this means that once an organisation is registered, the NGO law provides the state with 
too many opportunities to influence and liquidate their organisations. 
 
I, like anyone else, understand that there is always something which can be criticised, 
there are always some formal aspects that they can use to disturb your activities. So 
you end up writing reports explaining yourself, and not get anything done. This is why 
I do not want to register. For what we do, a non-registered organisation is enough.    
Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara 
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This outlines that a minority of TSOs in this study choose not to register to avoid and protest 
the law. The fact that only so few organisations have undertaken this step outlines that the 
majority of TSOs, even if they consider the NGO law as harmful to an autonomous civil 
society, acquiesce to it. Not being registered restricts the ability of TSOs within this group to 
access funding and resources, both from abroad and domestic. It is a positive sign that this 
protest group of TSOs took the active decision not to register, as it represents that some 
organisations are unwilling to submit themselves to the state‟s management of civil society. 
However, it also means that such organisations are „overlooked‟ be they state, starved of 
resources and that their power to influence the state is going to be limited. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how respondents portray the NGO law and its impact on their day-
to-day activities. In doing so the chapter delineates three groups of TSOs. Group one portrays 
the NGO law as professionalising TSOs and is made up of larger well resourced 
organisations. Group two outlines the law as bureaucratising and difficult to comply with by 
themselves as maintaining their registration. Group three portray themselves as not registering 
out of protest against the law. Other than predicted in the literature (see Maxwell, 2006; see 
chapter 3.4) the majority of TSOs remain registered. With the contraction of funding available 
from abroad as a result of the NGO law (see chapter 3.4), remaining on the Russian TSO 
register is the only way to be able to access the resource and funding provided by domestics, 
mainly government (see chapter 3.3.1) sources. This points out why, TSOs, despite 
illustrating „bureaucratisation‟, remain registered. The fact that the majority of organisations 
remain registered also indicates that TSOs do not oppose state managed civil society 
arrangements, in which they are likely to serve as surrogates to the state. Despite the differing 
portrayal of the NGO law, the communality of group one and two within this study is that 
they consider themselves as benefitting from remaining registered and conform to the law‟s 
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demands. When considering all TSOs within this study, bar the ones protesting the NGO law, 
the majority of organisations portray the law as the right law.  
 
TSOs are not opposed to being managed by the state underlying the importance for 
organisations to adhere to the state‟s demands. It reflects the state and its demands as an 
integral fabric of the official life of any organisation in Russia and consequently means that in 
the context of the Russian Federation, managed civil society is the norm. This highlights the 
„continuity‟ of past arrangements (Hedlund 2006) and the cultural-historic trajectory of the 
Russian Federation (see chapter 3). The cultural-historic examination indicates that in the 
past, legislation had a restrictive and controlling rationale and the 2006 NGO law mirrors this 
tradition (see chapter 3.4). Thus it is not new for TSOs to conform to restrictive legislation in 
order to survive. This demonstrates the need to engage with the cultural-historic past within 
the Post-Soviet context to understand elements of contemporary arrangements (Flynn & 
Oldfield, 2006).  
 
Adhering to the NGO law and adjusting form and structure provides TSOs in this study a way 
to seek legitimatisation as members of Russian civil society. Consequently, the NGO law has 
provided the state with a framework that enables it to manage civil society arrangements. In 
turn this might mean that the state‟s coercive pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) taking the form of the NGO law, could lead to the emergence of isomorphic 
tendencies amongst TSOs, aspects which are explored in more detail in chapter seven. In 
illustrating acquiescence to the NGO law, TSOs indicate a bleak future for the development 
of Russian civil society as an autonomous space. These portrayals, which as discussed are 
counterintuitive, demonstrate that TSOs think that the law is „a good thing‟ and further 
worsening the prospects of an autonomous space. Essentially TSOs have become willing 
participants in a managed civil society because it provides them a way of accessing funds. 
Hence the state has bribed TSOs into acquiescing. Therefore the NGO law represents the 
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state‟s legally mandated attempt to manage civil society and evidence presented in this 
chapter demonstrates this management of civil society by the state as a fait accompli.  
 
The general adherence and abidance to the rule of law, not only by state institutions but also 
by all other „citizens‟ has been an central issue in President Medvedev‟s current rhetoric 
calling for the modernisation of Russia (BBC, 2009; Krawatzek, 2010). In the 2009 
presidential address Mr Medvedev explicitly called for the adherence to the rule of law and 
fight against corruption (BBC, 2009). Based on the evidence outlined above, with regards to 
adhering to the rule of law, TSOs seem to have taken up this request. The acquiescence to the 
law dovetails with this meta-political rhetoric. For TSOs, the impact of the NGO law is that it 
has introduced a „clear set of rules‟ which set out the defining condition to be a member. In 
response TSOs have undertaken formal adjustments (professionalization, bureaucratisation, 
protest), however changes to their day-to-day activities were not needed as their contribution 
to democratisation has been limited (Taylor, 2006; see section 5.2.2). It seems that as rational 
actors, TSOs have adapted to the coercing forces of the NGO law. Constricting the potential 
of TSOs to contribute to democratising was outlined as a key objective of the NGO law 
(Maxwell, 2006). In creating a restrictive legal environment (see Maxwell 2006 and chapter 
3.4) the 2006 NGO law ensures that the state can take advantage of the pre-existing 
weaknesses of civil society. With such arrangements in place, TSOs will be unable to address 
the micro or organizational weaknesses (resource and public acceptance and legitimacy 
issues) as well as weaknesses at a macro or civil society level (fragmentation and participation 
issues) which have limited its democratisation potential. Consequently, the NGO law ensures 
that there is „no change‟ in the inability of civil society to develop into an autonomous space 
able to hold the state to account.  Hence, this chapter demonstrates that TSOs remain unable 
to develop civil society as an autonomous space, meaning that civil society remains weak and 
constricted (Crotty, 2006) and Russia‟s hourglass society intact (see chapter, 3; Rose, 1995). 
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Therefore, reflecting other scholars (Henderson, 2008; Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 
2008; Richter, 2009) this demonstrates a change in state-civil society relations, which are not 
conducive to the Gramscian ideal of civil society as a counterweight to the state (Foley & 
Edwards, 1996). In turn civil society remains deprived of its key functionality and 
contribution to the democratisation process. Conversely, as this thesis argues, such 
arrangements become mechanism to sustain the current managed democratic regime (Balzer, 
2003). Therefore, the NGO law achieves its political objective of „depoliticising‟ civic 
activity and „neutralising‟ its democratisation potential. Hence, the NGO law provides the 
state with the legal framework to manage civil society.   
 
In answering the question on how respondents perceive the NGO law and how it affects TSOs 
day-to-day activities, it has to be stated that the law creates a Foucaultian incentive system in 
which TSOs now act according to the roles the state envisions for them. In a similar fashion to 
the state‟s actions in the economy (Hanson & Teague, 2005), the various angles that TSOs 
illustrate about the effects of the NGO law outlines how the law has recreated a mechanism of 
suspended punishment (Ledeneva, 2006) for the civil society sphere. This demonstrates that 
managed arrangements represent a „transformation‟ of Russian civil society into a third sector 
aimed at “mobilising to help the state” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 747), encapsulating a vision of 
what civil society is, that is aligned with its cultural-historic trajectory (Evan, 2006b). Hence 
the NGO law leads to the state management of civil society. Yet it does not matter as civil 
society was underdeveloped, ineffective, and weak (Crotty, 2009; see chapter 3.3.1) 
beforehand. With the arrangements established and institutionalised by the NGO law, civil 
society is unlikely to develop into an independent and autonomous space able to hold the state 
to account (Taylor, 2006). In turn this makes Russian TSOs no longer „pluralisers‟ of public 
discourse or decision making or drivers of democratisation (Uhlin, 2006; see chapter 2.5). For 
the objective of this thesis to portray manifestations of managed civil society, the NGO law 
makes apparent the legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. Consequently, the NGO 
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law in itself is a manifestation of Russian managed civil society. In the subsequent chapters, 
this thesis will further investigate the question of how managed civil society arrangements 
manifest themselves. The following chapter examines research objective two (see chapter 1 
and 4.1). The focus is on the retreat of the state form service provision and the effect on 
education and health TSOs and their ability to act as substitutes for the state (see chapter 6). 
Chapter seven investigates research objective three (see chapter 1 and 4.1) and further 
explores marionette organisations as characteristics of state managed civil society 
arrangements to establish the limits of the Russian state‟s ability to control or mould civil 
society in this way (see chapter 7).  
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CHAPTER 6: Understanding TSO activity in Russia  
6.1 Introduction 
While chapter five examined the effects of legislative changes, highlighting the NGO law as a 
legal attempt to manage civil society, in chapter six the focus of the analysis shifts to the 
activities of TSOs in order to examine more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil 
society. Specifically this chapter examines research objective two of this thesis namely to 
elaborate on how TSOs act as state substitutes (see chapter 1.1 and 4.1). In looking at health 
and education TSOs, this chapter not only contributes to filling a void in the understanding of 
such organisations in Russia, but it also investigates the impact state withdrawal has on TSO 
activities such as service provision and advocacy.  
 
The literature discussed in chapter two demonstrates that in a context such as the UK (also 
referred to as democratic contexts; see chapter 2.2) service provisions by TSOs is common 
place (Pestoff, 1992; Salamon, 1995; also see chapter 2.3). Further the literature argues that in 
addition to engaging in such activities, TSOs continue to act as agents of an autonomous civil 
society by aggregating interest, bridging between the individual and the state, and holding the 
state to account (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2.2). In fulfilling both 
these roles TSOs act as builders of an autonomous civil society space contributing to 
democratic governance or democratisation (Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2.5). Understanding 
whether TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation assume such roles provides another 
lens to investigate the research question of this thesis of how managed civil society manifest 
itself in the Russian Federation. Specifically and following on from chapter five‟s 
examination of the NGO law, studying the role of TSOs will provide insight into the 
potentially more subtle attempts to manage civil society. To do so, this chapter addresses the 
two following questions: 
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How TSOs perceive their activities and themselves? 
 
What role TSOs consider themselves as assuming?  
 
To answer these two questions the chapter draws the analytical theme from objective two (see 
chapter 1.1 and 4.1. and appendix F.2). This chapter is organised into two sections. The first 
section outlines the activities of TSOs. First it highlights the formal and informal advocacy 
activities of TSOs. Second it examines the service providing activities of TSOs to illustrate 
the role that TSOs portray themselves as assuming. The second section of this chapter 
discusses these findings in light of the literature presented in chapter two and three and the 
proposition that understanding state substitution offers an insight into more subtle attempts to 
manage civil society.  
 
6.2 The activities of Russian TSOs  
As chapter one and three highlights, past research has focused on civil society actors such as 
human rights organisations (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, Sundstrom, 2005), environmental 
protection organisations (Crotty, 2003, 2006; Henry, 2006), women‟s rights organisations 
(Richter, 2002; Sperling, 1999) or trade unions (Kubicek, 2002). In the context of 
democratisation such organisations are portrayed as agents for advocating rights and 
improving and influencing policymaking via advocacy activities (Taylor, 2006; Uhlin, 2006; 
see chapter 2.5). It is this advocacy nature of TSOs, which is considered critical to civil 
society‟s contribution to democracy and democratisation (Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, often 
associated with the type of organisations investigated in this thesis, the majority of TSOs 
engage in advocacy activities in which they provide specific, often welfare related services, to 
the public (Hall, 2002). In order to answer the questions of how TSOs portray and perceive 
their role and engagement in activities, this section will look at how and if TSOs in this study 
engage in informal and formal advocacy activities and service providing activities. Examining 
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the former enables this thesis to draw inference on the ability of the TSOs to act 
confrontationally vis-à-vis the state and holding it to account. The latter provides insights into 
whether TSOs substitute the state and most importantly how these organisations understand 
these activities and thus their respective roles as builders of civil society (see chapter 2.5.1).  
 
6.2.1 Formal advocacy activities 
This section highlights the formal advocacy or lack thereof illustrated by respondents within 
this study. As chapter two outlines, formal advocacy is important as it enables holding the 
state to account. Such formal or also public advocacy consists of, for example “writing letters 
to the editor, working with advocacy coalitions, issuing policy reports, and conducting a 
demonstration” (Mosley, 2009, p. 6; see chapter 2.2). It is this behaviour of TSOs, which 
demonstrates an autonomous civil society. With regards to formal advocacy activities, 
appendix A highlights that the missions and/or objectives of most organisations refer to the 
protection of rights. In turn this leaves the impression that organisations in this study are 
similar to our understanding of pro-typical TSOs (see chapter 2.3). However, as will be 
highlighted in this section, this is not the case. A similar picture emerges when looking at the 
documentary evidence which organisations have provided (see chapter 4). For example 
Org16Sam provided several copies of their newsletter titled „Judicial protection of disabled 
rights in Russia‟. In a section entitled „Rights Page‟ (pravovaii stranitshka) the organisation 
outlines new legal initiatives which affect the disabled and outlining the implications, such as 
in this case the re-assessment of the disability status.  
 
We think, that re-assessment [of the disability status] is not necessary for those 
disabled, where their doctor was unable to improve the disability or injury over the 
past four years. 
Newsletter January-March 2008, p. 8, Org16Sam, Samara  
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It is this sort of activity that TSOs in this group understand as formal advocacy activities. 
Furthermore, TSOs highlight their formal advocacy activities as „writing letters to the social 
protection department‟ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg) or providing „legal advice 
and assistance‟ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara). These sort of activities are 
predominantly illustrated by organisations which are smaller and constructing the 
bureaucratisation discourse in chapter five and portraying themselves as „never received a 
penny from these [Federal] presidential grants‟ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg). 
On the other hand, larger TSOs highlight a myriad of interaction platforms where formal 
advocacy could take place. 
 
[What we do with regards to advocacy]. Well firstly we participate in all meetings, 
committees, roundtables, conferences which are organised by the government. Soon 
we have another seminar like that with the government authorities. We are going to 
talk about what work they are doing and what the legislative basis for our work with 
the disabled is. So you can see such work is done, it might not be very noticeable, but 
basically we try to know what the governments wants to do and try to provide our 
suggestions so that they are considered.  
Respondent 29, Org05Per, Perm 
 
Similarly, respondent 64 outlines that such roundtables should be a setting „where you should 
speak your mind‟ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg). Furthermore, Org15Yek in 
Yekaterinburg, for example, outlines how as part of their advocacy activities they try to be 
elected into the regional Public Chamber as well as attempting to receive a place on the 
„roundtable‟ at the department for social protection. Thus rather than aiming to change 
policymaking, the aim is to establish „working relationships‟ with the state; relationships that 
yield access to resources as well as personal connections. This begs the question of whether 
these consultations have an influence on the decision making process. This seems unlikely as 
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respondents highlight such roundtables as „a good way for the government to tell us about 
changes to the law‟ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara) or for them to „approach the 
authorities with a problem‟ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm). TSOs do seem to realise that 
once the state has implemented new legislation such roundtables are not able to „change the 
law [which] is more difficult than do it the right way from the beginning‟ (Respondent 64, 
Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg).  
 
The existence of roundtables and committees also explains the lack of direct or public 
advocacy activities outlined by respondents. Hence, there is little evidence in the discourse 
and narratives of the respondents that their organisations in this study engage in advocacy 
activities with the aim to influence decision or policy making (Uhlin, 2006). The following 
example from respondent 31 running an organisation to place people with disabilities into 
employment provides an insight into why public advocacy of a confrontational nature is 
lacking. This organisation was invited by the regional department for social security 
(sozialnia sashita) to contribute to a working group to propose a new regional welfare policy 
with a key pillar being to improve the employability of the disabled. However, respondent 31 
outlines that the policy, which was implemented, did not include a single suggestion of this 
working group and he concludes: 
 
You see we do want to work to influence policy. So we participate in all roundtables, 
well the ones that we get invited too. But we are not always invited, the administration 
usually only invites Org05Per, Org08Per, Org23Per. And they always agree with what 
the administration says. With the social protection and employability roundtable we 
were fortunate to be invited, but as I said it leads to nothing. I think that one of the 
problems why we do not influence policy that often, is that TSOs do not really work 
together. We meet and talk quite often, but real collaboration – not that often. For 
example as part of a TACIS [European Union program „Technical Aid to 
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Commonwealth of Independent States‟] project, the English donors made all or quite a 
few disability organisations sign a memorandum that we would work together. But 
since then nothing has happened, it has been two years now. Nobody comes and 
checks. 
Respondent 31, Org07Per, Perm 
 
This illustrates a lack of cooperation amongst TSOs on advocacy activities. Cooperation with 
other TSOs is seen as „helping us mainly morally‟ (Respondent 6, Org06Sam, Samara) and 
„not really cooperation, it is more an exchange of ideas‟ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, 
Yekaterinburg). The building of coalitions to engage in formal and confrontational activities 
is missing. Thus in turn TSOs outline that „there is no love or friendship lost‟ (Respondent 27, 
Org03Per, Perm). It seems that there is a need for external pressure, in the past donor funding 
(Henderson, 2001) so that TSOs engage in cooperative campaigns (see Sundstrom, 2005 for 
evidence that external influences can also be global norms of humanity). In effect this 
demonstrates that TSOs do not understand the need for cooperation with each other as a vital 
step to building an autonomous civil society (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). In turn it is no 
surprise that TSOs in this study do not associate any effectiveness with confrontational 
activities. For respondent 12 this has a historic legacy as  
 
during the Soviet Union, TSOs did not do any advocacy work and I think such 
stereotypes are still there [amongst the state authorities]  
Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara.  
 
Consequently, a large group of TSOs in this study mention that „it would be good to have a 
specialist with regards to rights in our organisations‟ (Respondent 27, Org03Per, Perm) and 
thus be able to engage in advocacy activities. The respondents from this group highlight that 
as organisations they just „do not engage in this kind of activity‟ (Respondent 27, Org03Per, 
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Perm) or that they „do not provide some form of direct legal help‟ (Respondent 59, 
Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg). This, many respondents in this group feel, is better left to other 
organisations as the following dialogue with respondent 26 from Org02Per in Perm 
demonstrates. 
 
Interviewer 
Do you engage in advocacy activities? 
Respondent 26 
No, no we do not. 
Interviewer  
Why do you not engage in such activities? 
Respondent 26 
We have some specialised organisations here in Perm. I think these are the 
organisations that should do this. We are here to provide a service to people.  
 
The group of TSOs outlining that they do not engage in advocacy activities is primarily made 
up of many smaller TSOs, a large part of which portrayed the NGO law as bureaucratising 
(see chapter 5.2.2) and marionette organisations, organisations which perceived the NGO law 
as professionalising TSOs (see chapter 5.2.1). The latter constituents of this group of TSOs 
also demonstrated themselves as adverse to any sort of public advocacy activity underlying 
that „we do not do big actions and activities‟ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg). 
Some of these organisations highlight it as the responsibility of „the level of our Russia wide 
organisation based in Moscow‟ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara) and that the effort to 
engage in advocacy it is not worthwhile because „today it is very difficult to change the 
situation for the better on a regional level‟ (Respondent 42, Org17Per, Perm). Consequently, 
direct and public advocacy does not extend beyond writing letters. Other more public and 
confrontational tactics are not something TSOs in this group feel comfortable engaging in. 
159 
 
I do not like working through demonstrations at all. Even if people are informed they 
do not understand the situation. And I observe that at demonstration people are 
manipulated according to the interest of the organisers and I do not like that. So I do 
not like this approach to work. 
Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm  
 
Effectively, the evidence on formal advocacy shows that TSOs in this study do not engage or 
do not want to engage in public and direct approaches with regards to their advocacy 
activities. Respondent 12 sums this sentiment up, illustrating the „fear‟ of losing resources 
that prevents TSOs form engaging in formal advocacy activities.   
 
I am more than convinced that if I took more than one rouble from the ministry of 
social protection, how would I later be able to go to one of their orphanages and 
outline any illegal activities? 
Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara 
 
This highlights that TSOs continue to contribute little in terms of democratisation (see chapter 
3.3.1 and chapter 5.3). In addition to being bribed into being managed by the state (see 
chapter 5.3), TSOs effectively „sell out‟ by forgoing confrontational public advocacy in order 
to gain potential resources from the state. This suggests that TSOs in this study do not 
consider their role as building an autonomous civil space or holding the state to account. It 
seems that they are more comfortable in providing services that will be explored in more 
depth later in this chapter. The lack of direct advocacy activities points towards a more subtle 
management of civil society arrangements in which the state clearly assumes the role of the 
manager. This section has demonstrated the limited nature of formal advocacy activities. The 
following section outlines informal advocacy activities.  
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6.2.2 Informal advocacy activities  
Rather than in formal advocacy activities, when considering informal advocacy activities a 
more nuanced and „active‟ picture of TSOs within this study emerges. Respondents frequently 
illustrate that they „can just give them [people in the authorities] a call with the problems I 
might have‟ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg). Informal advocacy activities or 
insider tactics refer to TSOs using their personal connection to influence policy makers 
(Mosley, 2009; see chapter 2.3). However, assessing whether or not TSOs are actually 
influencing policymaking, rather than just using these tactics to deal with bureaucratic 
difficulties is impossible. The informality of such activities, in particular in the context of the 
Russian Federation prohibits an objective assessment of the success of TSOs. Nevertheless, 
illustrating the various ways in which TSOs engage in such activities provide some insights 
into the potential managed nature of civil society arrangements. Within this study, two 
different groups of TSOs can be distinguished based on their use of insider tactics.  
 
The first group consists of both smaller grass-root type as well as larger TSOs which could be 
understood as being independent and which have personal connections to state authorities. 
These connections are „university friends or friends I made around that time‟ (Respondent 79, 
Org30Yek, Yekaterinburg). Primarily such connections are within the same area of the 
administration within which TSOs operate. TSOs in this group use these connections to 
informally advocate but not to change policies (i.e. the big issues) to speed things up and 
solve „operational‟ issues they might encounter in their service provision activities.  
 
I get in touch with the person, which can solve this problem informally. We know 
other organisations with which we cooperate sometimes, we organise a roundtable 
with them, and some of them are able to get us access to the mayor for such informal 
meetings.  
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Respondent 47, Org 22 Per, Perm 
 
Hence TSOs are happy to use informal advocacy activities to „address bureaucratic road 
blocks‟ because „the formal channels make the work much harder, maybe ten times harder‟ 
(Respondent 47, Org22, Perm). Thus in effect TSOs within this group primarily use insider 
tactics to ensure that they are able to engage in their other service providing activities. Similar 
to Evans‟ (2002) observations of TSOs being used to advance the „self-interest‟ of senior 
organisational members, these personal „advocacy‟ connections are frequently used to solve 
individual problems. Hence this group of TSOs uses their connections to advocate informally, 
but shy away from confrontational activities or formalising these activities. Thus TSOs seem 
to be afraid to jeopardise their informal connections if they would engage in formal advocacy 
or confrontational activities. Consequently, these TSOs do not engage in „systematic‟ 
advocacy work but focus on delivering services based on „knowing people‟ in relevant 
authorities.  
 
Portraying their insider connections as advocacy highlights how the primary consideration of 
TSOs in this group is not focused on establishing their independence from the state. Thus it is 
not a surprise that organisations attribute little value in engaging in confrontational tactics to 
influence policy (see section 6.2.1). A lack of cooperation and project based approaches (see 
section 6.2.1) which is also observed by others (Chebankova, 2009; Crotty, 2003, 2009), 
represents a weakness of civil society which the state is able to exploit and in a subtle way to 
manage civil society. This is indicative of the lack of understanding of TSOs in this study, 
that it is they, as agents of civil society, who are builders of civil society. In turn this 
demonstrates that the state is able to exploit the fragmented nature of Russian civil society 
(see chapter 3.3.1.1 discussing constraint 1) to manage it.  
 
162 
The second group is constituted by TSOs which have evolved out of „Soviet‟ social 
organisations and thus by default have inherited a long established connection with the 
nomenclature. Good relationships with the authorities are not only illustrated by „personal 
connections‟ but frequently manifested in access to „facilities‟ such as office space, a luxury 
for most Russian TSOs. For example, the head office of the Org26Yek in Yekaterinburg is 
housed in the building of the Department of Social Protection of the regional administration. 
Similar to the first group of TSOs, respondents from this group highlight that „informality‟ is 
the most efficient way to solve problems. However, they also portray that confrontational 
advocacy activities or organisations engaging in „demonstration and similar things, the 
authorities turn away from them and mainly cooperate with us three [referring to the three 
marionette disability organisations]‟ (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). TSOs seem to 
indicate that the state does not mind if they engage in advocacy activities as long as they 
remain informal. Therefore, this group of organisations is keen to outline that „we never go to 
court‟ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm). The following statement is reflective of how TSOs 
in this group understand their advocacy activities. 
 
People come to us not with pleasantries but with their problems and we have to solve 
the problems for them. They come to us when their rights are being violated or when 
they are unable to get something from the government, because a civil servant thinks 
that they are not eligible for it [a specific service or welfare benefit]. So we act like a 
buffer, we take on all the problems, just image if they [the disabled] would all go to 
the authorities straight away. This is what we do day in day out. Events such as going 
on to the street and shouting give us this, give us that, we do not do this. We do not 
want conflict with the authorities or the government.  
Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm  
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Hence this second group of TSOs demonstrate that informal advocacy is critical to their 
existence. However, as a trade-off to maintain access to the necessary networks with the state, 
TSOs in this group are willing to forgo engagement in confrontational advocacy activities and 
unwilling to formalise these informal mechanisms. It seems that in order to be able to 
maintain such „personal‟ relations, TSOs are willing to keep their engagement in 
confrontational activities to a minimum because otherwise „the bureaucrats will make it more 
difficult for you‟ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm).  
 
The evidence outlined thus far (see section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), highlights that, other than TSO 
research in developing a democratic context suggests, neither larger organisations (Child & 
Grønbjerg, 2007) nor the ability to use insider or informal advocacy (Mosley, 2009) results in 
TSOs engaging in advocacy as understood in the literature (Lauderdale, 2009). Even though 
TSOs might engage in activities that could be classified as advocating in nature, they do not 
do so publicly and do so frequently as part of providing legislative services. The outlining of 
formal as well as informal advocacy activities highlights that neither funding source nor  
proximity to the state explains the preference of TSOs to use informal advocacy channels. 
Thus far this chapter has established the presence of both formal and informal channels of 
advocacy. Furthermore, it demonstrated the preference of TSOs to use informal advocacy 
activities. Formal advocacy activities focus on for example getting elected to participate in 
roundtables, but there is an absence of suing the state, lobbying Federal bodies to make 
changes, or embarrassing the state into making legislative or policy changes. It is thus not 
surprising that most TSOs in this group delineate their advocacy work as providing legal 
services rather than campaigning for legislative improvements. In effect, TSOs in this study 
equate advocacy to service provision.  
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6.2.3 Advocacy as service provision 
Presenting service provision as advocacy is not exclusive to previously independent TSOs, 
but to marionettes. This is an important difference to the findings outlined in chapter five as it 
demonstrates that all groups of TSOs regardless of their funding or proximity to the state 
dress up their service provision as advocacy. Respondent 48 for example highlights that they 
teach their constituents about their rights in a „right protection school‟ by publishing a regular 
column in the local Permskiye Novosti newspaper titled „Legal advice for the disabled‟. This 
column presents case studies about how disabled people have dealt with issues accessing the 
health system or sorting out benefit problems.  
 
This is our way to provide advice. We would be unable to deal [with requests] if all 
the disabled people would come to see us. This way we can tell them, look that is what 
someone else has done, try that.  
Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm  
 
In a similar manner other TSOs in this study highlight that „we offer legal advice and 
assistance‟ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara), „enlighten people about their rights‟ 
(Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg), or aim to „increase the legal understanding of 
parents of their situation and what rights they have‟ (Respondent 7, Org07Sam, Samara). 
TSOs highlight that with regards to advocacy they have an „individual approach‟ (Respondent 
43, Org18Per, Perm) providing it as a service and only sometimes „write a complaint‟ 
(Respondent 38, Org13Per, Perm) but as pointed out above never go to court. It is this context 
of solving a problem for someone, which is why personal connections are important for 
TSOs. This means that TSOs informally advocate on an ad hoc basis and focus on smaller 
issues, such as individual problems. TSOs use solving problems as a catalyst to dress up 
service provision as advocacy. Therefore, TSOs in this study act as providers of legal services 
but not as political advocates. In perceiving themselves as service providers TSOs in this 
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study indicate that they consider that their role is one of serving the state rather than holding it 
accountable. In managed civil society arrangements, as proposed in this thesis, this is of no 
surprise as it enables the state to not „lose face‟ keeping potential discontent to a minimum 
and at the same time enables TSOs to raise awareness of some specific issues (see chapter 
3.5). Despite engaging in informal advocacy activities, TSOs in this study do not understand 
themselves as responsible to hold the state to account and as contributors to an autonomous 
civil society space (see chapter 2.3). Having looked at the question of how TSOs perceive 
their activities and themselves, as service providers but not political advocates or builders of 
civil society, understanding how TSOs portray these activities is also important. The literature 
in chapter two points out that TSOs which are primarily service providers, take on the roles 
and responsibilities associated with the state and therefore entails substituting or 
complementing the state (Young, 2000, 2001). Both of these aspects are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
6.2.3.1 Substituting and complementing the Russian state 
Having established how TSOs equate advocacy activities as service provisions, this raises the 
question of whether TSOs consider their activities as substituting and/or complementing the 
state. In exploring these issues, the questions of how TSOs perceive their activities and what 
role they see themselves as assuming will provide further insight into potentially more subtle 
attempts to manage civil society. In examining this it also explores the opinion of respondents 
on whether they feel that their organisations should be doing such activities.  
 
In addition to equating advocacy activities with service provision, TSOs in this study engage 
various types of activities that used to be under purview of the state. This is due to the forced 
withdrawal of the state (see chapter 3) from service provision in the 1990s (Sil & Chen, 2004) 
and the state has voluntarily continued this process thereafter (Hemment, 2009; Wengle & 
Rasell, 2008; see chapter 3.3). Despite these developments it is safe to assume that the state 
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will continue to assume a role in both health and education, the focus of this thesis (see 
chapter 1). The empirical material dovetails with this proposition and highlights that TSOs do 
substitute for the state. An example of such developments is the controversy surrounding the 
monetisation of welfare benefits for the disabled encated in 2005 (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). 
Within this study the respondents of various local chapters of nationwide active disability 
organisations, all of which originated in the Soviet Union, saw themselves, much like in the 
past, as cushioning the economic shortfall of their members. Even though respondents outline 
that the state did not directly encourage them to do so, they do highlight the existence of 
implicit assumptions that they have to take on these activities. The following quote reflects 
such circumstances. 
 
In the past, the disabled would receive free transport, but this was also cut [as part of 
the monetisation of welfare benefits]. What else, the monetisation of l'gote [welfare 
benefits] means that now you get money to pay for medicine and other things, but 
what is handed out is not enough. Many people opted to have the money [instead of 
vouchers], but when you think about it a bit, you will find out that the amount you 
receive does not compensate for the loss of a free service. Consequently, many of 
them come to us.  
Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm 
 
These TSOs highlight that they are unable to turn away people seeking help. Subsequently, 
documentary data on these organisations illustrates their engagement in the provision of 
services, in turn offsetting the withdrawal of the state in this case by offering free 
transportation. In light of the past and continuous „retreat‟ of the state from welfare provision, 
such developments are evidence that TSOs within this study should consider themselves as 
substituting for the state. This example clearly indicates that TSOs, in addition to equating 
advocacy to service provisions are also substituting activities that used to be under the 
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purview of the state. Herein, organisations in this study reflect pro-typical TSOs as doing 
what the government does not do (Levitt, 1973; see chapter 2.3). 
 
Similarity exists when considering TSOs as engaging in service providing activities to 
complement the state. In this case organisations often highlight and articulate their feeling that 
the services provided by the state are insufficient. This leads to the fact that „some come here 
when their individual rights are violated‟ (Respondent 60, Org11Yek, Yekaterinburg) and 
TSOs need to act „against discrimination against them [in this case people suffering from 
HIV/AIDS] by doctors in hospitals‟ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara). As such, 
organisations in this study mirror the behaviour of pro-typical TSOs (Levitt, 1973; see chapter 
2.3), however it also demonstrates the equating of advocacy to service provision. Reflecting 
the arguments in the literature (Kettl, 2000; Evers, 1995; see chapter 2.3), the state‟s 
insufficient service provision is rationalised as a result from the bureaucratic nature of state 
authorities, a fact which the following representative quote mirrors.  
 
For some time now, we have been arguing with the [state-run] Aids centre. They are a 
very closed institution. Their main doctor [chief executive] might be a good specialist, 
but he is a bad administrator. The Aids centre is supposed to help people with 
HIV/AIDS, help them to get the right stamps [in their paperwork] so they are able to 
go to the hospital for treatment. That centre has neither a psychologist nor the 
possibility to have group meetings and consultations and the building itself is in a bad 
condition.  
Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara 
 
These considerations prompt the question how TSOs understand advocacy equated as service 
provision and service provision activities. Despite acknowledging that „we are replacing the 
authorities, we are doing their work‟ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg), that is 
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substituting the state, TSOs understand themselves as predominantly wanting to complement 
it. TSOs in this study highlight that „we only want to support the government and not do it 
[the work] for it‟ (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). In outlining their activities in this 
manner, respondents highlight that they feel it should be the state doing these activities. 
Perversely this seems to suggest that TSOs challenge their own existence. It further indicates 
that they clearly understand themselves as subordinated to that state, existing at its mercy and 
will to provide them with resources. The wide spread understanding of complementing the 
state is due to the fact that TSOs still attribute ultimate responsibility for the services they 
provide. For example Respondent 61 of Org12Yek in Yekaterinburg focuses on delivering 
„humanitarian aid‟ to children‟s homes and psychiatric hospitals. This TSO collects and 
delivers basic food produce and vitamins to said locations, however understands itself as 
complementing the state despite highlighting that the state „should be providing such services‟ 
(Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg). The following statement from Org15Per running 
a hospice as well as an outreach program for the terminally ill, provides a representative 
statement of how TSOs in this study attribute their activities as the responsibility of the state.  
 
I would love to close all this, if the government institutions would take this on, as it is 
done in civilised countries. 
Respondent 40, Org15Per, Perm 
 
Effectively this suggests that TSOs have to substitute and complement the state because the 
state‟s provision is inadequate. Nonetheless, TSOs in this study consider that to all intents and 
purposes the responsibility for such activities should lie with the state. This is pivotal to 
TSOs‟ portrayal of complementing rather than substituting the state. In perceiving their 
activities in this manner, TSOs in this study portray the state as not only responsible for their 
activities but also more broadly, civil society. It is the state‟s prerogative to take on such 
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activities or outsource them to TSOs. This further highlights the subordination of TSOs to the 
state and its ability to manage civil society.  
 
Conversely, because the state does not do these activities, and thus TSOs have to exist, 
respondents raise the issues of funding with regards to such activities. They consider it the 
responsibility of the state to „help us financially‟ (Respondent 05, Org05Sam, Samara) or 
„fund our programmes, I think this would be normal‟ (Respondent 44, Org19Per, Perm). 
Therefore, in understanding themselves as complementing the state, TSOs illustrate that in 
such a case they consider the state as responsible for funding such activities.  
 
In Russia, it is mostly TSOs, which take care of that [social support for people with 
HIV/AIDS], and the government supports these activities by giving grants and 
offering projects 
Respondent 18, Org19Sam, Samara 
 
Other TSOs highlight that the „government provides us with subsidies‟ (Respondent 60, 
Org11Yek, Yekaterinburg) or „finances single projects and events‟ so that they can engage in 
their activities (Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg). However, in turn this evidently 
strengthens the perception that respondents hold vis-à-vis the state‟s responsibility to provide 
these services and subsequent portrayal of themselves as complementing the state. The wish 
of respondents for the state to fund their activities clearly creates resource dependency of 
TSOs on the state. For many TSOs, government funding is becoming increasing vital for their 
existence and activities. 
 
Well, basically we have no [resource] limitations for our projects, because you see, the 
state helps us. We would be unable to do this [referring to their activities] without 
such help.  
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Respondent 28, Org04Per, Perm 
 
In examining the question of how TSOs perceive their activities and themselves, the evidence 
highlights that ultimately they consider the state as responsible for service providing 
activities. Given that TSOs equate advocacy to service provision (see section 6.2.2), they 
outline that this is also the responsibility of the state. This in turn means that TSOs understand 
themselves as assuming a role of complementing the state. Such perceptions of their own 
activities are indicative of TSOs to not consider themselves as builders of an autonomous civil 
society space. On the contrary, TSOs perceive themselves as subordinates to the state, acting 
as its service providers, demonstrating the managed nature of civil society arrangements. 
These observations also demonstrate that TSOs do not seem to understand their role as 
builders of an autonomous civil society, and the potential compromise to such activities that 
come with state funding in the context of the Russian Federation. This leads to depoliticised 
TSOs and highlights a more subtle attempt of the state to manage civil society. Further, such 
developments are indicative of TSOs giving away any independence they might have left (see 
chapter 3.3.1) and it dovetails with the argument put forward that Russian civil society 
arrangements are managed by the state (see chapter 3.5).  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on further analysing the management of civil society in the context 
of the Russian Federation and the question of how managed civil society arrangements 
manifest themselves. Extending on chapter five, which looks at the legislative attempt to 
manage civil society, this chapter examined more subtle approaches to manage civil society. 
In order to investigate such attempts, the chapter addresses a gap in our understanding of 
Russian civil society by looking at health and educational TSOs and how they act as state 
substitutes. In doing so this chapter has examined the questions of how TSOs perceive their 
activities and themselves and what role TSOs consider themselves as assuming. By 
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examining the perception of respondents about how the work and activities of their 
organisations relates to the responsibilities of the state, this chapter is able to show the 
dominant and all-encompassing nature of the Russian state and illustrate the ensuing managed 
civil society arrangements. In doing so this chapter has portrayed the way in which TSOs 
engage in formal and informal advocacy activities.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that TSOs engage in some formal advocacy activities, but do 
not confront or hold the state accountable. TSOs are afraid of engaging in confrontational 
activities and portray themselves as more comfortable in using informal advocacy activities, 
preserving personal connections within the state and access to resources. Informal advocacy 
does provide more scope to influence the state (Mosley, 2009), but at the same time, given the 
lack of resources and fragmented nature of Russian TSOs (see chapter 3.3.1), this allows for 
more scope for the state to „capture‟ or „manage‟ TSOs. Furthermore, it means that TSOs are 
unlikely to engage in campaigns to confront the state or cooperate with other TSOs to build 
strong coherent social movements able to challenge and hence hold the state accountable 
(Taylor, 2006). These insights highlight that the state has created formal, taking the shape of 
the NGO law, and informal barriers to the freedom of assembly and thus the TSOs ability to 
contribute to democratisation (Taylor, 2006). In addition TSOs equate these informal 
advocacy activities as service provision and holding the state to account. The literature points 
out that service providing TSOs are less likely to engage in direct advocacy activities 
challenging the state (Anheier, 2009; Hall, 2002; see chapter 2.3). An observation that is 
reflected in the evidence outlined. Such considerations are indicative of the Russian state‟s 
attempt to depoliticise TSOs. In effect, TSOs portray themselves as providing advocacy 
through their services. Research evidence from a developed democratic context shows that in 
order to be effective in providing services TSOs need to publicly advocate, confront the state, 
and hold the state to account (Foley & Edwards, 1996, Anheier, 2009). The evidence 
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discussed in this chapter highlights that this is not the case and therefore indicates the 
management of Russian civil society.  
 
With regards to service providing activities and mirroring Soviet mentality (see chapter 3), 
TSOs aim to portray a state that is taking care of its citizens, hence a strong state. Rather than 
understanding any of their activities as substituting for the state, TSOs in this study consider 
their activities as complementing the state. Seeing themselves as complementing the state 
allows TSOs to depict the state as doing its part and portray themselves picking up the areas 
in which “the state is not doing enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). These aspects play an important 
part when determining the potential of civil society to contribute to democratic governance 
and in the case of Russian democratisation. The insight of this chapter shows that civil society 
is not autonomous and subordinates itself to the state by illustrating the state as being 
ultimately responsible to take care of its citizens and civil society. In this way, TSOs illustrate 
the state as being strong and in control. TSOs portraying a weak state image would mean a 
delegitimizing and undermining of state authority (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010), something 
alien to the context of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, TSOs in this study highlight that 
if the state does not take up such activities, it needs to fund TSOs. However, TSOs in this 
study do not understand the potential impediments to their autonomy, specifically when 
juxtaposed with the restrictive NGO law (see chapter 3.4), which the acceptance of such 
resources will bring in turn. This again highlights the lack of understanding of TSOs in this 
study of their role as building civil society. Similarly, as in the NGO law, the state takes 
advantage of this to further manage civil society. 
 
Chapter two illustrates that TSOs frequently become dependent on the resources associated 
with such contracts (see chapter 2.3). Resource dependency, as the literature argues (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) provides external agents with the ability to influence the objectives and 
activities of organisations. With regards to TSOs, the literature outlines that the contracting 
173 
out of services by the state has meant that such organisations are in a resource dependent 
relationship with the state (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Considering the context illustrated in this 
chapter, TSOs are specifically vulnerable to state influence and in particular because they 
„want‟ the state to fund their activities and take care of civil society. Therefore as this chapter 
highlights and contrary to the empirical insights from developed democracies (Chaves, 
Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Child & Grønbjerg, 2007), within Russia‟s managed civil 
society arrangements, the original proposition of resource dependency theory, that with 
government funding a limit of the political and therefore advocacy activity of TSOs (Smith & 
Lipsky, 1993), is occurring.  
 
The provision of resources by the state enables it to take on the role of the „principal‟ (see 
chapter 3.5 & Henderson, 2002) shaping agendas and activities of TSOs. In a comparative 
perspective, this is no different to western democracies such as the United States of America 
or the United Kingdom where the state also acts as the major resource provider for TSOs 
(Mercer, 2002). However, other than in developed democracies, the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that this has limited the political agendas of these organisations. This accelerates 
the process of depoliticising TSOs and the institutionalisation of these new management 
mechanisms established by both the NGO law (see chapter 5.3) and more subtle attempts 
illustrated in this chapter. Consequently, areas that have the potential to generate positive 
political return, such as disability, children, or veterans are more likely to receive resource 
support. Therefore, in addition to the incentives created by the NGO law (see chapter 5) the 
focus on the activities of TSOs demonstrates the mobilising of civil society around 
“patriotism rather than political protest” (Henderson, 2008, p. 18). The evidence shown in this 
chapter highlights that TSOs take this up as part of their raison d’être. Effectively this 
demonstrates the state‟s subtle attempts to manage civil society.   
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The weakness of Russian civil society stems from its weak contribution to democratisation; 
circumstances which TSOs engagement in service provision are unlikely to change. On the 
contrary, it provides the state with an opportunity to ensure stability of its regime. Service 
providing TSOs offer the state the possibility to distribute minimal social welfare provision 
needed for the system of a managed democracy to operate (Hemment, 2009). The state 
increasingly acknowledges the usability of TSOs to facilitate the managed democratic regime 
(Balzer, 2003). It seems that similar to Soviet social organisations, contemporary depoliticised 
TSOs act as surrogates for the state, which is further explored in chapter seven when 
examining marionette organisations.  
 
Chapter two argues that civil society is situated between the individual and the state and the 
„transformation‟ of TSOs in this study into service providers reshapes their relationship with 
state authorities, into hierarchical and dependent arrangements (see chapter 3.5). As 
specialised service providing organisations TSOs will be less conducive to „aggregation and 
representation‟ of interest driving „big issue‟ advocacy type activities (Taylor, 2006), and key 
for civil society‟s democratisation potential. TSOs are likely to be unable to attract public 
support and participation (see chapter 3.3.1) making such organisations depoliticised in nature 
and no longer assuming the role of builders of civil society. In effect this chapter, similar to 
chapter five, demonstrates that the underlying social relations shaping civil society (see 
chapter 2.4) have not changed. It is the lack of change in these underlying social relations that 
the state is able to exploit in these subtle attempts to manage civil society.  
 
To conclude and summarise this chapter and its focus on more subtle attempts of managing 
civil society, the evidence shows that TSOs in this study in effect equate advocacy with 
service providing activities. They substitute for the state but see themselves as 
complementing. Further, they consider the state as taking care of civil society. In doing so, 
TSOs feel that the state should be doing their activities and hence they should not exist. 
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However, if the state does not do this, it should at least fund TSOs. This clearly highlights that 
TSOs in this study do not (or do not want to) understand the role of TSOs as builders of civil 
society. Hence, similar to the 2006 NGO law, the state takes advantage of the weakness of 
civil society. In turn this leads to a depoliticising of TSOs and the potential prevalence of such 
organisations as surrogates of the state (i.e. marionette organisations). Chapter seven further 
investigates the subordination of TSOs to the state to highlight the management of complete 
civil society and establish potential limits to the state‟s ability to control and mould civil 
society this way.   
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CHAPTER 7: Organisational characteristics of state management 
 7.1 Introduction 
Chapters five and six have highlighted the attempts of the Russian state to manage and mould 
civil society. This chapter examines research objective three of this thesis (see chapter 1.1 and 
4.1) which is to investigate the characteristics of managed civil society and potential limits to 
the state’s ability to mould civil society in this way. To do so, this chapter examines the 
organisational level outcomes of the state‟s attempt to manage civil society. This contributes 
to answering the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves in 
the Russian Federation.  
 
A recurring conclusion of chapters five and six was that TSOs consider themselves to be 
subordinated to the state which is further explored in this chapter. Therefore this chapter looks 
at the mechanism with which the state attempts to capture and subordinate TSOs to ensure 
that they are subordinated. In turn TSOs are likely to mimic marionette like characteristics. As 
outlined in chapter three, marionette organisations are characterised by their proximity to the 
authorities and inherent lack of independence (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006) and can be 
defined as government organised nongovernmental organisations (Khanna, 2009). 
Marionettes assist the state in creating the image of a democratic society that has TSOs and a 
functioning third sector (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; see chapter 1 and 4). Marionette 
organisations are able to survive because they maintain mutually dependent and profitable 
relationships with the authorities, portraying themselves as independent, yet at the same time 
acting in accordance to the agenda of the state. This chapter also examines the characteristics 
of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs in this study. Specifically it outlines the 
differences and communalities between the three regions. Similar to insights from research in 
other areas of Russian civil society (see chapter 3) this section outlines that TSOs are 
becoming part of public institutions, reflecting a „nationalisation‟ of civil society. However,  
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extending the literature (see chapter 3.4) this chapter focuses on the examination of TSOs 
mimicking marionettes rather than just marionette organisations and highlights the increase of 
marionette like characteristics amongst once independent TSOs. TSOs with marionette like 
characteristics increasingly become the only „legitimate‟ inhabitant of Russia‟s civil society 
space as only they can access resources or interact with the state. With regards to the research 
question of how managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian 
Federation, the chapter outlines that this facilitates the management of civil society. 
Therefore, this chapter addressed the following two interrelated questions: 
 
Why are TSOs mimicking marionette organisations? 
 
How do TSOs with marionettes like behaviour differ to marionettes? 
 
To examine these questions, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks 
at the mechanism with which the state attempts to capture TSOs to encourage them to mimic 
marionettes. Further, this section examines the characteristics of marionette like behaviour 
amongst TSOs in this study. Specifically it outlines the differences and communalities 
between the three regions. The second section concluding this chapter examines the 
differences between TSOs mimicking marionettes and marionettes as illustrated in the 
literature in light of the research question of how managed civil society arrangements are 
manifested in the Russian Federation.  
 
7.2 Capturing health and education TSOs 
As highlighted in chapter three, funding government-organised organisations to demonstrate 
the existence of a third sector is not a recent phenomenon in Russia (Cook & Vinogradova, 
2006). In turn these organisations, also known as marionettes, enable the state to infiltrate 
civil society in an attempt to curtail TSOs activity and manage civil society. During the Soviet 
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period, marionettes provided the state a channel to address social issues as well as manage 
non-political participation (Alekseeva, 2010). Marionettes represent depoliticised civil society 
organisations managed by the state. The evidence presented and discussed in chapters five 
and six indicates explicit and subtle attempts to manage civil society and depoliticise TSOs. 
Depoliticised TSOs do not confront the state or act as a counterweight to it, creating a third 
sector or civil society that operates according to the directive given by the state. The 
following quote from Respondent 16 exemplifies this mentality.  
 
Russia is a country where the role of the government is important. If the government 
does not support something, then the TSOs have difficulties doing something in this 
direction. If the government says this needs to be done only then will TSOs work in 
this direction, otherwise nothing will happen this is how it works in Russia. It does not 
matter what the topic is. For example if the government says our policy is to support a 
healthy way of life, then more TSOs will be founded that work in this area. Without 
the help of the government, you cannot achieve anything. People understand that, this 
is why they feel that their time and money is wasted founding and working in such 
organisations [which do not work according to the government‟s policies].  
Respondent 16, Org17Sam, Samara 
 
This quote highlights that TSOs in this study have a directional perception of the state. In 
order to be able to operate as an effective organisation, the activities of TSOs have to reflect 
the aims and objectives of the state. Thus it seems that TSOs are waiting to be told what areas 
they need to engage in, rather than in a grass-roots manner deciding it for themselves. TSOs 
can choose not to follow the objectives set by the state, however they do so with the 
knowledge that they are less likely to be successful. TSOs portray themselves as not 
following the instructions of the state are often the ones that are unable to access resources 
and engage in activities such as meeting for tea and biscuits. Consequently in examining the 
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controlling of health and education TSOs, two groups of organisations exist (see Appendix G 
for a tables of both groups). The first group of TSOs not displaying marionette characteristics 
are organisations which illustrate themselves as lacking personal and close connection within 
the state, not being invited to participate in formal mechanisms of state-TSO interaction, and 
unable to access resources from the state. The second group of TSOs, many of which display 
some marionette characteristics or behaviours can be delineated as having closer and more 
personal connections with the state, being part of formal state-TSO interaction mechanism, 
able to access resources of the state, and aligning themselves with the directional approach 
illustrated in the quote above. These groups are described in detail in the following sections 
before examining the structures and incentives that encourage TSOs to mimic marionettes.  
 
7.2.1 TSOs without marionette characteristics 
The first group of organisations (see Appendix G.1 table G.6) consists of TSOs that do not 
mimic marionette organisations or display marionette characteristics. These organisations do 
not portray themselves as having a connection within the state. They also highlight that civil 
society is divided into „red disability organisations and white disability organisations‟ 
(Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg) meaning that some are able to interact with the 
state and others are not, referring to themselves as the latter. It is only preferred organisations 
that are invited to participate in formal interaction mechanisms such as roundtables.   
 
The administration only works with the organisations they like, the ones that do not 
ask questions. We do ask questions and so we are not invited [to these round tables].  
Respondent 31, Org07Per, Perm 
 
This highlights that the activities, rhetoric, and objectives of these TSOs do not seem to 
conform to the aims of the state. This group of TSOs considers other organisations which do 
participate in such interaction as being in an insufficient critical position towards the 
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government‟ (Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg), because these forms of interaction 
are initiated and controlled by the state. TSOs in this group do not adhere to these informal 
(directing) and coercive pressures and hence remain at the fringes of civil society resembling 
afternoon tea and coffee clubs. Many of these organisations engage in politically unsafe or 
contested topics such as HIV/AIDS (Zigon, 2009) or activities that are not part of the aims or 
objectives of the state. This limits the ability of such organisations to operate effectively.  
 
As soon as people hear the word HIV/AIDS or drug abuse, they close their door. They 
do not want to support activities of TSOs that work in such areas.  
Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara 
 
Therefore, another important factor that delineates the two groups of TSOs in this study is 
their ability to access resources. TSOs in this group of organisations portray themselves as 
unable to access domestic funding. For these „have-nots‟, as Org12Sam in Samara highlights, 
their entire budget is usually made up of membership fees and they do not tend to win grants 
from the state or „receive and resource from the government‟ (Respondent 38, Org13Per, 
Perm). Respondent 55 from Org07Yek in Yekaterinburg highlights the plight of TSOs in this 
group of „never received a penny from the state‟.  
 
I have not received a single penny [kopeka] from the state. The local councillor has his 
office just down the hall from our room here. But we have not received anything of 
the city.  
Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
In turn this starves such TSOs of the resources to conduct their activities effectively. The 
group of TSOs that do not display marionette like behaviour can be characterised as not 
subordinating themselves to the directional approach of the state. However it highlights that 
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by not engaging in this way, they are unable to operate in an effective way, making them into 
afternoon coffee and tea clubs for friends and family to meet and socialise. Furthermore, this 
limits their ability to hold the state to account. The second group of TSOs in this study are 
organisations that portray themselves as displaying marionette like characteristics.   
 
7.2.2 TSOs with marionette characteristics 
Surprisingly this is the larger group of TSOs (see Appendix G.2 table G.7) in this study 
illustrating the increase of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs, which were independent 
in the past. This group encompasses marionettes as well as TSOs that mimic marionette 
organisations. The latter are different to marionettes primarily because they lack the political 
embeddedness, something discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter. TSOs in 
this group illustrate themselves as loyal to the Federal state reflected in the following quote 
taken from an informal chat with respondent 61 referring to a speech addressing the state by 
President Medvedev the day before 
 
Now I am upbeat about the third sector. He said so many good things yesterday, that 
we need to root out corruption. If you would have asked me yesterday, what I think 
about our work, and then I think I would have given you a negative assessment. But 
now, after he said all these positive things, that the state needs to work with us and not 
against us, that he will address the negative attitude of the local bureaucrats, this is all 
very promising 
Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
This illustrates the absence of hostility of TSOs within this group against the state. This is 
further highlighted by the proximity many of the organisations in the group aim to portray in 
stating that they have „friends in the administration‟ (Respondent 79, Org30Yek, 
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Yekaterinburg), or that „when we work with the state, it is always a win-win‟ (Respondent 52, 
Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg)  
 
Apart from working „closely together with the government authorities‟ (Respondent 05, 
Org05Sam, Samara) or that their organisations are „not confrontational‟ (Respondent 49, 
Org01Yek, Yekaterinburg) this group of organisations illustrate that they profit from 
following the directives of the state. An example of such behaviour is outlined by respondents 
when referring to the year of the child and family the Russian government declared in 2007. 
The majority of TSOs in this study adjusted their projects, programs, and activities to focus 
on children. The following statement reflects such comments:   
 
Of course when they [the state] announced the year of the child and family it was 
easier for us to go to donors and ask for support. It was easier to access [local] 
government structures; we were able to say to everyone, look the government supports 
us.   
Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Aligning their activities with the agenda of the (Federal) state helps TSOs to access resources. 
Thus it is not surprising that this group of TSOs portray themselves as being able to access 
resources from the state. For example, in the informal chat following the interview, Org23Per 
was proud to convey that the regional administration now has a provision in its budget, which 
means that the organisations receive regular income from the state. Similarly, Org32Yek 
outlines how the city administration invited them to attend the budget meeting, which enabled 
them to receive resources directly from the budget without the need to participate in grant 
competitions.  
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I have a meeting with the city council. Today they have their final discussion of the 
budget. I have to be there for 1 o‟clock, so I can see if we get some money directly 
from the budget. 
Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Hence for the organisations that have state resources, keeping relations and personal 
connections in tact is vital. Considerations of independence or building an autonomous civil 
society are clearly not a primary importance to respondents and TSOs in this group. Despite 
respondents of this group emphasising different ways of how they access funding from the 
state, directly from the state or via grants, they still consider themselves as privileged 
representatives of civil society.  
 
Yes we do write grants, and considering this, our projects [pragrami] must be good, so 
we always receive something. Every time we participate [in a grant competition] we 
receive something. I cannot remember when we did not receive a grant [which they 
applied for]. This is quite interesting, because I know that very many people write 
them, but not everyone receives them, but our organisation is always supported. 
Respondent 78, Org29Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
As for being part of this group, it seems that TSOs understand themselves as selected by the 
state to help it build civil society. This indicates the lack of understanding of what role TSOs 
should be assuming (see chapter 2.3). And thus resembling the conclusions made about the 
2006 NGO law (see chapter 5.5) that the state takes advantage, using the offer of funding and 
resources to further the management of civil society. However, for this group of TSOs, by 
mimicking marionettes demonstrates that as organisations they are reacting in a rational 
manner to the incentives created by the state. These incentives aim to create social 
arrangements, which facilitate a civil society that fits with the managed democratic regime. 
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TSOs operate on the instructions of the state and it is these instructions that facilitate 
marionette like behaviour of TSOs. Therefore the following section discusses the various 
ways in which the state aims to capture (i.e. instruct) TSOs and therefore encourage them to 
mimic marionette organisations.  
 
7.2.3 Mechanism of capturing TSOs   
In chapter three, this thesis outlined that the lack of an organised civil society (Richter, 2009) 
means the state needs to capture TSOs (Hedlund, 2006, see chapter 3.5). This section will 
illustrate ways in which the state captures TSOs. In turn this enables the state to create the 
image of a functioning third sector. The state does this by providing resource incentives as 
well as establishing formalised ways of interaction between the state and civil society. TSOs 
highlight that in contemporary Russia there are „lots of modes of interaction of TSOs with 
administrative structures‟ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara) and this way the state 
provides „moral and material support‟ (Respondent 76, Org27Yek, Yekaterinburg). Therefore 
the state creates a mechanism to select organisations for preferred access to the state. Access 
to the state is important for TSOs in this study as is illustrated by the dominance of informal 
advocacy (see chapter 6). For marionettes to exist and TSOs to become marionette-like, a 
vital ingredient is that they are sponsored by the state. The illustration of resource dependency 
in the following section indicates the monetary way in which the state sponsors TSOs and 
encourages marionette like behaviour.  
 
7.2.3.1 Resource dependency 
As discussed in chapter six, TSOs are reliant on personal connections within the state and 
engage in service provision which they consider as complementing the state. This inevitably 
makes TSOs less independent and highlights that they do not understand themselves as 
builders of civil society. The increase in resources made available by the state via state or 
quasi-state organisations for TSOs further serves to strengthen this position (Cook & 
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Vinogradova, 2006). The provision of resources and funding, even though often minimal, has 
existed in the past particularly at the regional level (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). However, 
more recently funding has been made available directly from the Federal centre (The Public 
Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008). Funding from the Federal centre is provided 
through several organisations, which have been set up by the Federal Public Chamber, a body 
organised by the state to manage state-civil society interactions (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002; 
Richter, 2009). TSOs refer to the available funding via these organisations as presidential 
grants. Table 7.1 highlights the various organisations that are set up, and their orientation, that 
is activities which they are meant to fund, as well as the amounts of funding they 
administered in 2008 (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008).  
Specialised Funding 
Organisations 
Thematic area of projects to receive 
funds 
Total amount of funding 
(Number of projects) 
“Social Designing 
Institute” 
Opinion polling and monitoring of the 
state of civil society 
56 Million Roubles (30) 
“Znanie” 
[Knowledge] 
Education, arts, culture and public 
diplomacy 
253 Million Roubles (270) 
“In Support of Civil 
Society” 
Protection of human rights and freedoms 
and legal education of the public 
127 Million Roubles (115) 
“National Health 
League” 
Promotion of healthy life style; protection 
of public health and environment 
141 Million Roubles (251) 
“National Charitable 
Foundation” 
Support of and social care for the poor 
and socially vulnerable groups of citizens 
374 Million Roubles (411) 
“Governmental 
Club” 
Youth initiatives; youth movement and 
organisation projects 
216 Million Roubles (146) 
Table 7.1: Presidential grants and their distribution adapted from annual report of the Public Chamber of 
the Russian Federation  
 
Table 7.1 outlines that in 2008 the six specialised organisations distributed 1250 million 
roubles to 1223 projects (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008) meaning an 
average project contribution of just over 1 million roubles or around 20,000 British pounds. In 
comparison municipal or regional authority grants are less attractive. 
 
Now we have a system of municipal grants, but the money which they pay out is not 
very much. I think it is around 100,000 roubles. With that you can organise maybe two 
events.  
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Respondent 77, Org28Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
In a context in which the state has restricted the ability of TSOs to access funding outside of 
Russia (see chapter 3.4.1 and chapter 5) available domestic resources are increasingly 
important. This facilitates the state‟s attempt to manage civil society. For TSOs it often 
reflects increased competition, competition that ensures that TSOs do not cooperate, making 
their management easier for the state.  
 
Now there is very stiff competition for resources on what I would say a very small 
market [meaning limited supply]. So you might cooperate in projects or something 
similar, but when it comes to funding then you do not.  
Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm 
 
It is thus not surprising that despite more competition attribute to presidential grants, TSOs 
are more inclined to apply for such funding. This becomes clear when juxtaposed against the 
observations made by the Federal Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (The Public 
Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008). They have registered a decrease in activities 
aimed at protecting rights, which can be classified as counter the state, and an increase of 
activities providing social benefits, education or offering leisure or sport activities which can 
be classified as depoliticising, which is not surprising (The Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation, 2008).  
 
Respondents understand the resources provided by the state as „government grants for the 
TSO sector‟ (Respondent 42, Org17Per, Perm) and indicate that the state is „finally taking 
care of TSOs‟ (Respondent 09, Org09Sam, Samara). This is something many feel is long 
overdue after neglecting TSOs in the 1990s (see chapter 3.3.1). This sentiment is 
demonstrated in the following quote from the director TSOs in Perm:  
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On the level of the government they have develop this grant system. Now the 
government makes sure that we have TSOs.  
Respondent 26, Org02Per, Perm 
 
The majority of TSOs in this study welcome that the state is taking care of civil society but 
this is another indication that they understand themselves as being subservient to the state. 
Due to the fact that the funding TSOs receive is administered by the Federal centre of local 
authorities, the sentiment that it is the states responsibility to take care of civil society which 
is an indication of a worrying development amongst TSO decision makers. It demonstrates 
that respondents do not seem to understand the roles of TSOs as builders of an autonomous 
civil society. Conversely, they attribute this role to the state. Furthermore, the willingness to 
access funding from the state demonstrates that TSOs in this study do not acknowledge how 
compromised they will be if they take the state‟s money. TSOs are willing to give away their 
independence, and seem to feel more comfortable within civil society arrangements managed 
by the state.  
 
I think the grant is a form of supporting and nurturing the development of TSOs. This 
way they [the state authorities] stimulate the activities of such organisations and also 
their creation.  
Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Respondents understanding of the state taking care of civil society, indicates the state‟s 
attempt to manage civil society. Further, it reflects contemporary arrangements in the 
economy in which a dominant state subtly manages the economy using the mechanism of 
state-corporatism (Fish, 2008; Hanson & Teague, 2005; Kubicek, 1996) which has led to 
Russian style capitalism (Gustafson, 2001). Similarly the issue of resource dependency 
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provides the state with an effective mechanism to capture and manage civil society. The fear 
of losing state resources has been a recurring motivation of TSOs behaviour in chapters five 
and six. Another mechanism of state capture is the ideological buy-in of TSOs and is 
reflective of the directional approach by the state. This leads TSOs to adjust their activities 
and engagement in accordance to state policy. The illustration of the ideological buy-in in the 
following section indicates a more subtle way of the state sponsoring TSOs and encouraging 
marionette like behaviour.  
 
7.2.3.2 Ideological buy-in 
In displaying marionette characteristics, TSOs associate proximity to the state with benefits 
such as access to resources because „funding availability has changed towards Russian 
governmental financing‟ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara). For marionette organisations, 
state funding is an integral part to both their creation as well as continuous existence and 
reflected in their ideological buy-in. However, it also points out a crucial incentive for TSOs 
which were previously independent to marionetties themselves. With regards to the 
ideological buy-in, the objective of state is to „change the aims [of TSOs] and focus on the 
cooperation with such organisations that are active in a non-critical way‟ (Respondent 45, 
Org20Per, Perm). Thus TSOs will engage in activities in line with the Federal state‟s agenda, 
as they are more fruitful to ensure survival of their organisations. Respondent 59, reflecting 
the impression of other respondents, highlights how a change in the priorities of the state 
benefited their organisation.  
 
If for example our project matches a [government] program, then they will take it on 
board [meaning funding it]. You know the government‟s priorities are now based 
around preserving families and supporting families and this is very good for us, 
because our objectives and project overlap with this.  
Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg 
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Respondent 59 demonstrates that because their activities overlap with the priorities of the 
state, this has been beneficial for their organisation. This signals that there are benefits for 
TSOs if they align their activities with state policy and in effect mimic marionette 
organisations. With regards to the activities of TSOs, this quote is indicative of the state 
controlling and directing organisations to what are preferred activities as „it is the government 
itself who decides which programmes are needed and which are not‟ (Respondent 57, 
Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). This demonstrates that the state can decide which organisations to 
fund and interact with and it does so based on whether or not they fit with its political 
priorities. This encourages the ideological buy-in of TSOs. It also indicates the negotiated 
nature of legitimacy (i.e. marionette like behaviour) in managed civil society. TSOs align 
themselves with the policies of the state becoming marionette like and in turn become 
legitimate to interact with the state. In turn TSOs become public institutions.   
 
Well in Yekaterinburg people think that our organisation is already a part of the 
government structure. This is because we work very closely with the municipal 
administration and we have our offices in the building of the administration, so many 
think that we are a government structure.   
Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
As a result TSOs begin to reflect marionette like features. Thus the ideological buy-in 
represents another way in which the state is able to capture TSOs. Furthermore, ideological 
buy-ins also enables TSOs to access „different meetings, committees, round tables, public 
meetings, and public chambers‟ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara), that is direct and 
formal ways of accessing the state. The Public Chamber is discussed representatively for 
these ways of access and a method of capturing TSOs. The illustration of the Public Chamber 
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in the following section indicates the institutionalised way of the state sponsoring TSOs and 
encouraging marionette like behaviour.  
 
7.2.3.3 The Public Chamber 
As chapter three outlines, the Public Chamber has been initiated by the state to formalise and 
manage interaction between TSOs and state authorities (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002; Richter, 
2009; see chapter 3.4.1). Despite some critical and confrontational behaviour towards the 
Federal Public Chamber, the regional or city equivalents display a less confrontational stance 
(Richter, 2009). The Public Chamber seemingly serves to legitimate marionettes as agents of 
civil society as well as capture TSOs, which subsequently then exhibit marionette like 
behaviour. The invitational aspect of Public Chamber ensures that TSOs remain politically 
inactive outside these formal interaction mechanisms in order to be able to maintain their 
membership. TSOs which are invited consider the structure and the development of the Public 
Chamber as normal in the Russian context.  
 
What I can tell you, this [the Public Chamber] is one of the reins of the government to 
control the TSOs. In particular when it comes to administering grants, they ask you 
these questions, what kind of office space do you have, how many computers do you 
have, how many staff members. Such questions help them [the state] to establish a 
database of TSOs. Well it is a desire to control the market, this is normal.  
Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
However, considering the development prospect of civil society as an autonomous space, 
control of TSOs as normal highlights a worrying prospect. This underlines that TSOs do not 
understand civil society as an autonomous space, but as a space that is controlled and 
managed by the state. In turn TSOs appear more like marionettes than autonomous and 
191 
independent agents of civil society. Hence, TSOs in this group consider the Public Chamber 
as an important part of being able to engage in their activities.  
 
I think that it [the Public Chamber] is indispensable. It can be helpful, if it is working. 
This is a structure that could be able to represent opinions to which the government 
has to listen. The only thing, as far as I know, government organs create all these 
Public Chambers; from the beginning, they are already marionettes. Therefore, they do 
not work properly, but the idea of such is very good.  
Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
In regards to the management of civil society it aligns with the wishes of respondents in this 
group seeking proximity to the state. Even more than an institution for access to the state, the 
Public Chamber is a signal to TSOs, that in order to be able to gain proximity to the state, 
they will need to alter their activities. In turn this means that TSOs have to depoliticise 
themselves and in effect become marionette like organisations. Therefore, the institution of 
the Public Chamber provides a way for the state to capture TSOs. Further, as this section has 
argued, this creates incentives for TSOs to behave marionette like. This represents the 
completion of the management of civil society; TSOs with marionettes like behaviour are 
therefore the organisational consequences or outcomes of managed civil society 
arrangements. The following section illustrates the marionette like features TSOs have 
adopted across the three regions. 
 
7.2.4 TSOs with marionette like behaviour  
This section explores marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs (see chapter 3.5). The aim is 
to understand to what extent TSOs are becoming servants of the state and enforcers of the 
Federal state‟s infrastructural power (Mann, 1986) as well as differences of such behaviour 
across the three regions. The previous section has outlined the structures and incentives in 
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place creating coercive pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) for TSOs and forcing them to 
resemble marionettes. Therefore, in exploring how TSOs behave like marionettes, it enables 
the chapter to draw conclusions whether the state has completed the management of civil 
society. As this chapter has pointed out, with regards to health and educational TSOs there are 
various incentives for such organisations to behave in a marionette like fashion. Furthermore, 
TSOs in this group, focus on building alliances and developing cooperation with the state, 
rather than remaining autonomous. Displaying marionette like characteristics enables TSOs to 
do so. The following sections outline the characteristics and nature of such organisations in 
the three regions of Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm. 
 
7.2.4.1 Marionette like behaviour in Yekaterinburg 
The earlier illustrated incentive structures of round tables, committees, or the public chamber 
to encourage marionette like behaviour provide the critical parameters to highlight marionette 
like behaviour in all three regions, and particularly in Yekaterinburg. Many respondents 
highlight that by engaging with the state in round tables or committees they have been drawn 
into working for the state. In particular respondents outline their new role within the state as 
overlapping with the work of their TSOs. For example, respondent 51 points out that part of 
her part-time role with the regional authorities means that she oversees the city‟s regulations 
to make buildings more accessible for people in wheelchairs. At the same time, the main 
objective of Org03Yek to promote accessibility into public buildings and spaces. Rather than 
considering this as compromising the organisation‟s ability to remain autonomous, respondent 
51 considers this as a good way to collaborate with the state. Respondent 65 provides another 
example of similar arrangements where TSO decision makers are „sucked‟ into state 
structures. Arguing that their organisation was faced with a lack of resources, respondent 65 
highlights that through engaging in committees they were able to interact with the 
government. As a result the relevant government authorities have hired respondent 65 and the 
organisation‟s employees as full time staff with the objective to run this specific TSO.  
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To solve this problem [of financing our employees], the department for sport created a 
special section for adaptive sports and we are employed by this department. We 
receive our salary from a government institution but work here in this TSO.  
Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
In effect such organisations are becoming part of the state and its structures. This represents a 
„sucking in‟ of TSOs. This sort of characteristic is particularly dominant amongst TSOs which 
portray themselves as having received foreign funding in the past or which could be classified 
as „advocacy or policy organisations‟ (Crotty, 2006). As opposed to the insight that the state 
creates marionettes (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), this highlights that amongst health and 
educational TSOs a reverse movement takes place. This might facilitate informal advocacy 
illustrated in chapter six, but does not encourage TSOs to act as counterweights to the state or 
building an autonomous civil society space.  
 
Another characteristic of marionette like behaviour is that TSOs are „spun off‟ from the 
government. Even though resembling the „creation‟ of organisations by the state (i.e. 
marionettes; see Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), organisations that are spun off, highlight that 
they have not been created by the government. These sort of spin offs seem to be particularly 
common amongst health TSOs focusing on „capital intensive‟ service provision activities 
such as drug addiction or alcohol abuse. Respondent 52 highlights that Org04Yek was 
founded while still working within the relevant government department. 
 
I used to work in the department of education. We had a big problem with disabled 
children in schools. So I decided to set up a TSO and a centre that would address some 
of these problems. As there were many nursery buildings which were in decay we 
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were given this building here. I just went to the municipality with my idea and they 
were happy to give it to me.  
Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg 
 
Subsequently, respondent 52 used this organisation to parachute herself into new 
employment, maintaining her relations with the department of education as well as providing 
employment for her immediate family. Similar to the „sucking in‟ of TSOs to the state, such 
spinning off also ensures that such organisation maintain their loyalty to the state. TSOs do 
not consider their role as building civil society, but much rather as extending the state and 
complementing the state‟s service provision (see chapter 6). As key decision makers have 
been part of the state structures, TSOs that have been spun off from the state, illustrate their 
membership in round tables and committees. 
 
7.2.4.2 Marionette like behaviour in Samara 
Whereas in Yekaterinburg several respondents indicated that they have effectively spun off 
from the state, in Samara, none of the TSOs indicate or portray themselves as such. There are 
TSOs such as Org15Sam which were founded by the encouragement of the state. However as 
in case of Org15Sam, which is a local chapter of a nationwide organisation, such 
encouragement has taken place at the Federal level. Even though none of the TSOs in this 
study located in Samara portrayed themselves as spin offs from the government, the reverse 
movement of „sucking in‟ TSOs does take place. Similarly to the respondents in 
Yekaterinburg, an overlap of responsibilities can be observed, in which respondents in their 
employment for the state are responsible for the areas in which their TSOs primarily engage 
in. For example Respondent 19 is responsible for the implementation of the city‟s youth 
program and policies as part her „day job‟ in the state, and at the same time, the TSO‟s main 
activities are targeted at young children and adolescences.  
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I do not work here all the time. I work for the government and I focus on the 
development of youth policy. 
Respondent 19, Org20Sam, Samara 
 
This highlights a clear similarity to the arrangements outlined in Yekaterinburg. 
Consequently, it becomes difficult for TSOs to criticise the work of the state, as many would 
criticise themselves personally. However, for some TSOs, this sucking in means that they are 
able to establish closer ties with the authorities.  
 
Besides I am not only a member of staff at the department of education but I am also a 
member of the committee for the rehabilitation of disabled children which the 
department put into place. So you see we are very directly involved with it and our 
contact to the department is quite close. 
Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara 
 
Again reflecting the discourse of interaction and alliance with the state, the sucking into the 
state provides a good stepping stone to such arrangements. As illustrated above this indicates 
that TSOs see that marionette like behaviour provides them with access to the state.  
 
Without between sector interactions you would not survive a day, so we build good 
relations with the regional powers. These relations are constructive because we offer 
services and programs which they [the state] accept and support.   
Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara 
 
Despite less clear evidence of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs in Samara, 
respondents paid particular importance to working and collaborating with the state. 
Interactions that facilitate as argued above marionette like behaviour. Hence, TSOs in Samara 
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displaying marionette like characteristics have moved closer to the state, but they are not as 
embedded within the state as other marionette organisations found in the Russian context 
(Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006).  
 
7.2.4.3 Marionette like behaviour in Perm 
With regards to moving closer to the state, TSOs in Perm resemble those of Yekaterinburg 
and Samara. However, other than their counterparts in the other two regions, TSOs in the 
group mimic marionettes in Perm are more uneasy about the outcomes for their activities and 
particular consequences for other TSOs.  
 
I think the danger is that an elite of TSOs are emerging. As a result, the state will only 
interact with them and other organisations will have no chance to work with the state.  
Respondent 37, Org12Per, Perm 
 
This respondent considers himself as a member of the „elite‟ of TSOs. In other sectors of 
Russian civil society, marionettes, because they are set up by the political elite, are often seen 
as organisations of the elite (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). With regards to examining the 
nature of organisations mimicking marionettes in the three regions, this represents being 
„sucked‟ into the state which is more explicitly illustrated by respondents in Samara and 
Yekaterinburg. It is those organisations that are selected by the state; for interaction and to 
„develop‟ civil society.   
 
We basically find the elites [decision makers] of civil society and work with them to 
develop that sector.  
Respondent 83, GovOrg01Per, Perm 
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Hence TSOs seem to believe that it is the state that selects TSOs to interact with and it is the 
states‟ prerogative to develop civil society. Similar to Samara, respondents attribute high 
importance to the collaboration with the state. For example Org02Per not only outlined that 
they participate in all round tables or committees, but because of their good relations to the 
relevant government department, they assisted the researcher in recruiting respondent 83; a 
government official (see Appendix A). It is thus not surprising that many TSOs portray how 
closely they work with the state.  
 
In all honesty, we work very closely with the administration of the governor of the 
Perm region. We have very good relations with the department of health and the 
department for education. Also we have a very good understanding with the 
Ombudsman for Human Rights for the Perm region. [This is a position within the 
administration of the governor of the region and appointed by the governor of Perm]  
Respondent 29, Org05Per, Perm 
 
Hence similar to the other two regions, organisations describe a clear wish to collaborate with 
the state. In turn this is indicative that such TSOs do not want to or do not understand the role 
they should be playing in building an autonomous civil society space and facilitating 
democratisation.  
 
Other than in Yekaterinburg and Samara, in Perm TSOs seem to portray being „sucked in‟ 
less explicitly. However, there are some organisations that, similar to Yekaterinburg, portray 
themselves as being spun off from the state. An example of such organisations in Perm is 
Org21 Per. The founder of this organisation used to work for the department of health and the 
current director as an adviser to several politicians of United Russia; United Russia being the 
„party of power‟ of the current political regime (Krystanovskaya & White, 2005). Hence 
similar to marionette organisations in other sectors, such organisations appear to offer a space 
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to employ friends, family, and political allies. However, Org21Per and other such spun off 
TSOs highlight the state as playing only a supportive role.  
 
Our organisation, I know for sure, was not created through the initiative of the 
government but with its direct support.  
Respondent 46, Org21Per, Perm 
 
The fact that this organisation was created with the support of the government rather than by 
its initiative highlights how such TSOs want to portray themselves as independent. This is a 
vital characteristic of marionette-like behaviour in particular vis-à-vis their role of creating the 
image of a functioning third sector.  
 
A further observation relating to organisations with marionette like behaviour is their attitudes 
towards the Public Chamber. In Yekaterinburg and Samara respondents portrayed this 
institution as a positive improvement for the development of civil society. However, in Perm 
TSOs displaying marionette characteristics rallied against the proposed regional Public 
Chamber. The following quote from respondent 47 mirrors the outlook of others on the Public 
Chamber.  
 
Well I have a more negative assessment. It does bring some good and I have 
participated in several events of the [Federal] Public Chamber. At the Federal level let 
it exist and help TSOs to promote their interests. But here in the region it is a totally 
unnecessary structure. We do not need to formalise these things that we can already 
do. We talk to whomever we need to without it [the Public Chamber].  
Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm 
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However, in outlining their opposition to the Public Chamber, TSOs re-iterate their 
marionette like nature. In Perm, rather than offering a way to work in alliance with the state, 
respondents consider the Public Chamber as a challenge to their established ties with the 
administration. TSOs fear that the process of establishing the Public Chamber will challenge 
their preferential access to the state, as the authorities might engage with other organisations 
displaying more marionette like features and characteristics. It underlines the indication that 
TSOs displaying marionette like characteristics, confirming that the state has completed the 
management of civil society. 
 
7.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the nature of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs within this 
study. In doing so it not only highlights how the Russian state is succeeding in completing the 
management of civil society but also provides new insights into the mimicking of marionettes 
amongst many health and education TSOs. To elaborate on these aspects the chapter first 
examined which TSOs are mimicking marionette organisations and then illustrated the 
incentives and structures to highlight why they engage in this behaviour. This section 
demonstrates that to be able to become a member of organisations which are able to interact 
in such structures (i.e. Public Chamber) TSOs need to be mimicking marionette organisations. 
Being unable to be part of such structures reduces TSOs to nothing more than afternoon tea 
and coffee clubs unable to hold the state accountable. This chapter demonstrates clear and 
strong incentives for TSOs to adopt such marionette characteristics. In turn this further 
weakens civil society as a force for democratisation (Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2). The chapter 
highlights resource dependency, ideological buy-ins, and the Public Chamber as a mechanism 
used by the state to capture TSOs. However, not all TSOs can access these channels of 
sponsorship. This enables the state to select organisations and send out signals to others about 
the expected behaviour of TSOs. These mechanisms to capture and marionettise, enables the 
state to divide-and-conquer civil society, ensuring continual fragmentation (see chapter 3.3.1) 
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and its collective weakness. It dovetails with chapters six and the argument put forward of  a 
more subtle management of civil society.  
 
The chapter also illustrates the marionette like characteristics of TSOs within this study. The 
chapter delineates such organisations as the ones that are primarily able to access domestic 
resources the chapter highlights three specific features of marionette like behaviour. First,  
health and educational TSOs overlap with observations about marionettes in other sectors 
(Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006; see chapter 3.4.1), organisations 
across the three regions portray themselves as spun off from that which is created by the state. 
Yet, other than marionettes amongst environmental organisations (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 
2006), such organisations aim to highlight that they are autonomous from the state, but well-
connected enabling them to work in alliance with the state. However, in actual fact such TSOs 
become part of the public infrastructure, in particular as all of them are funded by the state.   
 
The second feature across the three regions outlined by respondents is the „sucking in‟ of 
TSOs. This creates preferred organisations which are likely, in addition to the ones spun off 
by the state, to reflect the only legitimate representatives of civil society. This sucking in of 
TSOs has not been clearly articulated as features of marionette organisations in the literature 
(Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006, 2009; Henry, 2006). However, the drawing in of 
key TSO staff or members into government structures limits the potential confrontational 
nature of such organisations. In turn this encourages TSOs to mimic marionette organisations. 
The sucking in of TSO decision-makers in the sector of health and education TSOs highlights 
the emergence of what this thesis terms hybrid marionettes (see chapter 3.5). These hybrid 
marionettes demonstrate the increase in marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs, in 
particular amongst formally independent organisations, and thus the successful management 
of civil society by the state. Even though it is frequently the case within western democratic 
civil societies (see chapter 2) that leaders or directors of TSOs, who are active on a voluntary 
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basis, might also work in state structures, such arrangements are of a more peculiar nature in 
the context of Russia Federation. The evidence illustrated here highlights that rather than civil 
servants being engaged in voluntary activities in their spare time, respondents portray this as 
being invited to work in state structures.  
 
The third characteristic of marionette-like behaviour is the TSO‟s portrayal of working in 
alliance with the state. Again working in alliance with the state also occurs in democratic 
western contexts (Anheier, 2005, 2009; see chapter 2.3). However as the alliances occur due 
to the „sucking in‟ of decision-makers and the alignment of TSOs activities with the aims of 
the state, it indicates the mimicking of marionette organisations rather than emancipation of 
state-TSO relations. The dominance of informal advocacy and lack of willingness to 
formalise such activities also highlights the hierarchical and dependent relationships that 
underlie such alliances. Nevertheless respondents consider the engagement in a formalised 
structure of interaction with the state as vital. In this, TSOs mimicking marionettes overlap 
with marionettes in other areas of civil society (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). However, it 
seems that respondents are unaware of compromising their position as builders of an 
autonomous civil society space. For managed civil society arrangements to function, TSOs 
with marionette like behaviour are important as it enables the state to excerpt influence over, 
for example, the handling of social issues in turn stabilising its political regime (Mann, 1986). 
In effect this illustrates the development of quid pro quo arrangements where the state and 
TSOs exchange loyalty for survival.  
 
In the literature, marionette organisations are illustrated as founded by the state and aligning 
their activities with the objectives of the state (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Furthermore, 
marionettes are embedded within the political elite working with the state rather than 
confronting it, legitimising state policy, and portraying themselves as independent (Cook & 
Vinogradova, 2006). Comparing TSOs displaying marionette like behaviour to pro-typical 
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marionettes highlight several communalities. Similar to marionettes, TSOs mimicking 
marionettes depend on the state for resources and it is the organisations that are able to access 
such resources that display such behaviour. However, other than marionettes, TSOs in this 
study illustrate that they are „sucked into‟ the state. This shows that TSOs mimicking 
marionettes lack the embeddeness in the (local) political elite displayed by marionettes. In 
effect TSOs mimicking marionettes have to be understood as hybrid marionettes. As TSOs 
still display the ideological buy-ins, the resource dependence, and aligning with the aims of 
the (Federal) state, they display marionette like behaviour. However, their lack of political 
embeddedness means that, at least on the local level, TSOs can theoretically act more 
confrontationally. This is not the case as the dominance of informal advocacy in chapter six 
demonstrates. Nevertheless, hybrid marionettes facilitate the state‟s attempts to manage civil 
society. The state does not need for these organisations to be embedded in the political elite to 
control such TSOs because in fear of losing their access and associated resources, TSOs 
mimic marionettes. The advantage of their hybrid nature for the state is that it facilitates the 
portrayal of a functioning and independent third sector yet at the same time manages civil 
society. In addressing the question of how TSOs with marionette like behaviour differ to 
marionettes this chapter outlines that differences are minimal. Furthermore, the hybrid nature 
of marionettes facilitates the management of civil society by the state.  
 
The consideration of mimicking marionettes and accessing domestic resources also highlights 
the bi-polarity of Russian civil society. Organisations which do not display marionette like 
characteristics are not only unable to interact with the state but also lack access to resources 
and thus the ability to be active agents of civil society. It is these organisations that resemble 
afternoon tea and coffee clubs, which are situated in the bottom half of Russia‟s hourglass 
(Rose, 1995). Their lack of resources, support, and recognition by the state inhibits their 
ability to bridge across or effectively hold the state accountable. As a result civil society will 
remain constricted (Crotty, 2006; see chapter 3) and unable to fulfil its democratising role 
203 
sufficiently. Addressing the gap in the literature (see chapter 3 & 4) vis-à-vis our lack of 
understanding of health and education TSOs, the characteristics described here broaden our 
understanding of such organisations. The importance of alliances with the state and the 
sucking in of key individuals of TSOs demonstrates a side of marionette like behaviour 
previously not clearly articulated (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006, 2009).  
 
TSOs mimicking marionettes (i.e. hybrid marionettes) play an important role in the Russian 
state‟s attempt to shape and mould civil society to its own ends. As a G8 state, nominal 
democratic country with nuclear weapons, the Russian state has to at least give the impression 
of a society that has TSOs and a functioning autonomous civil society (see chapter 1). 
However, civil society of such a nature does not, as illustrated in chapters one and three, align 
well with the present managed democratic regime. Thus TSOs with marionette like 
characteristics demonstrate that the state is able to capture civil society but maintaining the 
image of independence. However, capturing in the context of the Russian Federation is an 
exchange process in which TSOs trade resources for survival by mimicking marionettes. As a 
result the state provides napravleniye to TSOs directing and managing civil society. 
Therefore, the majority of TSOs in this study remain subservient to the state limiting the 
emergence of more liberal, democratising, and unmanaged civil society arrangements 
conducive to democracy (Taylor, 2006). The marionette-like nature of TSOs serves as a 
source of infrastructural power (Mann, 1984) for the Federal state. At this macro-level civil 
society-state relation are statist resembling the control mechanism for Russia‟s both 
corporatist economy (Hanson & Teague, 2005; Lane, 2000; Radygin, 2004) and managed 
democratic regime (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007).  
 
Consequently, the marionette-like characteristics of TSOs not only highlight the management 
of civil society but also the further limitation of the democratisation potential of TSOs. Many 
TSOs within this study, which might have been seen as forming the constricted middle 
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ground of this hourglass society in the past (Crotty, 2006; Rose, 1995), now display 
marionette like features. In addressing the research question of this thesis, of how managed 
civil society arrangements manifest themselves in the Russian Federation, the marionette like 
behaviour of TSOs is an indication of completion of the management of civil society. The 
following chapter will discuss these aspects in light of the literature and contribution to the 
literature this thesis makes. Therefore, chapter eight provides a comprehensive and coherent 
characterisation of managed civil society as well as its implications for democratisation in the 
Russian Federation and the relevance of civil society theory to understand developments 
within Russian contemporary society.  
  
 
 
 
 
.  
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CHAPTER 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the discussion of managed civil society arrangements by considering the 
insights from the empirical evidence (see chapter 5, 6, & 7) and demonstrating the 
contributions made by this thesis. Before presenting the discussion and contributions, the 
chapter recaps the starting point of the thesis. Within the thesis, the notion of a managed civil 
society arrangements is put forward and explored. Throughout the thesis, both theoretical and 
empirical factors explore state-society relations to illustrate these arrangements. In order to do 
so the theoretical construct of civil society is operationalised. Civil society is defined as “the 
space between the individual family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150) and a space made up 
of “autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary organisations” (Neace, 1999, p. 150), which are 
referred to as Third Sector Organisations (TSOs). Another construct related to civil society 
and operationalised is social capital. Social capital is defined as “features of social 
organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Both these concepts are credited with 
improving democracy and democratic governance (Taylor, 2006). The discussion of these 
constructs (chapter 2) as well as the development of civil society in the context of the Russian 
Federation (chapter 3) challenges these dominant understandings and assumptions of 
conventional autonomous state-society relations, the mediating role which civil society 
assumes between the individual and the state, and the universal applicability of the civil 
society-democracy orthodoxy. Consequently this thesis investages the research question of 
how managed civil society arrangemetns are manifested in the Russian Federation.  
 
All three empirical chapters provide a unique insight into health and education TSOs in the 
context of the Russian Federation, a group of organisations that have received little attention 
in the past (see chapter 3 & 4). Throughout all three empirical chapters, the discourses of 
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respondents and their portrayal of their organisations, and civil society demonstrate their 
desire to work in alliance with the state. The following quote captures this sentiment amongst 
respondents in this study:  
 
We think that it is important to work together with government rather than to fight 
with them. The way to change anything in these institutions [in Russia] is actually by 
working together with them, rather than tell them what they are doing wrong and that 
we do things right.  
Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm 
 
Cooperating and working in alliance with the state is something that TSOs within this study 
embrace. However, it also highlights that TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation are 
not the agents of democracy they are meant to be (see chapter 2.5). Therefore, both discourses 
illustrate a change in understanding civil society. Such assertions run counter the argument of 
the transition of Russia into a democratic country (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005) and rather 
highlight a transformation where the state remains an integral part of the societal fabric. TSOs 
are willing to give up their autonomy and independence to ensure that they are able to 
establish such relations, highlighting that they do not understand their role as a builder of an 
autonomous space and drivers of democratisation. These conclusions are supported by other 
research that asserts a rhetorical shift amongst Russian civil society activists from the 
politically laden understanding of civil society (as a counterweight to the state) to the 
apolitical understanding of the third sector (Salmenniemi, 2008; see chapter 2). In addressing 
the research question of how managed civil society manifest itself, the contribution of this 
thesis is  
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the evidence based-proposition that in the context of the Russian Federation, civil 
society exists within a managed form, which does not correspond to traditional models 
of civil society.  
 
In order to discuss and highlight the contribution made by this thesis, this chapter is divided 
into two sections. The first section of this chapter discusses each of the objectives in turn. The 
second section of this chapter illustrates the contributions this thesis makes to civil society 
literature, its constructs, and discourses within. The section presents the theoretical 
contributions of this thesis drawing on the literature review (see chapter 2 and 3) and the 
voids highlighted. It explores potential for future research addressing methodological issues 
as well as future theoretical directions. The section also illustrates potential policy 
implication. The thesis concludes with a short summary and some general concluding 
remarks.  
 
8.2 Discussion 
This section discusses the conclusions of chapters five, six, and seven. It explores each of the 
research objectives in turn.  
 
8.2.1 NGO law as mechanism for managed civil society  
The previous three empirical chapters have illustrated several facets of contemporary Russian 
civil society. In so doing chapters five, six, and seven have outlined a Russian civil society 
that is managed by the state. In investigating the impact of the legislative changes on the day-
to-day workings (see chapter 1 objective 1) chapter five demonstrates that the implementation 
of the 2006 NGO law is the legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. The chapter 
outlines three different groups with regards to their perception of the NGO law. Despite some 
TSOs not registering out of protest, the majority of TSOs acquiesce to the NGO law. 
Adhering to the law and thus being managed by the state is important for TSOs and also 
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highlights how the state is able to exploit pre-existing weaknesses of Russian civil society 
(see chapter 3.3.1). It illustrates that the state has bribed TSOs into adhering to the NGO law. 
Consequently TSOs are unlikely hold the state to account (Taylor, 2006). These 
considerations clearly demonstrate the prevalence of statist civil society arrangements (Hale, 
2002), in which the law acts as a management mechanism of such arrangements.  
 
As the cultural-historic considerations in chapter three demonstrate, the past legislation had a 
restrictive and controlling rationale and the 2006 NGO law mirrors this tradition. There is 
little literature on how the Russian regulatory framework (i.e. the 2006 NGO law) shapes civil 
society arrangements (see chapter 3), and this thesis addresses this void. Chapter five 
illustrates how acquiescing to the 2006 NGO law provides TSOs with legal recognition 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and thus access to resources. Achieving legitimacy has been made 
out as a key motivation for organisations to behave in specific ways (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin-Andersson, & Suddaby, 2008), and Russian TSOs in this study reflect these insights. 
The process of attaining legitimacy focuses on the audience and the type of legitimacy 
established (Greenwood, et al., 2008). In the context of the Russian Federation, the state and 
its threshold condition of playing by its rules (i.e. acquiescence to the NGO law) enables 
TSOs to achieve legitimacy. In the context of the NGO law, being an acquiescence has 
become a taken-for-granted position (Zucker, 1977) that TSOs need to assume in order to 
exist.  
 
With regards to Taylor‟s (2006) observation of civil society facilitating democracy this 
development has further implications. Because the state and no other audience confer 
legitimacy in the context of the Russian Federation, TSOs have to subordinate themselves 
(reflected in the alignment with the dominant political discourse) to the state, rather than 
establishing an autonomous space of equal strength and importance. Therefore, the NGO law 
is a vital tool to manage civil society arrangements. The theoretical predicted isomorphic 
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developments as a response to such legitimacy seeking (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) are 
illustrated by developments such as the „mimicking‟ of marionette behaviour highlighted in 
chapter seven. Consequently, the 2006 NGO law‟s „suspended punishment‟ nature (see 
chapter 5) enables the state to use the administration of legitimacy as a mechanism to manage 
civil society arrangements.  
 
In examining the NGO law closer, the findings presented in chapter five, illustrate two 
competing discourses to which TSOs which adhere to the law subscribe too. This illustrates a 
dividing line in how respondents understand the NGO law‟s impact on their organisations. 
Some organisations see it necessary to illustrate the NGO law as improving their 
organisations. Improved accountability, transparency, and thus effectiveness are all outcomes, 
which are currently high in the academic, political, and popular discourse on TSOs in 
developed democratic nations such as the US (Anheier, 2009). However, in the context of the 
Russian Federation these outcome improvements refer to improving accountability and 
transparency in the eyes of the state thus portraying the state as all-dominant. Hence, the idea 
of improving organisations mirrors the subordination of TSOs to the state. In turn, TSOs do 
become potential partners with the state, but rather than being equal, such relations are 
characterised by vertical and dependent relationships. With regards to democratisation, the 
idea of more accountable and transparent organisations is certainly something that needs to 
develop in Russia. Nevertheless, at the moment such rhetoric reflects realities closer aligned 
with managed civil society rather than traditional liberal civil society.  
 
Contrary to this „professionalization‟ discourse, some TSOs in this study highlight the 
bureaucratisation potential of the law. This is characteristic of coercive isomorphic pressures 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that lead to TSOs resembling state structures. In turn such 
organisations do not build civil society as an autonomous space. Nevertheless, TSOs remain 
legitimate members of civil society, but at the same time, this highlights the dominant 
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position of the state vis-à-vis civil society. Therefore, both discourses rationalising the effects 
of the 2006 NGO law are illustrative of managed civil society arrangements. These discourses 
illustrate how the 2006 NGO law has created a control mechanism which enable the state to 
manage TSOs.  
 
Despite the difference in opinions about the impact of the NGO law on their organisations, 
proponents of both discourses align themselves with the general positive assessment of the 
NGO law. It is thus not surprising that TSOs highlight that the NGO law does not influence 
their activities adversely. Therefore, assessing the effects of the NGO law indicate a potential 
decoupling of the structure and form of TSOs from their activities (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It is the neglect of the impact of the NGO law and this 
decoupling that demonstrates that TSOs contribute little to democratisation or building a civil 
society as an autonomous space. Therefore, TSOs remain unable to develop civil society as an 
autonomous space, meaning that civil society remains weak and constricted (Crotty, 2006) 
and Russia‟s hourglass society intact (see chapter, 3; Rose, 1995). Such insights also illustrate 
that the democratisation potential of TSOs remains constrained (see chapter 3) and therefore 
the NGO law provides the basic tenet for managed civil society arrangements.  
 
TSOs use the NGO law and adherence to it as a way to portray themselves as legitimate 
participants of Russian civil society. They adapt to the coercing forces of the NGO law as all 
rational organisational actors do. This also means that TSOs are less likely to be situated 
between the state and the individual (Neace, 1999). In such arrangements, TSOs are unlikely 
to address legacy issues such as lack of public support or fragmentation, which have 
constricted civil society development post ante the Soviet Union (see chapter 3.3.1). This 
highlights the objective of the NGO law to neutralise and limit the democratisation potential 
embedded in TSOs and depoliticise their activities. In so doing this also illustrates that 
managed arrangement represent the transformation of Russian civil society into a third sector 
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aimed at “mobilising to help the state” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 747), encapsulating a truly 
Russian vision of what civil society should look like (Evan, 2006b) and is alinged with the 
managed democratic regime and corporatist economic arrangements. Other than in the 
traditional understanding of civil society facilitating democracy and acting as an accountant of 
the state (Taylor, 2006), conformity to the state‟s vision is more important. Hence, Russian 
TSOs are no longer „pluralisers‟ of public discourse or decision making and can no longer be 
understood as drivers of democratisation.   
 
8.2.2 TSOs as substituting the state 
Chapter six examines how TSOs now act as state substitutes and in so doing outlines more 
subtle attempts of the state to manage civil society. The chapter highlights that TSOs prefer to 
engage in informal advocacy activities addressing small problems rather than the bigger 
issues. Furthermore, such advocacy activities are equated to service provision for which TSOs 
expect the state to provide resources. However, TSOs in this study do not acknowledge the 
compromising position that this puts them in with regard to the state. In so doing chapter six 
demonstrates how TSOs develop into depoliticised organisations. Furthermore, it highlights 
that social relations which shaped and weakened civil society development in the past have 
not changed. This demonstrates how the state exploits pre-existing weaknesses such as the 
fragmentation of civil society (see chapter 3.3.1) to subtly manage civil society.  
 
Chapter six highlights that TSOs are equating advocacy to service provision and do not 
portray themselves as engaging in confrontational activities vis-à-vis the state. This is 
contrary to the literature that understands service provision as the contracting out of the 
welfare state (Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). In the literature, both 
the substitution of state service provision, by offering similar services, and complementing 
state service provision, by extending the service offered by the state, are understood as 
positive or beneficial partnerships for both TSOs and the state (Kramer, Lorentzen, Melief, & 
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Pasquinelli, 1993). However, in the context the Russian Federation TSOs that illustrate that 
they are substitutes for the state could be understood as being too strong. In turn strong TSOs 
taking on the responsibilities of the state would delegitimize and undermine the authority of 
the state (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010). Therefore, TSOs always refer to their service 
provision as complementary. This way TSOs ensure that the ultimate responsibility for a 
service remains with the state which is hence taking care of its citizens. These arrangements 
reflect Young‟s (2000) complementary relationship; the state directs service provision via 
vertical relationships in which it retains the dominant power base. As such, TSOs become 
helpers to the state and consequently their organisational identities are being transformed if 
not destroyed (Brinkerhoff, 2002).  
 
Consequently, chapter six outlines that TSOs are tools of the state, which enable it to smooth 
the impact of neo-liberal welfare reforms (Hemment, 2009). However, the rolling back of the 
state is not taking place in terms of handing over responsibility (Csaba, 2009), but rather in 
coercing TSOs to engage in service provision. Service providing TSOs are the ideal 
distribution channels of social welfare services to both smooth the continuous retreat of the 
state (Sil & Chen, 2004) as well as ensuring stability and security of the regime (Henry, 
2009). Thus, it is not a surprise that Henderson (2008) observes a mobilisation of TSOs 
around patriotic ideals and not political protest focusing on the modernisation (i.e. 
democratisation) of the political regime. Consequently, the activities of TSOs reflect state 
policy and not bottom-up driven agendas. TSOs seek to be close to the state, however 
contrary to Kuhnle and Selle‟s (1992) assertion that the nearness of the state and the TSOs 
reflect a state friendly society, in the context of the Russian Federation such nearness is a 
reflection of the state‟s ability to control and manage society. As subordinates, TSOs are 
likely to be used to achieve political goals (Mendel, 2009), rather than facilitating 
democratisation and public participation in decision-making (Taylor, 2006). Reinforcing the 
conclusion drawn from examining the NGO law, the analysis of how TSOs substitute for the 
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state highlights the management of civil society. These aspects herald the end of the 
„Gramscian‟ tradition and logic (i.e. civil society as a counterweight to the state (see chapter 
2)) of civil society. However as illustrated in chapter three, this logic was removed from what 
Russian TSOs envision and therefore their embrace of such changes are not surprising. 
Nevertheless, in considering TSOs as service provisions this thesis is able to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the more subtle attempts to a managed civil society.  
 
8.2.3 Curtailing and managing organisational activity  
Chapter seven examines the organisational level characteristics of managed civil society and 
in turn demonstrates the completion of the management of civil society by the state. By 
highlighting incentives and structures put in place by the state to encourage marionette-like 
behaviour and presenting the marionette-like characteristics of TSOs, chapter seven indicates 
organisational level outcomes and the management of civil society. Marionette-like behaviour 
will not address the problem of limited level of social mobilisation (Oldfield, 2001) and hence 
consolidate the pre-existing weakness of civil society. However, respondents do not see such 
developments as negative for their TSOs but an “impetus for greater interaction between 
government agencies and NGOs” (Oldfield, Kouzmina, & Shaw, 2003, p. 165). It seems that 
they understand the managed civil society as the appropriate adaption of this concept to the 
Russian context. 
 
Chapter seven outlines that many TSOs in this study have begun to mimic traditional 
marionettes in both rhetoric and frequently, behaviours. In turn, such TSOs trade in their 
independence and autonomy for financial support and sponsorship from the state. Formalised 
and state-controlled structures of interaction such as the Public Chamber (Richter, 2009), 
provide the foundation for such state managed arrangements. As a result some organisations 
are being pulled upwards by the state. TSOs that do not belong to this club drift towards the 
bottom half and as a result of resource deprivation begin to resemble Soviet area „kitchen 
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circles‟ (Gibson, 2001). In effect the prevalence of marionette-like behaviour is evidence for 
the institutionalisation process of managed civil society arrangements.  
 
Other than in the areas of human rights (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007) or environmental 
protection (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006) chapter seven highlights that in the sectors of health 
and education TSOs, many of them display marionette-like characteristics. However, 
demarcating TSOs mimicking marionettes as marionette organisations similar to the ones 
discussed in the literature (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006) is becoming increasingly difficult in 
managed civil society arrangements. The evidence in this thesis illustrates that in particular, 
organisations that used to be considered advocacy-policy organisations are more actively 
seeking to adopt and mimic marionette characteristics. However, such organisations lack the 
cultural-historic elite embeddness of marionettes. Other than marionettes which are displaying 
„integrate dependency‟ (i.e. full funding by the state and very close state control), TSOs 
mimicking marionettes are „separately dependent‟ which means that they receive partial 
funding as well as being subject to either direct or indirect top-down controls by the state 
(Kuhnle & Selle, 1992). The combination of these two dependencies enables the state to 
excerpt control over civil society. By establishing separate dependent relationships, TSOs are 
able to attain legitimacy which, as demonstrated in chapter seven, they are able to leverage to 
access domestic, but non-governmental funding and resources. Thus in addition to the 
coercive forces of the NGO law, this demonstrates mimetic isomorphic developments 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) amongst TSOs. In this sense, TSOs are becoming increasingly 
homogeneous settling within the top half of the hourglass (see chapter 3 and Rose, 1995) and 
mimicking marionettes. On the other hand such isomorphic developments also apply to TSOs, 
which do not display such marionette characteristics (see chapter 7). However, rather than 
mimicking marionettes, such organisations seem to turn into afternoon tea and coffee clubs. 
In addition to the insight that these considerations provide us about managed civil society 
arrangements, such developments also illustrate the isomorphic developments that serve as 
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evidence for the institutionalisation of such arrangements (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin-Andersson, & Suddaby, 2008; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977).  
 
A pivotal insight offered by the examination of marionette like characteristics is that in 
addition to „hard approaches‟ of state-sponsorship such as, for example, the provision of 
resources, „soft approaches‟ to state-sponsorship also exists (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Mirroring 
Hales (2010) observation of political party funding, hard as well as soft state-sponsorship 
provides TSOs with a seal of approval that enables them to access additional resources from 
businesses or private donations. In addition to the hard approaches to state-sponsorship that 
result from resource dependency, formal and structured arrangement for the interaction 
between TSOs and the state (Richter, 2009) (e.g. Public Chamber) form the heart of soft 
approaches to state-sponsorship. The membership in these often exclusive structures portrays 
to outsiders (be they local or council bureaucrats or civil servants, business people, or private 
donors) the state‟s acceptance of a specific organisation. However, as demonstrated in chapter 
seven in order to be able to become a part of such exclusive structures, organisations need to 
display marionette like traits and characteristics. In turn, the quintessential structure of an 
hourglass is being re-established, which leads to civil society arrangements that are much 
closer to Russia‟s cultural-historic social arrangements (Rose, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). 
In line with the continuity theoretical idea (Hedlund, 2008) that informs managed civil society 
arrangements, the “prevailing social structures” (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 228) (i.e. the 
hourglass society) have shaped the development path of TSOs and thus civil society. 
Therefore, the prevalence of marionette like organisations not only signals the 
institutionalisation of managed arrangements, but is also evidence of the continuation of past 
social arrangements (Hedlund, 2008). Arrangements that chapter three demonstrates are 
limiting civil society and its contribution of democratisation (Taylor, 2006) 
 
216 
8.2.4 Summary of Discussion 
As this discussion highlights in managed civil society arrangements TSOs seek legitimate 
membership in civil society in several of ways; TSOs who acquiesce to a restrictive law, do 
not act confrontationally and exhibit marionette like characteristics. This highlights formal 
and informal rules for Russian civil society agents as well as the effects on such agents. 
Without adhering to these requirements TSOs are starved of resources. Consequently, civil 
society „lacks the teeth‟ to ensure that it holds the state accountable which would facilitate 
democratisation. It outlines the management of civil society as an exchange relationship 
between TSOs and the state in which the former trade in their independence for resources and 
survival. Consequently, the „managed‟ space of civil society is both an outcome and 
facilitates the functioning of Russia‟s corporatist „managed‟ economy and „managed‟ 
democratic order.  
 
The elements that make up managed civil society also interlink with Hale‟s (2010) assessment 
of Russia being a hybrid regime. In such a regime the state, in this case the authority of the 
president, subordinates all political processes and powers into one “single pyramid of power” 
(Hale, 2010, p. 33). TSOs are subordinated via the control of resources and a potential system 
of suspended punishment (Ledeneva, 2006) created by the NGO law. Such a hybrid regime, 
combining democratic aspects and authoritarian ones (Hale, 2010), means that in the case of 
Russia the state is not interested in creating a civil society as sui generis but as this thesis 
shows favours to manage civil society. Russia aims to portray itself as a democratic country 
(Shlapentokh, 2009) and the existence of an autonomous third sector holding the government 
to account is pivotal to this objective. Traditionally, such a civil society space acts as the 
lynchpin for the establishment of governance structures and institutions that further 
development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). However, as 
this thesis has demonstrated post ante the Soviet Union, rather than reflecting an autonomous 
space, the Russian state remains all-dominant and manages civil society arrangements. Thus 
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this hybrid political system hinges on a strong government (Hale, 2010). A strong government 
is frequently recommended for the continuous and sustainable development of a country, its 
institutions, and more importantly an emancipated civil society space (Skocpol, 2002). 
Consequently, managed civil society arrangements constituted another piece of evidence of 
the deliberate rejection of an open society post ante the Soviet Union (Rutland, 2008). In 
exploring managed arrangements this thesis outlines the consolidation of the hourglass 
(Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 1995) as well as the institutionalisation of civil society 
arrangements characterised by strong, structured, and dependent relationships between TSOs 
and the state.  
 
8.3 Implications and Contributions 
This thesis examined the question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested 
in the Russian Federation. To address this question this thesis draws on the bodies of civil 
society theory and the research literature on civil society in Russia (see chapter 2 and 3). This 
informs three research objectives. First, this thesis looks at the impact of legislative changes 
on TSOs, concluding that they represent a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. 
Second, the thesis outlines how TSOs act as state substitutes which provide an insight into 
subtle attempts of the state to manage civil society. Third, the thesis investigates the effect of 
state managed civil society on TSOs. In so doing the thesis concludes that this encourages 
TSOs to mimic marionettes and represents the completion of the management of civil society. 
This section outlines the theoretical contribution made by this thesis. This is followed by 
practical implications and discussing the limitations to this study as well as future research 
avenues.  
 
8.3.3 Theoretical Contributions 
Civil society is frequently seen as the lynchpin to the development of an institutional 
environment that ensures development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 
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2002; Williamson, 2000), no more so in the context of the Russian Federation with its nuclear 
weapons and notional democratic order. The process of democratisation is considered integral 
to the transition process Russia is said to be undergoing (Shleifer & Triesman, 2005) and as 
part of such considerations civil society is inadvertently intertwined with democracy 
(Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Mercer, 2002; Salmenniemi, 2008). However, the 
evidence in this thesis highlights that when considering civil society, Russia has not 
undergone a transition towards an autonomous space. On the contrary, civil society has 
transformed into a space managed by the state and reflecting the importance the Russian state 
places in Russia‟s societal fabric. This thesis outlines that Russian civil society does not 
reflect this positive relationship between TSOs and democracy. Therefore, this thesis 
contributes to the discussion about the universal applicability of western models of civil 
society (Glasius, Lewis, & Seckinelgin, 2004; Lewis, 2002). Even though this study illustrates 
the limited explanatory power of traditional civil society theory, the concept remains a useful 
tool to examine the space attributed to civil society (Lewis, 2002). Thus on a theoretical level, 
managed civil society arrangements constitute an extension of our understanding of civil 
society highlighting that its autonomous nature is relevant for democracy but not necessarily 
for the existence of civil society itself.  
 
8.3.3.1 Civil Society and Democratisation Theory 
The preceding sections highlighted the manifestation of managed civil society arrangement. 
As chapter three discusses, managed civil society arrangements are an outcome of the effects 
of shock therapy, rapid but uncompleted democratisation, and misguided civil society 
building. This thesis outlines that despite being credited with democratising Latin America 
and Central and Eastern Europe (Hyden, 1997; Kocka, 2004) civil society‟s contribution to 
democratisation in Russia is minimal. Consequently, civil society cannot be considered a 
space which is autonomous, nor a space for democracy education (Chandhoke, 2007; Edele, 
2005; Frolic, 1997; Hale, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Kasif, 1998; Kubik, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001). 
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Even though Russian managed civil society does not mirror traditional arrangements, it 
reflects institutional arrangements that perform similar functions (i.e. the provision of services 
(Kubik, 2005)) albeit in different ways.  
 
The literature challenging the orthodox assumption of civil society = democracy has been 
growing (Mercer, 2002; Taylor, 2006). In repressive regimes, the “cost of organising” 
(Hadenius & Uggla, 1996, p. 1629) is increased and therefore only state managed civil society 
is able to exist. These civil society spaces are different in the fact that they lack the autonomy 
associated with the traditional model (see chapter 2). Such managed civil society is less likely 
to be able to democratise these regimes. In such an environment, civil society activity is 
permitted within the areas from which the state withdrew and only within officially 
legitimised associations and organisations (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996). Therefore, the state 
uses various incentives to consolidate and maintain its position of power vis-à-vis civil 
society (Mamdani, 1996). In turn, associational life can only exist if sponsored by the state 
(Khanna, 2009) leading to phenomena such as government-organised associations, 
government manipulated groups and government regulated and initiated associations (Edele, 
2005; Uhlin, 2006) or in the context of Russia, marionette organisations (Coock and 
Vinogradova, 2006). The dominance of such organisations limits the political opportunities, 
which can be created by civil society agents (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). The insight 
from this thesis and Russian managed civil society arrangements dovetails theses insights and 
conclusions. The thesis outlines that TSOs in this study trade in their autonomy and ability to 
act as agents of democratisation for survival and resources.  
 
In various contexts, civil society co-opted and bestowed by the state is central to the state‟s 
ability to govern (Frolic, 1997). Similar to the insights in this thesis, the Chinese experience 
shows that despite co-optation, civil society enjoys some autonomy, however in return it is 
required to engage in disciplined cooperation on the terms of the state (Frolic, 1997). Russian 
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managed civil society reflects similar arrangements where TSOs mimic marionettes and do 
not publicly confront the state. Managed arrangement should not be considered a negative 
sign for civil society development per se, but an outcome of past and present political, social, 
and economic arrangements. Consequently, this thesis extends our understanding of civil 
society arrangements in contexts where the state is traditionally less responsive to bottom-up 
impetus such as China (Frolic, 1997), India (Chandhoke, 2007), or African countries (Lewis, 
2002). Consequently, managed civil society does not have to be an autonomous space or 
contributing to democratisation. This is a pivotal extension to democratisation literature which 
focuses on developing civil society as an autonomous space to democratise the state (see 
chapter 2.5.1).   
 
8.3.3.2 Civil society literature in the context of the Russian Federation 
This thesis adds to our understanding of civil society in the context of the Russian Federation 
in two ways. First, by examing health and education TSOs, it addresses organisations that 
have thus far only received limited research attention. Second, in examining managed civil 
society this thesis provides an insight into contemporary civil society arrangements. 
 
Through a traditional civil society lens, Russian managed civil society remains politically 
weak (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). This thesis illustrates that despite this political weakness, 
TSOs are able to develop into service providers. This thesis illustrates that a weak civil 
society does not mean that its development is stalled (Howard, 2002a; Simon, 2004; Maxwell, 
2006). On the contrary, TSOs remain active and are becoming more active as service 
providers, however as their acquiescence to the NGO law highlights, within the boundaries 
set by the state. This thesis highlights that TSOs want to be approved by the state and are 
happy to receive orders from it (see chapter 7). TSOs in this study do not seem to make a 
distinction between influencing the state and working together, which illustrates the limited 
democratisation potential contained in civil society. With regards to the contribution to 
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literature on civil society in Russia, this thesis illustrates that TSOs remain ineffective as 
change agents and are primarily situated at either ends of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006; 2009; 
see chapter 7). The ineffectiveness of TSOs to stimulate change to social arrangements and in 
particular underlying social relations (see chapter 3, 5, 6, & 7) highlights the 
institutionalisation of managed civil society arrangements (Piven & Cloward, 1977).   
 
This thesis also contributes to the understanding of health and education TSOs in the context 
of the Russian Federation. Illustrating that such TSOs engage in mimicking marionettes  
provides us with insights into the potential future behaviour of such organisations in Russia. 
These TSOs highlight various ways through which the state encourages such mimicking 
behaviour. Therefore, the emergence of TSOs with marionette-like characteristics assists the 
state to cement its dominance (Mann, 1984). The existence of TSOs mimicking marionettes 
echoes Overshoots‟ observations that agents of civil society can be seen as 
“gosudarstvenniki” (2007, p. 43). Consequently, Russian TSOs are not organisations, which 
are driven by increasing public participation or membership, but by pleasing the state 
demonstrating that the Russian state now manages all “levers of power and patronage” 
(Cappelli, 2008, p. 554). Effectively, this is evidence of a fundamental shift in the 
understanding about the role civil society should be playing in Russia. As this thesis argues, 
this is a shift away from a Gramscian civil society against the state, to civil society for and 
with the state which is more aligned with the cultural-historic importance of the Russian state. 
Consequently, managed civil society is an extension and manifestation of Hedlund‟s (2008) 
continuity theory observed in the economy and development of Russia‟s political regime.  
 
In summary, this thesis contributes to the democratisation literature by extending our 
understanding of civil society and its link to democracy. The thesis demonstrates that civil 
society can exist and operate without necessarily producing democratic outcomes or 
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contributing to democratisation. With regards to the literature on civil society in Russia, this 
thesis addresses the void in our understanding about health and education TSOs.  
 
8.3.2 Policy Implications 
This section looks at the policy implications of this research. This thesis highlights that the 
cultural-historic context of the Russian Federation means civil society is not a driver for 
democratisation. On the contrary, it is managed and directed by the state. The thesis 
highlights that it is the state, which drives these managed arrangements putting in place 
various pressures to coerce TSOs into compliance. It is the state that has implemented the 
2006 NGO law restricting foreign funding as well as tightening supervision over TSOs. 
Furthermore, the state has created a context in which TSOs displaying marionette-like 
behaviours thrive and where they do not want to formalise their informal advocacy activities 
for fear of losing access to the state. Given the active role of the state in creating such 
managed arrangements this leaves only limited scope for policy recommendations or 
implications for the Russian state. Such recommendations draw on civil society theory 
operationalised in this thesis (see chapter 2) and hence focus to counteract such arrangements. 
Clearly policies which would provide TSOs more autonomy, less direct state control, 
facilitate equal interaction between the state and civil society, encourage collaboration 
amongst TSOs effectively turning TSOs into „schools of democracy‟ would catalyse the 
development of an autonomous civil society. However, for the state, managed civil society is 
an extension of its policies used to direct the economy and politics. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that the state is interested in changing its course and encourages the development of a civil 
society that is autonomous and independent, bridging between the individual and the state, 
and holding the state to account.  
 
Conversely, this demonstrates that Russia is now a truly managed democracy. The recent 
denial of entry to Luke Harding, a Guardian newspaper journalist (BBC, 2011), and the 
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domination of media airtime by United Russia during elections (Klomegah, 2011) indicated 
the all-dominant state. The state now controls the media (Balzer, 2003), the economy 
(Hanson, 2003), and as illustrated in this thesis civil society. These managed and controlled 
arrangements increase the gap between the state and its citizens (i.e. the hourglass nature of 
society; Rose 1995; see chapter 3.5) and lead to a lack of government responsiveness to its 
citizen‟s demands. It is this gap, which has catalysed the current uproars in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and other parts of the Middle East. However, in Russia this swell of public dissent remains 
absent, as the state is able to control civil activity by subtly managing civil society, it ensures 
that such tendencies remain constricted. Consequently, the question arising is how the 
international community should interact with such a managed democracy. Therefore, the 
policy implications of this thesis will need to focus on the highlighting potential policy 
recommendations for the international community.  
 
The recent events in the Middle East have put the international community in a precarious 
position. Regimes that once acted as friends in the region or reliable partners face a challenge 
to their legitimacy. Even without the active dissemination of the idea of civil society as agents 
of democracy, recent uproars display the importance of collaborative action of civil society 
agents in holding the state to account and challenging the legitimacy of regimes. However, 
Russia has a less friendly relationship to most of the international community specifically to 
democratic countries such as the US and UK (Shalpentokh, 2009). Thus it is not surprising 
that support for an autonomous civil society is considered as an external challenge to the 
regime‟s legitimacy (Shalpentokh, 2009). Other than in the recent uprising in the Middle East 
when the international community encouraged the regimes restraint to enable an autonomous 
civil society to challenge the state, it is in no such position towards the Russian Federation. 
The main problem, in particular for European countries is that an open challenge and support 
for popular uprising will strain vital economic ties with Russia. Thus, the international 
community will have to encourage more gradual pro-democracy changes aimed at „freeing‟ 
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civil society from the management of the state. The evidence in this thesis highlights that 
many respondents and hence TSOs are content with current arrangements and would be 
unlikely to support a system that would see them lose their resources. Therefore, the 
international community will need to create systems with which they are able to circumvent 
the NGO law. However, these approaches need to be more subtle with regards to their 
democracy promotion agenda than civil society support in the past. The Charities Aid 
Foundation might provide an example. It has registered in Russia in a bid to be able to access 
funding from Russian donors as well as being able to distribute funding from foreign donor 
sources (CAF Russia, 2011). This way the international community can attempt to reduce the 
resource dependency of TSOs and highlight the compromising position TSOs assume in 
taking government resources. Furthermore, such attempts need to focus fostering across TSO 
collaboration not only in their activities but to build coalitions that are able to challenge the 
state. For example donors could make resources available only to a coalition of Russia TSOs, 
rather than individual ones. Furthermore, based on the experience in recruiting TSOs for this 
study, many organisations have close ties to local universities, and thus such programs need to 
focus on the knowledge exchange between, for example European and Russian scholars. 
These exchanges need to aim at encouraging shared interest of citizen participation and other 
democratic activities. Consequently the key focus of the international community is to 
facilitate the development of TSOs‟ organisational capacities to act as autonomous 
collaborating agents. It is the organisations that are apprehensive to managed civil society 
which are likely to be most conducive to such programs and policies. It is unlikely that such 
policies will show to be successful quickly as the Russian state, as demonstrated in this thesis, 
is an integral fabric of economic, political, and social life. Even though the research was 
undertaken in the context of the Russian Federation, the implications may apply to other 
transitory and democratising context displaying similar characteristics. 
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A second aspect of the policy recommendation of this thesis needs to focus on TSOs which 
are outside or at the fringes of managed civil society arrangements. The question is how TSOs 
can hold the state accountable despite a lack of resources and interaction. The thesis has 
demonstrated that TSOs want access to resources and that they play an important role as 
service provider for the retreated state. It is these activities where TSOs have the ability to 
catalyse their contribution to democratisation. TSOs not reliant on the state for resources will 
need to focus to become more openly confrontational and challenging the state within the 
context of their activities. TSOs should consider and portray this as a way to improve their 
effectiveness in delivering service rather challenging the legitimacy of the state. It is the latter 
which is likely to create difficulties for TSOs in managed civil society arrangements. The 
drive of TSOs to become more effective will automatically force them to become more 
confrontational vis-à-vis the state. In turn they will aggregate the interest of citizens and act as 
bridges between the state and the individual (Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, TSOs outside the 
managed arrangements need to collaborate with each other even if active in different areas. 
TSOs should not consider their activities in, for example the health sector as an obstacle to 
building a coalition for advancing an autonomous civil society with organisations engaged in 
education. As illustrated earlier the international community can support such collaborative 
activities. In effect, because of the withdrawal of the state since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the state is somewhat reliant on TSOs to offset the social ills caused by such a 
development. In turn this means that TSOs need to recognise the bargaining power they do 
have vis-à-vis the state. However, only in a collaborative arrangement will they be able to 
take full advantage of their bargaining power. It is down to the TSO‟s decision makers to 
drive such collaboration. Civil society gains its credibility from campaigning on things that 
are important to citizens. When TSOs in Russia start to group together and address issues 
important to citizens they will be able to challenge the state. Consequently, TSOs outside 
managed arrangements need to broaden their public appeal by actively engaging in activities 
at the heart of many citizens.  
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Given the theoretical lens taken in this thesis on policy implication, be it for the international 
community or TSOs in Russia, it focuses on the advancement and encouragement of building 
shared values around democratic governance. These policy implications and their 
implementations need further attention and need to be seen in light of the limitation of this 
thesis, both of which are highlighted in the following section.  
 
8.3.3 Implications for Future Research 
Given that our understanding of Russian civil society is still in its early stages, the proposition 
of managed arrangements provides various avenues for further research. In order to outline 
these avenues the limits of this study need to be acknowledged.  
 
8.3.1.1 Research and methodological limitations 
While the regional comparative approach could be said to be representative of many industrial 
regions within the Russian Federation, one must be careful in transcending the insights and 
conclusions drawn here to rural regions, autonomous republics, and the economic centres of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Consequently, the consideration of research and methodological 
limitations is important to be able to infer the representativeness of the insights of this thesis. 
These limitations refer to the choice of methodological techniques and subsequent decisions 
regarding the selection of participants and analysis. This section outlines limitations that 
result from the research setting. In particular, these illustrate limitations of working in the 
Russian environment, language, and cultural issues as well as problems of positionality of the 
research. With regards to the focus of this study and the data collected, this thesis has not 
examined the internal configuration or „operational aspects‟ of TSOs. However, these internal 
aspects are another factor that shapes the behaviour of such organisations and therefore can 
have an impact on macro developmental aspects similar to those considered within this thesis. 
227 
Nevertheless, an in-depth internal consideration of all participating organisations was beyond 
the realm of this thesis.   
 
Despite the fact that the results presented in this thesis illustrate a strong extension of the 
results gathered from other studies of Russian TSOs (see chapter 3), the thesis only focus on a 
limited group of TSOs. It is conceivable that different regions or different sectors might have 
led to different insights and thus the theoretical relationship with the existent literature. 
Furthermore, the study adopted a western perspective on civil society in which volunteerism, 
participation, and civil society as an autonomous space are important. Adopting a different 
framework and drawing on different concepts might have led to different propositions, 
themes, and results.   
 
Further, in operationalising a qualitative methodology it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations this entails. With regards to respondents there are two issues which need 
addressing: the selection of respondents as well as respondents themselves. The theoretical 
and snowballing approached used within this study (see chapter 4), though appropriate, might 
lead to a critique over the generalisability of these results outside the core context, which are 
health and educational TSOs in Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm. The implication for the 
findings might be that other geographical locations and similar sectors might lead to 
somewhat different conclusions. Confirming the findings in different geographical areas and 
sectors of Russian civil society could have strengthened this study and it needs to be 
considered in the future. However, the restriction on time and resources did not allow the 
extension of this research project. The use of theoretical contextualisation throughout the 
interpretation process (see chapter 4) aimed to address these issues of generalisation and if not 
ensuring generalisation in a statistical sense to a population, it enables generalisation to 
theoretical propositions. Furthermore, using leaders and organisational decision makers as 
respondents frequently based on the recommendation of others might have meant that the 
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people participating in this study reflected similar mental models, ideas, and opinions. In this 
way findings could have a „bias‟ leading to a particular interpretation represented in the study. 
However the use of local project partners helped with the selection of a variety of highly 
knowledgeable respondents (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
 
Another methodological limitation lies with the usage of interviews as the primary data 
collection techniques. Despite the rigor of the approach (see chapter 4.2 and 4.4) with regards 
to choosing participants there was potential „self-reporting‟ bias within their responses. Thus, 
respondents might have used interviews to appear favourable in the eyes of the researcher as 
well as providing answers, which they believe the researcher wanted to hear. To address these 
aspects, discourse analytical techniques as well as triangulating of the data across three 
regions was operationalised. As qualitative methodology draws its strength from the richness 
and contextual considerations, observations, meeting notes, and the research diary served to 
re-contextualise the coded interview accounts aiding triangulation. Furthermore, memory 
effects, where the respondents do not remember or do not want to remember past experiences, 
might also influence interview accounts. Triangulation also assisted with these aspects, as 
some of the textual artefacts were produced in the past.  
 
Another potential limitation of the qualitative research methodology operationalised is the 
large amount of data collected (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Using the coding process (see 
chapter 4) the researcher selected the data to be included in the analysis. Despite the aim to 
use data from all sources, the time constraints and the focus of this thesis (see chapter 4) also 
facilitated the data reduction process and breadth of data used. However, because the raw data 
remains in the researchers‟ possession, in future, additional aspects that were outside the 
realm of the thesis can be explored using additional theoretical considerations.  
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Concerning the analysis process, a potential limitation arises from the difficulty of the 
researcher being able to „bracket out‟ their background in the interpretation process (Creswell, 
2009) as this adds subjectivity to this process. Assumptions about the world, the gender of the 
researcher, the cultural context of the researcher‟s upbringing and education all influence the 
interpretation process. Triangulation of data sources (see chapter 4) assisted in counteracting 
such tendencies. In addition reflective periods and discussion with field experts assisted to 
„neutralise‟ the researcher‟s background in the interpretation processes. Furthermore, 
continuous theoretical contextualisation during the interpretation processes also aimed to 
„bracket out‟ potential subjective conclusions.  
 
This last consideration with regards to limitations illustrates the problem of the positionality 
of the researcher (Deetz, 1996). This is of particular importance in a „low-trust‟ environment 
(Mishler & Rose, 1997) such as Russia. The insider/outsider dichotomy is important in all 
qualitative research studies but particularly when conducting the study in a „foreign‟ country. 
Insiders are usually people grown up in the same country as respondents (Herod, 1999). The 
discussion of positionality of the researcher influences the generation and hence interpretation 
of data (Deetz, 1996). The particular context of this study also means that the issue of 
positionality of the researcher needs to be considered. The researcher‟s positionality impacts 
the recruitment of respondents (Herod, 1999) and also the information provided by 
respondents. The Russian low-trust environment (Mishler & Rose, 1997) means that 
respondents have a tendency to be less open towards outsiders, aiming to portray their own 
cultural environment more positively. Consequently, their interview accounts can have a 
positive bias aiming to make themselves, their organisations, culture, relevance for this study, 
their state and government look favourable towards outsiders. To address these limitations the 
researcher aimed to shift his positionality. In this study this was attempted in four ways. First, 
the researcher used Russian in all communications with respondents. Second, the researcher 
emphasised his Russian roots and family heritage. Third, informal chats before and after the 
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interview, sharing personal information, allowed the researcher to build trust and thus limit 
the perception of being an outsider. Fourth, the researcher revisited, whenever possible 
organisations to gather observational data by attending meetings, seminars, or other 
organisational activities. This had the potential to shift the perception of respondents about the 
researchers‟ outsider position and consider the researcher as an insider in particular during the 
informal conversations that took place on such occasions. However, time and resource 
constraints meant that not all organisations could be revisited.  
 
Language is another potential limitation. All qualitative analysis is sensitive to the language 
used (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) but the Russian language is rich in words and full of 
idiomatic expressions which are difficult to capture during the translation process. Therefore, 
the process of translation might have lost some of the contextual issues and riches of the 
language, which would have enriched the dataset. However, to counter such issues the 
researcher consulted bilingual native speakers to assist in translating the meaning of such 
expressions. 
 
8.3.1.2 Future Directions 
Taking into account the limitations of this research project, this section elaborates on future 
research avenues. Five potential avenues are discussed. First, further research should 
„validate‟ the emerging managed civil society arrangements in different regional contexts and 
sectors. Clearly when considering the NGO law, advocacy activities, or aspects of marionette 
behaviour there is a potential that other sectors to health and education might have a different 
experience. Validation of the proposition of a managed civil society in other areas of civil 
society is therefore of paramount importance. This could lead to different themes and insights 
about Russian civil society and further aid our understanding of whether and to what extent 
civil society is managed by the state. Although unlikely given the importance of the Russian 
state, it could be that other sectors rather than displaying evidence of management, signal the 
231 
advent of de Tocqueville‟s „communities of associational life‟. Only with further research, in 
different regions and different sectors will we understand whether managed arrangements 
represent a Russian-style civil society. This avenue of research would also need to engage in 
more quantitative work to establish and examine issues of generalisation.   
 
Second, future research needs to take a more in-depth approach of specific organisations to 
explore how such managed civil society arrangements impact the internal configuration, such 
as governance structures, membership recruitment, or the ability to form social movements. 
Only then can we understand how managed arrangements affect TSOs and their adjustment to 
these institutional factors more specifically. Furthermore, legislative changes take a long time 
to materialise and therefore more longitudinal approaches to study these effects and other 
aspects need to be part of a future research agenda. Such considerations will also enable us to 
gain a more specific insight into the logic that drives some of the isomorphic developments 
outlined in this thesis and whether or not TSOs behave as institutional entrepreneurs 
attempting to shape the isomorphic pressures in alternative ways.  
 
Third, given the importance attributed to comparing civil society in context such as the 
Russian Federation‟s with traditional theoretical understandings (see chapter 2) another 
avenue for future research needs to focus on the comparative exploration of civil society 
across democratising contexts. This will extend our understanding of the concept of civil 
society and enable researchers, rather than to referring to „traditional models‟ versus non-
traditional ones, to understand the communalities across democratising contexts. It will also 
provide new insights and understandings of civil society in both democratising and developed 
democratic contexts. In light of some of the issues faced by developed democracy, such as 
democracy fatigue and a change in associational activities and life (Maloney, 1999; Newton, 
1997; Putnam, 2002; Whiteley, 1999), such comparative studies could potentially provide 
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valuable insights into alternative forms of social capital generation and non-traditional 
arrangements into which civil society might transform. 
 
Fourth, re-conceptualising civil society and making it appropriate to contextual factors also 
offers an additional avenue for political scientists studying various political regimes. Future 
research in the area would provide us with a better understanding of how managed civil 
society arrangements are situated within the bigger picture of macro political governance. 
Specifically combining the managed civil society consideration in this thesis with Hale‟s 
(2010) analysis of hybrid political regimes could provide the researcher with a more 
comprehensive way to understanding the functionalities and roles of various social space in 
such regimes.  
 
Finally, future research also needs to focus on issues of practice and in particular best practice 
of TSOs. Evidently, as indicatively illustrated in this thesis, some organisations, despite being 
„left out‟, „pulled upwards‟, or unable to engage in advocacy are still able to teach citizens 
norms and values (Taylor, 2006) and thus occupy the space between the state and civil society 
(Neace, 1999). Examining the different approaches of organisations and deducing best 
practice for TSOs to engage in this way within managed civil society arrangements would be 
fruitful for both our understanding of Russian civil society and assisting in its development to 
nurture and stimulate democratisation. Overall, these various avenues of future research could 
offer new exciting insight into when and why civil society contributes to building modern 
democratic societies.  
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has set out to examine civil society in Russia. In so doing it has operationalised the 
concepts of civil society, third sector organisations, and social capital. In doing so this chapter 
has investigated the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves 
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in the context of the Russian Federation. Collecting and analysing the data across three 
Russian regions has enabled this thesis to illustrate such arrangements. The thesis highlights 
the 2006 NGO law is an explicated attempt to managed civil society. The thesis also 
demonstrates that there are more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. 
Furthermore, in chapter seven the thesis outlines the increase in marionette-like behaviour 
amongst TSOs which facilitated the management of civil society. This highlights that civil 
society in the Russian Federation does not bridge the gap between society and state, develop 
an autonomous civil society space, and so its influence on the democratisation of political 
governance remains limited.  
 
The thesis illustrated that civil society in Russia does not develop sui generis, but needs to be 
understood as being adapted to the cultural-historic trajectories shaping the social relations at 
the heart of such arrangements. Oldfield (2001), referring to the concept of sustainable 
development, highlights the need to seek a Russian perspective on issues that at their heart 
reflect a western idealised model of development. Managed arrangements have to be seen as 
the adaptation of the construct of civil society to the particularities of the Russian context. 
Managed civil society is not an argument for the death of civil society in Russian per se, but 
rather represents an important addition to the conceptual understanding of civil society. It 
highlights the contextual and path-dependent nature of this theoretical construct. Russian civil 
society outlined in this thesis shows us the exploratory limits of the traditional model outlined 
in chapter two. It also provides additional insights into how civil society arrangements in 
democratising contexts differ to western arrangements. Civil society in Russia illustrates the 
need to understand civil society as a space, which is shaped by its context, rather than 
constituting a driving force for democratisation within that context. Civic engagement is 
possible within structures and forms that are at odds with a traditional understanding of civil 
society. As shown in this thesis meaningful engagement can take place in civil society 
arrangements in which the state plays a prominent and all-encompassing role in defining the 
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boundaries of civil society activity. Conversely, this managed model of civil society is closer 
to the traditional model than it seems, as it emphasises, similar to the new public management 
discourse in the latter, state-civil society cooperation and voluntary civic participation. 
However, the boundaries in which this is possible are more restrictively defined. 
 
Nonetheless, the development of a managed civil society also means that like in many other 
authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes (Kubik, 2005), activities which are antagonistic 
towards the state or which hold the state accountable are less of a focus for TSOs. The strong 
and dependent relationships that dominate civil society offer the state the possibility to use 
these organisations to legitimise its actions. Mirroring Evan‟s (2006b) predictions, this thesis 
illustrates that the state does not completely absorb civil society, as in the Soviet period, but 
that it dominates civil society. From our traditional perspective we know that only when there 
are circumstances that allow TSOs to stay independent of the state will they be able to engage 
in effective advocacy to improve the situation for their respective constituencies. If TSOs fail 
to maintain their independence, it is likely that they will become tentacles of the Russian state 
supporting it for better or for worse. However, after the failure to import western-style civil 
society, the evidence presented suggests that Russian civil society activists are becoming 
increasingly comfortable with the idea of managed civil society arrangements. TSOs yield 
their political rights and potential in exchange for the pledge of the state to provide resources 
and co-operative partnerships. Thus managed arrangements are as much an exchange 
relationship as a directing of civil society by the state. Civil society as a lens to understand 
state-society relations in Russia shows that little has changed since the end of the Soviet 
Union. Despite a process of democratisation, the state and society are just as isolated from 
each other as they were in Rose‟s 1995 hourglass characterisation of Russian society (Rose, 
1995). Today‟s Russian civil society is neither a space for pluralism nor a space for conflict 
and confrontation. It seems that civil society in Russia has partially developed backwards into 
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arrangements where it once again aligns with the interests and priorities of the vertical power 
structures, and as a result, becomes subordinated to and managed by the state. 
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Appendix A: List of participating organisations 
Code 
Date, 
Membership/Staff 
(current) 
Main Objective Region Register 
Org01Sam 1991, 8 S Assisting civil society development and NGOs Samara YES 
Org02Sam 
2001, 1 S 
Helping other NGOs, working with young people on legal initiatives and 
spreading advanced pedagogical technologies. 
Samara YES 
Org03Sam 
2007, 6 S Developing, administering and running charitable programmes  Samara YES 
Org04Sam 2000, 2 S Developing and recruiting volunteers  Samara YES 
Org05Sam 1992 (1918), ca. 
3000 M 
Supporting and activating young people Samara YES 
Org06Sam 
1991, 2 S Working for children with hearing problems and impairments Samara YES 
Org07Sam 2003, ca. 20 M Helping and supporting families with disabled children Samara YES 
Org08Sam 
2000, 3 S 
Providing additional education about the folklore and history of the Russian 
people  
Samara YES 
Org09Sam 
1997 (1993), 3 S  
Promoting the practical application of advanced forms educating children and 
the youth, the education of human rights and legal culture as well as love for the 
nation 
Samara YES 
Org10Sam 
2001, 60 S 
Working with people with drug addiction, HIV/AIDS and the most vulnerable 
groups of society 
Samara YES 
Org11Sam 
2002, 3 S 
Providing additional education of different languages for people from all 
circumstances 
Samara YES 
Org12Sam 2003, 100 M Assisting families that have children with Down Syndrome Samara NO 
Org13Sam 1998, ca. 15 M Promoting orienteering as a sport and a healthy way of life Samara YES 
Org14Sam 1999, 7 S Supporting, assisting and protecting the rights of people with HIV/AIDS Samara YES 
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Org15Sam 
2005 (1988), S 2 Promote the needs of the disabled Samara YES 
Org16Sam 
1998, 23 S 
Integrating the disabled into society, protecting their rights, and providing 
additional help 
Samara YES 
Org17Sam 1985, 5 S Promote a healthy way of life Samara YES 
Org18Sam 2005, ca 4 S Organising Youth exchanges and volunteers Samara YES 
Org19Sam 2007, 3 S Providing help to people with HIV/AIDS Samara YES 
Org20Sam 
1992, 3 S 
Helping and promoting the issues of children by encouraging voluntary activity 
and association and lobbying  
Samara YES 
Org21Sam 
1999, 3 S 
Educating the medical profession about HIV and working on the prevention of 
the spread of HIV infections in vulnerable groups 
Samara YES 
Org22Sam 
1998, 1 S/ca 10 M Advancing the issues of children and fighting corruption in the public services Samara NO 
Org23Sam 
2000, ca. 60 M 
Helping parents with children with autism, promoting the rights of autistic 
children for education and social integration 
Samara NO 
Org24Sam (1924-1933) 
1987, 5 S 
Helping children in difficult life situation, poverty and in children's homes. 
Conducting humanitarian aid for children 
Samara YES 
Org01Per 
1999, 3 M 
Promoting drug awareness, fighting drug addiction, promoting drug 
rehabilitation and providing support to families affected by drug addiction 
Perm NO 
Org02Per 
1868, 12 S 
Providing domestic primary care, organising humanitarian actions and charity 
events 
Perm YES 
Org03Per 
1999, ca 20 S 
Helping the disabled to find work, conducting social projects for the disabled, 
developing commercial activities to fund our projects 
Perm YES 
Org04Per 
1995, 6 S 
Promoting and organising disability sport at the professional level (Paralympics) 
to armature and hoppy level 
Perm YES 
Org05Per 
1938, 38 S 
Promoting the interests (rights/accessibility/social integration) of the blind, 
organising employment and the cultural life for them 
Perm YES 
Org06Per 2006, N.A. Promoting political activity of the youth Perm YES 
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Org07Per 1993, 4 S Promoting the employability of the disabled Perm YES 
Org08Per 
1926, 22 S 
Promoting the interests of the deaf, organising employment, supporting 
education and cultural activities for the deaf 
Perm YES 
Org09Per 
1997, N.A. 
Promoting the interest of the severely movement disabled, supporting and 
promoting the creation of a rehabilitation centre for the severely movement 
disabled 
Perm YES 
Org10Per 
1998, 4 S 
Assisting children in difficult life situations, Empowering Russia‟s Most 
Vulnerable Children and Young People 
Perm NO 
Org11Per 
1992, ca 18 S 
Running the Gulag Museum and promoting the Memory of the political 
repression, Promoting human rights and citizenship education  
Perm YES 
Org12Per 
1998, 4 S 
Promote the memory of political repression, promote human rights and 
citizenship among the youth 
Perm YES 
Org13Per 2000, 60 M Promoting and employing the all disabled Perm YES 
Org14Per 
ca 1997, 70 M 
Helping families with children with autism, promoting the rights of autistic 
children and young people 
Perm NO 
Org15Per 1994, 50 M Supporting families with members dying of cancer in the hospice and domestic Perm YES 
Org16Per 2005, 10 M Ensuring fair elections and educating the public about the electoral process Perm NO 
Org17Per 
1996, 16 S 
Providing legal support to other TSOs. Assisting TSO in their PR and marketing 
campaigns  
Perm YES 
Org18Per 
2005, 9 M 
Promoting housing associations and assisting people in setting up TSOs. 
Teaching people about their rights 
Perm YES 
Org19Per 
2003, 20 M 
Educating people about citizenship and human rights. Engaging school children 
in civic behaviour 
Perm YES 
Org20Per 
1994, 11 S 
Protecting individual and collective rights and assisting citizens in protecting 
their own rights 
Perm YES 
Org21Per 2006, 4 S Providing assistance to people with drug problems Perm YES 
Org22Per 
1998, 3 S 
Supporting social initiatives and implementing social projects, providing 
research service to the state 
Perm YES 
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Org23Per 
1988, ca 15 S Promoting the rights of the disabled, providing social support for the disabled  Perm YES 
Org01Yek 
2003, 5 S 
Working with young mothers, providing psychological pre- and postnatal help. 
Providing family consultation 
Yekaterinburg YES 
Org02Yek ca 2005, 1 S Promoting the rights of people in wheelchairs Yekaterinburg YES 
Org03Yek 1999, 1 S Promoting the rights of people in wheelchairs, promoting an accessible city Yekaterinburg YES 
Org04Yek 
ca 2000, 5 S 
Running and providing a centre for psychological support to families with 
disabled children.  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org05Yek 
2001, 10 S/M 
Promotion if healthy lifestyles and the protection of citizens' health. Improving 
the moral and psychological state of citizens. Strengthening the prestige and the 
role of family in society.  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org06Yek 
2001, ca 5 M 
Promote the integration of people in wheelchairs, improving they technological 
ability of people in wheelchairs 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org07Yek 
2002, ca 30 M 
Promote the integration of the disabled. Establish a inter-cultural centre for the 
disabled 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org08Yek ca 2000, 20 S Running rehabilitation facilities for drug users Yekaterinburg YES 
Org09Yek 
1996, 0 
Promote the rights of the disabled, Encourage the creation of TSOs run by the 
disabled - DISSOLVED 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org10Yek 2000, 7/8 S Improving childcare and the situation of children Yekaterinburg YES 
Org11Yek 1918, 10 S ca 
7000 M 
Promoting the needs of the Blind. Providing employment to the blind. Providing 
cultural life appropriate for blind people 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org12Yek 1998, 1 S Proving Humanitarian Aid to children in children‟s homes.  Yekaterinburg NO 
Org13Yek 
2004, 1 S 
Providing afternoon and out of school programs to children based on martial 
arts 
Yekaterinburg 
NO 
Org14Yek 
2003, 20 M 
Protecting the rights of the disabled. Creating employment for the disabled 
focusing on the environment. Improving the standard of life of the disabled. 
Providing psychological and legal to the disabled. 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
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Org15Yek 1999, 22 S Providing support to people, in particular young mothers with HIV/AIDS Yekaterinburg YES 
Org16Yek 1995, 2 S Organising special Olympics Yekaterinburg YES 
Org17Yek 
2002, 9 M 
Solving problems and educating people to work with children with strong and 
difficult developmental difficulties.  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org18Yek 
2007, 6 M 
Promoting freedom and world peace amongst young people. Encouraging and 
educating young people 
Yekaterinburg 
NO 
Org19Yek 
1992, 32 M 
Promoting and engaging in humanitarian activities. Helping and supporting 
children‟s homes 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org20Yek 
1999, ca 30 M Helping families with disabled children suffering from cancer and onco-
hematological diseases - DISSOLVED 
Yekaterinburg 
NO 
Org21Yek 
1992, 8 S 
Assisting families that have disabled children. Providing rehabilitations and 
integration services to families with disabled children 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org22Yek 1996, 2 M Assisting children with movement impairments Yekaterinburg NO 
Org23Yek 
1998, 3 S 
Education children with hearing impairments. Assisting families with children 
with hearing impairments 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org24Yek 
1999, ca. 10 S 
Representing the interest of students. Organising students and student 
participation 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org25Yek 1992 (1918), ca. 
17 000 M/ ca 25 S 
Supporting and activating young people 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org26Yek 
1988, 5 S Promote the needs of the disabled 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org27Yek 1961, 4 S Providing additional education to children. Running of an after school-club Yekaterinburg YES 
Org28Yek 1998, 1 S Promote family life and work life balance for women Yekaterinburg YES 
Org29Yek 1998, ca. 40 S Rehabilitating drug users using Christian-orthodox values Yekaterinburg YES 
Org30Yek 
2003, ca. 450 M 
Promoting and supporting the rehabilitation of people suffering from multiple-
sclerosis 
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
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Org31Yek 
2004, ca. 3 S 
Promoting the integration of migrants. Supporting and educating the law 
enforcement agencies as well as migrant communities about rights and 
responsibilities  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org32Yek 
2005, ca. 20 S 
Providing employment to the disabled. Promoting and protecting the rights of 
the disabled.  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Org34Yek 
2000, 1 S 
Promoting a healthy life without drugs, alcohol, cigarettes and other addiction. 
Promoting more effective drug treatment. Providing support for drug users and 
influencing social policy to support drug users. Protecting children and 
supporting people with HIV and hepatitis.  
Yekaterinburg 
YES 
Table A.1: List of participating organisations 
S = Staff/M = Members.  
Appendix B: Letter of Access  
Appendix B.1: Letter of access to Russian universities – English 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
      
 
Dear, 
We would like to invite your organisation to participate in a piece of research which is to be conducted by 
members of the Economics and Strategy Group at Aston Business School, Aston University, United 
Kingdom over the coming months.  
The purpose of the research is to investigate non-governmental and grassroots organisations that are active 
within the Russian health and educational sector. As part of my doctoral research, I want to explore the way 
in which these organisations conduct their activities and learn more about how they interact with different 
aspects of their environment.  
What’s involved? 
 
We would like to ask for your assistance in making contact with and negotiating access into non-
governmental and grassroots organisations that are active around issues relating to health and education. 
The research will employ a qualitative methodology and therefore we would hope that a small number of 
senior members of these organisations would be willing to participate in semi-structured interviews which 
will last no longer than one hour. Upon request the interview questions can be made available before hand. 
The project we propose has gained the approval of the Aston Business School Research Ethics Committee. 
All data and information provided by organisations and participants will be anonymous and their responses 
treated with complete confidentiality. Further, we would very much like to meet with local officials of the 
Federal Registration Service who may be able to provide us with registration statistics concerning these 
types of organisations.      
 
The research will be overseen by Dr. Jo Crotty, a Lecturer at Aston Business School. Jo‟s research team, 
whose members include Dr. Peter Rodgers and Sergej Ljubownikow, have extensive research experience in 
Commonwealth of Independent States, China and the UK. In addition Aston Business School has worked 
closely in recent years with a large number of organisations as well as several other academic institutions 
both in the UK and abroad. As a result, we have a strong reputation in both academia and business.  
 
We aim to begin data collection at the beginning of May 2008 for a two month period. Hence, the purpose 
of this letter is to ascertain whether your organisation would, in principle, be interested to participate in the 
research and help us negotiate access into local organisations.  
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A member of the research team will contact you shortly to discuss the project. Alternatively, you can 
contact us directly on 0044-121-204-4986, or e-mail ljubowns@aston.ac.uk. Thank you for your 
consideration, 
Best Wishes, 
 
Sergej Ljubownikow 
 
Doctoral Student 
Aston University 
Aston Business School 
Economics and Strategy Group 
Birmingham, B4 7ET 
United Kingdom 
Tel: 0044 (0)121 204 4986 
Email: ljubowns@aston.ac.uk 
www.aston.ac.uk 
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Appendix B.2: Letter of access to Russian universities – Russian  
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
      
 
 
Уважаемые Господа, 
  
Мы приглашаем Вас для совместной работы в одном из исследовательских проектов, который будет 
проводится в ближайшие месяцы сотрудниками экономической и стратегической группы 
Астонской Бизнесшколы, Астонского Университета в Великобритании. 
 
 Задачей этого проекта являются исследования негосударственных организаций и организаций 
неориентирующихся на экономическую выгоду, активно принимающих участие в вопросах 
здравоохранения и образования.  
 
Как часть моей докторской работы, мне бы хотелось исследовать в каких направлениях эти 
организации работают и ознакомиться с их влиянием на разные аспекты окружающей среды. 
  
 О чем идет речь? 
 
Мы хотели бы Вас попросить помочь нам вступить в контакт с вышеназванными организациями. 
Наши исследования используют качественные методики и мы надеемся, что квалифицированные 
работники этих организаций смогут принять участие в заранее составленных интервью, которые 
длятся около одного часа. При желании, вопросы интервью будут представлены заранее для 
ознакомления. 
 
Проект, который мы Вам предлагаем, одобрен этическим и исследовательским отделами Астонской 
Бизнесшколы. Все данные и информации полученные нами, останутся анонимными и не подлежат 
разглашению. В дальнейшем, мы хотели бы встретиться с представителями местного Федерального 
Бюро Регистрации для получения регистрационной статистики. 
   
Все исследования будут проводиться под наблюдением Др. Джо Кротти, одной из 
преподавательниц Астонской Бизнесшколы. Исследовательская группа вокруг Др. Джо Кротти 
включает в себя вместе с другими сотрудниками, Др. Петера Роджерса и Магистра Сергея 
Любовникова. Эта группа имеет огромный исследовательский опыт в странах Комменвел, Китая и 
Великобритании. Эта школа проводила совместные работы со многими организациями и 
университетами не только в Англии, но и за еѐ пределами. Результатом этих работ является 
значительная репутация в академических и экономических кругах. 
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Мы хотели бы начать сбор информации с начала мая 2008 г. на протяжении двух месяцев. Цель 
нашего письма узнать Ваше мнение по предложенному нами проекту. Хотели бы Вы принять 
участие в нем, оказав нам помощь для вступления в контакт с местными организациями. 
 
Один из участников проекта вступит с Вами в контакт для обсуждения возможностей этого проекта. 
При желании возможна прямая связь по тел.0044 121 204 4986 или по электронному адресу 
ljubowns@aston.ac.uk. 
 
Большое спасибо за оказанное внимание. 
 
С наилучшими пожеланиями 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Аспирант Астонской Бизнесшколы 
                                                                                    Сергей Любовников 
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Appendix C: Consent form 
Appendix C.1: Consent form – English 
 
Third Sector Organisation in the Russian Federation 
I would like to invite you to participate in a piece of research which is to be conducted by a 
member of the Economics and Strategy Group from Aston Business School. The purpose of 
the research is to investigate NGOs and GROs in Russia.  
 
What is involved? 
 
We would like participants to take part in a tape recorded interview that will last no longer 
than one hour. The researcher will be asking ten preset question that can be made available 
before hand upon your request.  
 
Please be aware that participation in this research will have no adverse effects and there are 
no penalties for non-participation. All data will be stored in accordance with the UK Data 
Protection Act (1998) and the confidentiality of your data will be maintained at all times. All 
tape recordings of interviews will be transcribed by the researcher, ensuring that any 
information that may make participants identifiable is anonymised. A small team of subject 
matter experts from within Aston Business School will then assist the researcher in the 
analysis of this data. Please be aware that you have the right to withdraw from the research at 
any time and that there are no adverse consequences for withdrawal.  
 
Your participation will provide data for the PhD thesis of the researcher, Sergej 
Ljubownikow, and anonymous results may be published in academic journals. Therefore, 
your participation in this research would be greatly appreciated and will form a valuable 
contribution towards improving our understanding about NGOs and GROs in Russia. If you 
are happy to participate, please complete the attached consent form before the interview. 
 
Any further questions, please do not hesitate to e-mail Sergej at ljubowns@aston.ac.uk or 
telephone 0044 (0) 121 204 4986 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
 
 
Sergej Ljubownikow 
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Consent Form 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
In relation to the „NGOs and GROs in Russia‟ study, I have been fully informed, in writing, 
about the purpose of the study and exactly what is required in order to participate. I have read 
and fully understood the covering sheet to this consent form and agree to participate in a tape-
recorded interview. 
 
 
Named Researcher  
 
Sergej Ljubownikow, 
Doctoral Researcher, 
Economics and Strategy Group, 
Room SW713 
Aston Business School, 
ljubowns@aston.ac.uk 
Tel: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
 
Full Name (in 
Print): 
 
 
 
Name of 
Organisation: 
 
 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research 
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Appendix C.2: Consent form – Russian  
 
Негосударственные Некомерциальные Организаций и 
Организаций Неориентирующихся на Экономическую Выгоду 
в России 
 
Дорогие Участники, 
 
Я хочу пригласить Вас принять участие в исследований, которое проводится 
сотрудником экономической и стратегической группы Астонской Бизнесшколы с 
Самарским Государственным Университетом. Цель этого исследования является 
изучение негосударственных некомерциальных организаций и организаций 
неориентирующихся на экономическую выгоду в России. 
 
О чем идѐт речь? 
 
Мы приглашаем Вас принять участие в интервью, который будет записан и не длится 
больше часа. Ведущий интервью задаст Вам 10 вопросов, с которыми Вы можете 
заранее ознакомиться, если Вы желаете. 
 
Участие в этом интервью для Вас абсолютно безопасно и Вы так-же можете отказаться 
от участие в интервью.Все данные собранние в результате интервью будут храниться в 
соответствий с законодательством о защите частных дат (закон 1998 г.). Вес на плѐнке 
записанный интервью будет писменно переведен ведущим интервью. Он несет 
ответственность что-бы никто из участников интервью не мог быть идентифицирован. 
 
Группа сотрудников Астонской Бизнесшколы занимающися изучением проэктом 
окажут помощь ведущему интервью в анализе собранного материала.  
Примийте во внимание, что Вы можете в любое время отказаться от дальнейшего 
участие в этом проекте, без всяких для вас ослажнений. 
 
Мы гарантируем полную анонимность Вашей совместной с нами работы. Результаты 
этого исследования не будут предоставлены для пользования другими организациями. 
 
Эта совместная работа даст основу для моей докторской работы и результаты этой 
работы могут быть опубликованы в академических изданиях. Поэтому Ваше участие в 
этом проекте окозало бы мне большую помощь и расширила-бы наше понимание о 
существующих НКО в России. 
 
Если Вы хотите принять участие в этой работе, заполните пожалуйста до интервью 
прилагаемое подтверждение вашего участие. 
 
Если у Вас возникнут вопросы, Вы можете написать мне e-mail:  ljubowns@aston.ac.uk  
или позвонить по телефону: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986  
 
 
С наилучшеми пожеланиями 
 
Сергей Любовников 
274 
 
 
 
 
Подтверждение о принятие участия в интервью 
 
Я писменно информирован/а о целях исследования «Негосударственные 
некомерциальные организаций и организаций неориентирующихся на экономическую 
выгоду в России» и ознакомлен/а с вопросами которые будут исследоваться. Я 
прочитал/а и понял/а предлагаемое письмо и согласен/согласна принять участие в 
записаном интервью. 
 
Ведущий интервью 
Sergej Ljubownikow 
Doctoral Researcher 
Economics and Strategy Group 
Room SW713 
Aston Business School 
ljubowns@aston.ac.uk 
Tel.: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986 
 
 
 
Подпись: 
 
 
 
Ф.И.О.: 
(печатнами буквами) 
 
 
Название организаций: 
 
 
 
Число: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Спасибо за Ваше участие в интервью 
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Appendix D: Interview protocol 
Interview Questions: 
Background 
1. Can you tell me about the development of your organisation? 
How was it founded, what was the motivation to create it, what was its purpose, what 
were some of your original projects/activities? 
2. How has the working environment changed over the last 5 years? 
3. How do you recruit new members into your organisation? 
 Are you successful? 
 How many people do you have now versus five years ago? 
4. What projects is your organisation currently involved in? 
 List the most important ones and describe each of them. 
5. Why do you conduct these projects? 
6. How do you go about conducting your projects? 
 How do you plan them? 
 How do you execute them? 
 How successful/unsuccessful have they been? 
7. What factors impact/limit your work on these projects? 
8. How do you finance yourself? 
9. Are you engaged in advocacy or rights protection activity? 
 What do you do in this line of work? 
 How effective do you think your work is? 
 
State-substitution 
10. Do you work with partners on any of your projects? 
Who are these organisations? (Are they state organisations, Are they pseudo state 
organisations?) 
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11. Do you know how your partners fund themselves? 
12. Why do you interact these particular organisations? 
13. How does your collaboration work?  
 How do you divide up responsibility?  
Why do you do so in this way? 
 What works, what does not? 
 What is good, what is bad? 
14. Have any of these projects or activities been previously performed by the state? 
 Which ones?  
15. Does the state or state institutions/structures conduct projects or activities similar to 
yours? 
16. Are there other organisations which do the same/similar activities? 
17. How did you form your partnership with these state organisations?  
 
NGO-legislation 
18. Are you aware of the legislative changes of 2006 regarding non-commercial 
organisations? 
 What about your partners, are they aware? 
19. How has the new legislation impacted your organisation? 
 Its resources, funding, membership? 
 Activities and projects you undertake? 
 Impacts on a day-to-day basis? 
20. What do you think about the NGO law? 
 What will happen to your organisation? 
 Is it good or bad? 
 Who do you think profits from the law? 
 How will affect civil society? 
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Marionettes 
21. What do you think of civil society in your region? 
22. Do you know of any NGOs that have been created by the state? 
 Why did they come about? 
 What impact do you think they will have? 
 Do you work with any of these organisations, How and Why? 
23. Do you participate in the local Public Chamber? 
 Why do you participate?  
How did you become part of it? 
What impacts does it have on your organisations and its activities? 
 
24. How will your work be affect by the planned reforms on education/health? 
25. Do you have any statistics or information about your organisations that you could give 
me? 
26. Do you know anyone else I could talk too? 
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Appendix E: List of Respondents by Region 
Appendix E.1: Respondents Samara 
 Gender  Organisation Category Field of Activity 
Respondent 1 Female Org01Sam Director Other 
Respondent 2 Female Org02Sam Director Education 
Respondent 3 Female Org03Sam Director Other 
Respondent 4 Female Org04Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 5 Male Org05Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 6 Female Org06Sam Director Health 
Respondent 7 Female Org07Sam Director Health 
Respondent 8 Male Org08Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 9 Male Org09Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 10 Male Org10Sam Director Health 
Respondent 11 Female Org11Sam Director Education 
Respondent 12 Female Org12Sam Leader Health 
Respondent 13 Female Org14Sam Leader Health 
Respondent 14 Female Org15Sam Director  Health 
Respondent 15 Male Org16Sam Director Health 
Respondent 16 Male Org17Sam 
Deputy 
Director 
Health 
Respondent 17 Female Org18Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 18 Female Org19Sam Leader Health 
Respondent 19 Female Org20Sam Leader Education 
Respondent 20 Male Org21Sam Director Health 
Respondent 21 Female Org22Sam Leader Education/Rights 
Respondent 22 Male Org23Sam Leader Health 
Respondent 23 Female Org24Sam Director Health 
Respondent 24 Male Org14Sam Leader Health 
Table E.2: Respondents Samara 
All but “Project April”, “AIDS NGO Chapaevsk” and “Impulse” are located in Samara City. 
“Project April” is located in Tolyatti. “AIDS NGO Chapaevsk” and “Impulse” are located in 
Chapaevsk.  
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Appendix E.2: Respondents Perm 
 Gender  Organisation Category Field of Activity 
Respondent 25 Female Org01Per 
Founder/L
eader 
Health 
Respondent 26 Male Org02Per Director Health 
Respondent 27 Female Org03Per 
Deputy 
Director 
Health 
Respondent 28 Male Org04Per Director Health 
Respondent 29  Male Org05Per Director Health 
Respondent 30 Female Org06Per 
Assistant 
to Director 
Education 
Respondent 31 Male Org07Per Director Health 
Respondent 32 Female Org08Per Director  Health 
Respondent 33 Female Org09Per Leader Health 
Respondent 34 Female  Org10Per 
Co-
Director 
Health/Education 
Respondent 35 Male Org11Per Director Education 
Respondent 36 Female Org11Per 
Deputy 
Director 
Education 
Respondent 37 Male Org12Per Leader Education/Rights 
Respondent 38 Female Org13Per 
Founder/D
irector 
Health 
Respondent 39 Female Org14Per 
Founder/L
eader 
Health 
Respondent 40 Female Org15Per Director Health 
Respondent 41 Male Org16Per Leader Education/Rights 
Respondent 42 Male Org17Per Director Other/Rights 
Respondent 43 Male Org18Per Leader Other/Rights 
Respondent 44 Male Org19Per Director Education/Rights 
Respondent 45 Male Org20Per Director Other/Rights 
Respondent 46 Male Org21Per Director Health 
Respondent 47 Male Org17Per Director Education/Other 
Respondent 48 Female Org23Per Director Health 
Respondent 83 Male GovOrg01Per 
Liaison 
Officer 
Health/Education/
Other 
Table E.3: Respondents Perm 
All organisations are located in the city of Perm. 
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Appendix E.3: Respondents Yekaterinburg 
 Gender  Organisation Category Field of Activity 
Respondent 49 Female Org01Yek Director Health 
Respondent 50 Male Org02Yek Director Health 
Respondent 51 Female Org03Yek Director Health 
Respondent 52 Female Org04Yek Director Health 
Respondent 53 Female Org05Yek Director Health 
Respondent 54 Male Org06Yek Director Health 
Respondent 55 Female Org07Yek Director Health 
Respondent 56 Male Org08Yek Director  Health 
Respondent 57 Male Org09Yek Director Health 
Respondent 58 Female  Org09Yek 
Co-
Director 
Health 
Respondent 59 Female Org10Yek 
Marketing 
Director 
Education/Health 
Respondent 60 Male Org11Yek Director Health 
Respondent 61 Female Org12Yek Leader Education 
Respondent 62 Male  Org13Yek Leader Education 
Respondent 63 Male Org14Yek 
Founder/L
eader 
Health 
Respondent 64 Female Org15Yek Director Health 
Respondent 65 Female  Org16Yek Director Health 
Respondent 66 Female Org17Yek Director Health 
Respondent 67 Male Org18Yek Leader Education 
Respondent 68 Male Org19Yek Director Education/Other 
Respondent 69 Female Org20Yek Director Health 
Respondent 70 Female Org21Yek Director Health 
Respondent 71 Male Org22Yek  Director Health 
Respondent 72 Female Org23Yek Director Health 
Respondent 73 Female Org24Yek 
Divisional 
Director 
Education 
Respondent 74 Female Org25Yek Director Education 
Respondent 75 Male Org26Yek Director Health 
Respondent 76 Female Org27Yek Leader Education 
Respondent 77 Female Org28Yek Leader Education/Health 
Respondent 78 Female Org29Yek Leader Health 
Respondent 79 Male Org30Yek Leader Health 
Respondent 80 Female Org31Yek Director Education/Rights 
Respondent 81 Female Org32Yek Director Health 
Respondent 82 Male Org34Yek Director Health 
Table E.4: Respondents Yekaterinburg 
All but “Blagoe Delo” and “Development” are located in the city of Yekaterinburg. “Blagoe 
Delo” is located in the village of Verkh-Neivinskiy and “Development” in the city of 
Pervouralsk. 
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Appendix F: Coding scheme and chapter structure 
Appendix F1: Codes and coding hierarchy after 20 coded interviews 
Themes Categories Codes  
Legislative Change 
NGO Law 
Perceived Effect 
Public Chamber 
Registration 
Reporting Requirements 
Tax 
Funding Lack of Funding 
TSOs as service providers 
Activities 
 
Limits and Problems of 
Activities 
Rights Protection and 
Advocacy Activities 
Outcomes 
Funding  
Russian Private and Business 
Other Russian 
Foreign 
Interaction 
Relationships with 
authorities 
Relationships with NGOs 
Cooperation with NGOs 
Cooperation with the state 
Role of Marionette 
organisation 
Interaction 
Personal connections with 
authorities 
History of organisation 
Constituency  
Motivation for foundation 
Personal information about 
Interviewee 
Organisational information 
Funding Sources 
Ability to receive funding 
from domestic non-state 
sources 
Ability to receive funding 
from domestic state sources 
Portrayal of civil society 
Understanding of the 
relationship between the 
state and TSOs 
Table F.5: Coding scheme after coding 20 interviews 
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Appendix F.2: Coding scheme and structure chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure F.1: Coding scheme and structure chapter 5 
  
Legislative 
Change
Preceived effects 
on civil society
Law abidding 
citizens
Understanding 
civil society
Opinion about 
current situation
Understanding of 
what civil society 
should be
Prospects for civil 
society 
development
Law as 
professionalising
Accountability 
and 
Transparency
Improving TSOs
Dealing with 
lack of funding
Law as 
bureaucratising
Annual reporting 
requirements
Problems and 
difficulties with 
the authorities
Actual effects No effect
Impact on 
activities
The effect of the 
NGO law on 
civil society
Change in state-
TSO relations
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Appendix F.3: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 6 
 
 
Figure F.2: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 6 
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providers
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Appendix F.4: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 7 
 
 
Figure F.3: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 7 
 
 
Role of marionettes
State sponsorhsip
Non-financial 
sponsorship
Access to budget 
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Ability to receive 
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Ability to receive 
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Appendix G: TSOs mimicking marionettes  
Appendix G.1: TSOs not displaying marionette characteristics  
 
 
Organisational 
Code 
Registered  
Date, 
Membership/Staff 
(current) 
Org11Sam YES 2002, 3 S 
Org12Sam NO 2003, 100 M 
Org14Sam YES 1999, 7 S 
Org22Sam NO 1998, 1 S/ca 10 M 
Org07Per YES 1993, 4 S 
Org09Per YES 1997, N.A. 
Org10Per NO 1998, 4 S 
Org13Per YES 2000, 60 M 
Org16Per NO 2005, 10 M 
Org02Yek YES ca 2005, 1 S 
Org06Yek YES 2001, ca 5 M 
Org07Yek YES 2002, ca 30 M 
Org09Yek NO 1996, 0 
Org14Yek YES 2003, 20 M 
Org17Yek YES 2002, 9 M 
Table G.6: TSOs not displaying marionette organisations 
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Appendix G.2: TSOs displaying marionette characteristics  
Organisational 
Code 
Registered  
Date, 
Membership/Staff 
(current) 
Org21Yek YES 1992, 8 S 
Org24Yek YES 1999, ca. 10 S 
Org25Yek YES 1992 (1918), 17 000 M 
Org26Yek YES 1988, 5 S 
Org27Yek YES 1961, 4 S 
Org28Yek YES 1998, 1 S 
Org29Yek YES 1998, ca. 40 S 
Org30Yek YES 2003, ca. 450 M 
Org32Yek YES 2005, ca. 20 S 
Org15Yek YES 1999, 22 S 
Org16Yek YES 1995, 2 S 
Org10Yek YES 2000, 7/8 S 
Org11Yek YES 1918, 10 S ca 7000 M 
Org12Yek NO 1998, 1 S 
Org03Yek YES 1999, 1 S 
Org04Yek YES ca 2000, 5 S 
Org01Yek YES 2003, 5 S 
Org21Per YES 2006, 4 S 
Org22Per YES 1998, 3 S 
Org23Per YES 1988, ca 15 S 
Org14Per NO ca 1997, 70 M 
Org15Per YES 1994, 50 M 
Org11Per YES 1992, ca 18 S 
Org12Per YES 1998, 4 S 
Org08Per YES 1926, 22 S 
Org02Per YES 1868, 12 S 
Org03Per YES 1999, ca 20 S 
Org04Per YES 1995, 6 S 
Org05Per YES 1938, 38 S 
Org06Per YES 2006, N.A. 
Org24Sam YES (1924-1933) 1987, 5 S 
Org20Sam YES 1992, 3 S 
Org21Sam YES 1999, 3 S 
Org15Sam YES 2005 (1988), S 2 
Org16Sam YES 1998, 23 S 
Org17Sam YES 1985, 5 S 
Org01Sam YES 1991, 8 S 
Org02Sam YES 2001, 1 S 
Org03Sam YES 2007, 6 S 
Org04Sam YES 2000, 2 S 
Org05Sam YES 1992 (1918), 3000 M 
Org06Sam YES 1991, 2 S 
Org07Sam YES 2003, ca. 20 M 
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Org08Sam YES 2000, 3 S 
Org10Sam YES 2001, 60 S 
Table G.7: TSOs displaying marionette characteristics 
